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 Abstract 
The human being is commonly considered as being the weakest link in information security. 
Subsequently, as information is one of the most critical assets in an organization today, it is 
essential that the human element is considered in deployments of information security 
countermeasures. However, the human element is often neglected in this regard. 
Consequently, many criminals are now targeting the user directly to obtain sensitive 
information instead of spending days or even months trying to hack through systems. Some 
criminals are targeting users by utilizing various social engineering techniques to deceive the 
user into disclosing information. For this reason, the users of the Internet and ICT-related 
technologies are nowadays very vulnerable to various social engineering attacks. 
As a contribution to increase users’ social engineering awareness, a model – called SERUM – 
was devised. SERUM aims to cultivate social engineering resistance within a community 
through exposing the users of the community to ‘fake’ social engineering attacks. The users 
that react incorrectly to these attacks are instantly notified and requested to participate in an 
online social engineering awareness program. Thus, users are educated on-demand. 
The model was implemented as a software system and was utilized to conduct a phishing 
exercise on all the students of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. The aim of the 
phishing exercise was to determine whether SERUM is effective in cultivating social 
engineering resistant behaviour within a community. 
This phishing exercise proved to be successful and positive results emanated. This indicated 
that a model like SERUM can indeed be used to educate users regarding phishing attacks.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Orientation and Background 
The objective of this section is to give the reader an overview of what this research report is 
all about; how this chapter is structured, as well as some background information that is 
required to understand the field of the study addressed in this dissertation, namely: social 
engineering. 
1.1.1 Orientation 
“Social engineering is commonly used to manipulate people, by deception, into giving out 
information or performing an action” (Mann, 2008). Speaking at the Gartner information 
security conference, analyst Rich Mogull claimed that social engineering is the single greatest 
threat to enterprise security in the decade ahead (Kotadia, 2004). However, if the users of the 
Internet and ICT-related services learn how to safeguard themselves from falling prey to 
these socially malicious attacks, many of the risks associated with social engineering could be 
mitigated. This study, therefore, proposes a contribution – in the form of a model – for 
cultivating social engineering resistance within a community.  
The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows: Section 1.1 (Orientation and 
Background) provides a brief background of what information security is and why 
organizations implement information security. Subsequently, section 1.2 (Research Problem) 
gives a background to social engineering and discusses the problems associated with social 
engineering. Section 1.3 (Research Question) disseminates the problem into some relevant 
research questions. Section 1.4 (Research Objectives), discusses how these questions were 
addressed; and eventually, it addresses the research objectives, as set out.  
Following the research objectives, section 1.5 (Research Methodology and Process) discusses 
how the research was conducted. Section 1.6 (Assumptions) discusses speculations the 
researcher had about the study. Since the study concerns people, section 1.7 (Ethical 
Considerations) discusses ethical issues that needed to be taken into account.  
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An overview of the following chapters is provided in section 1.8 (Chapter Overview). 
Finally, a conclusion to this chapter is provided in section 1.9.  
1.1.2 Background 
As information technology has become generally available and more affordable, the number 
of organizations that implement this technology has increased considerably in recent years 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008). This has opened up opportunities for many organizations, such 
as allowing their employees to do most of their business online (Ciampa, 2005). As a result, 
most employees are currently information-workers (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
Some employees work with information that is very important and sensitive to their 
organization (Mann, 2008). This sensitive information can include: credit card information, 
source code for a software program, or even a password for entering the system of an 
organization, and suchlike (Peikari & Chuvakin, 2004). Indeed, there are many threats that 
seek to compromise this kind of sensitive information (Sophos, 2009). However, if such a 
threat succeeds, the organization’s public image can be seriously harmed; and in some cases, 
the organization can even come to a standstill (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
This could seriously harm the wellbeing of the organization. Consequently, information has 
become one of the most valuable assets in any organization (Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  
To protect their sensitive information, many organizations have attempted to ensure that their 
organizations follow standards and best practices, such as ISO27002, King and COBIT – as 
far as possible (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). These standards and best practices 
advocate various methods and measures to keep their confidential information secure. 
However, it is frequently assumed that simple technical solutions, such as firewalls and virus-
scanners are adequate for keeping information secure (Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  
Although such measures can control access and keep information protected to some extent, it 
is often overlooked that these measures are used by people (Mann, 2008); and people are 
correctly dubbed as being the weakest link, when it comes to security in an organization 
(Mitnick, Simon, & Wozniak, 2003). There are several historical events that support this 
statement. One example is the Great Wall of China; which was built to keep the enemy out. 
The wall seemed impregnable. However, one of their enemies, the Manchus, breached it – 
but not by using force to break it down. Instead, they simply bribed the gatekeeper, who was 
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supposedly guarding the wall. Consequently, when the Manchus decided to make their final 
move on China in 1644, they were let through the wall by a disaffected Chinese general 
(Lovell, 2007). 
Thus, it is important that information should be protected. However, since most employees 
work with information today, and since the employees are the weakest link in information 
security (Mitnick et al., 2003), they are also the main targets when sensitive information is 
sought by an attacker (Mann, 2008). The next section will discuss this problem in more 
detail. 
1.2 Research Problem 
The previous section concluded that people are usually the weakest link in information 
security; and they are therefore, often the primary target in an attack. This section elaborates 
on this ‘problem’ further.  
1.2.1 Problem Background 
During the 1960s, a man named Frank Abagnale, discovered that by using social techniques 
he could physically deceive employees working at a bank to approve his requests. By using 
this deceptive ‘face-to-face’ approach, Abagnale managed to successfully steal millions of 
US dollars (Abagnale & Redding, 1980).  
Likewise, in a similar approach, about 20 years later, a man named Stanley Rifkin used a 
phone to deceive employees working at Security Pacific National Bank into wiring 10.2 
million US Dollars into his account in Switzerland. At this time, this was the largest bank 
robbery in the history of the United States (Mitnick et al., 2003). These men both mastered 
the art that is now referred to as ‘social engineering’.  
As cited in section 1.1.1, “[S]ocial engineering is commonly used to manipulate people, by 
deception, into giving out information or performing an action” (Mann, 2008). In this new 
age of information technology, social engineers have found a number of new means whereby 
they can exploit their victims. Email, for example, has opened up many opportunities, which 
allow criminals to ‘fish’, or ‘phish’, for sensitive information.  
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Phishing typically involves an attacker sending email messages, which claim to be from a 
legitimate company – usually a financial institution. The user, presented with a message, is 
requested to perform some action, such as updating credentials or verifying his/her identity, 
by clicking on a link in the message. However, when accessing the link, the user is then 
redirected to a fake website. This fake website looks as authentic as the company’s actual 
website; but, it is designed to elicit personal information from the user, which is then sent to 
the attacker instead of to the user’s company (Aburrous, Hossain, Keshav, & Fadi, 2010).  
Phishing attacks have evolved rapidly in recent times. In early February 2010, Sapa (2010) 
published an article citing SABRIC CEO, Kalyani Pillay, stating that: "Banking industry data 
managed by SABRIC show that the number of 'phishing' websites targeting local bank clients 
that have been detected and shut by the banks have more than trebled in the last four 
months".  
However, phishing, or other email-based social engineering attacks, are not only used to 
target bank clients. Since most employees nowadays are information-workers, they are also 
extremely vulnerable targets.  
For instance, in a social engineering assessment conducted by Redspin (2009), it was 
discovered that 94 percent of over one hundred companies, had at least one employee who 
failed their email test – by supplying information that would seriously compromise their 
organization.  
One employee is “one too many”, as it only takes one employee to open up a ‘bridge’ 
between a criminal and the system of the organization (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). 
However, most employees have no intention of harming their organizations. Most employees 
are simply unaware of these attacks, since they lack the necessary training (Mann, 2008).  
According to Denning (1999), the attacks performed by a social engineer can be categorized 
according to the medium used. Consequently, from the examples used in this section, it may 
be concluded that these mediums will include the following means of communication: face-
to-face, a phone, or email (Denning, 1999). Thus, it may be concluded that many employees 
are particularly vulnerable to various social engineering attacks, since they are unaware of 
these attacks.  
This ‘unawareness’ of social engineering attacks puts the organization at considerable risk. 
The next sub-section states this problem concisely. 
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1.2.2 Problem Statement 
The previous sub-section discussed and rationalised the research problem; and it was 
concluded that organizations are at risk, since their employees are unaware of modern social 
engineering related risks. Therefore, the Problem Statement for this dissertation was set as 
follows: 
 
Organizations are put at risk, because information-workers are highly vulnerable to social 
engineering attacks. 
 
Following the background and problem statement, the next section will now discuss the 
research questions for this study. 
1.3 Research Question 
The previous section discussed the research problem. It concluded that most employees are 
vulnerable to various social engineering attacks, since they are unaware of them. Therefore, it 
was assumed that employees could be more resistant, and would not be as likely to 
compromise sensitive information, if they were more aware of the threats associated with 
social engineering. Consequently, a model for cultivating a social engineering resistant 
community was proposed as being a possible remedy to this problem. Through this study, the 
researcher, therefore, has aimed to answer the following primary research question: 
 
How can a social engineering resistant community decrease the risks associated with social 
engineering attacks? 
 
The primary research question was divided into the following sub-research questions. 
 
 What are the factors that make users vulnerable to social engineering? 
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 What are the countermeasures that could mitigate these factors? 
 How can these countermeasures be incorporated into a model that would lead to social 
engineering resistant behaviour? 
 
Following the discussion of the Research Questions, the Research Objectives section 
discusses how the researcher aimed to address the Research Questions in this study. 
1.4 Research Objective 
The previous section queried, as a primary question, how a social engineering resistant 
community can decrease the risks associated with social engineering attacks. This question 
was then differentiated into a number of sub-research questions. This section proposes how 
these questions should be addressed, by discussing the objective of this study.  
The primary objective of this study was to contribute information towards a social 
engineering resistant community – by proposing a contributing solution – in the form of a 
model to assist communities in cultivating social engineering resistant behaviour. 
Information regarding how the primary objective was met can be found in Chapter 7 section 
7.3. The next section will discuss the research methodology and process followed throughout 
this study. 
1.5 Research Methodology and Process 
To meet the research objective, a particular methodology and process were followed. Thus, 
this section’s purpose is to discuss how this research was conducted, by briefly discussing the 
process and methodology followed throughout this research study.  
This research study started with a literature survey, which included studying scientific 
journals, books, theses, and technical reports in the field of information security, social 
engineering and phishing. This literature survey led on to a more specific literature study 
regarding psychology, human behaviour and deception.  
  
7 
 
The purpose of the literature survey was to gather the necessary background regarding all 
the concepts considered essential – in order to meet the research objectives and, 
consequently, design a model to address the problem situation.  
To verify the concepts of the model, a software implementation of the model was 
developed. The software implementation was evaluated by a focus group consisting of ten 
information security experts.  
In order to answer the research question (i.e. how a social engineering resistant community 
can decrease the risks associated with social engineering attacks), a more realistic type of 
evaluation was needed. As a result, all the students – 25 579 – of the Nelson Mandel 
Metropolitan University in South Africa were chosen as the target group to be exposed to the 
software implementation. The purpose of this ‘exercise’ was to verify whether the software 
implementation, based on the model, could assist a particular community in cultivating social 
engineering resistant behaviour to emails (phishing). Consequently, this answered the 
research question. 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the sub-questions of the research, as well as their related 
methods and sub-objectives. The following section discusses some assumptions of this study. 
 
Sub-research Question Research Method Sub-research Objective 
What are the factors involved 
that makes users vulnerable to 
social engineering? 
 
Literature Survey. Conduct a Literature Survey to 
determine why users are susceptible 
to social engineering. 
What are the countermeasures that 
can mitigate these factors? 
Literature Survey. Identify the most essential 
countermeasures that can help with 
addressing social engineering. 
How can these countermeasures be 
incorporated into a model that 
leads to social engineering resistant 
behaviour? 
Literature Survey, Modelling, 
Expert Review, Software 
Implementation, Exercise. 
Explore how the countermeasures 
involved with addressing social 
engineering can be developed into a 
model and a Software 
Implementation – in order to provide 
verification of the concepts. 
Table 1.1: Sub-research Questions/Methodology/Objectives summary 
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1.6 Assumptions 
The research methodology and process followed in this study was discussed in the previous 
section. The intention here is to present some assumptions the researcher had about the 
community. 
Firstly, it was assumed that most users within a particular community knew how to handle a 
computer and use email. Secondly, it was assumed that the required technology and policies 
regarding protecting information were already being implemented within the community. 
Finally, it was assumed that all the computers within the community were free from viruses, 
spyware, and suchlike. The next section discusses the ethical considerations relevant to this 
study. 
1.7 Ethical Considerations 
When a study concerns people, there may be some ethical issues that need to be considered. 
Since this research involved an experimental study on human behaviour, this research 
required ethical clearance from the university authorities. The proposal of this study was 
submitted and reviewed by the Faculty RTI Committee (FRTI), for ethical clearance; and 
subsequently, it was referred to the Research Ethics Committee (Human) (REC-H) of the 
university for approval. Consequently, ethical clearance was obtained for conducting the 
formal exercise.  
1.8 Chapter Overview 
This section presents an overview of the following chapters in this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2: Information Security Today 
The aim of this chapter is to acquire some understanding regarding why it is important to 
keep information protected and why this could be a tedious task. This leads on to a 
conclusion that the human being is, generally, the weakest link in information security. 
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Chapter 3: Exploiting Human Behaviour by means of Social Engineering 
To mitigate the weakest link in information security (the human being), it is important to 
understand how human behaviour can be exploited via social engineering. Therefore, this 
chapter explains why users are vulnerable to social engineering; and it identifies the factors 
that make them vulnerable. Furthermore, some techniques a social engineer can use are 
identified. As discussed in section 1.2.1, one such technique involves phishing. 
 
Chapter 4: Phishing 
A brief literature survey on phishing attacks is provided in this chapter. The chapter identifies 
what phishing is, and how one can identify phishing attacks. Additionally, some commonly 
known solutions for mitigating phishing attacks are identified. 
 
Chapter 5: Developing a Social Engineering Resistant User Model 
The focus in this chapter is on how to deal with the social engineer. The chapter identifies the 
main countermeasures that are involved with addressing social engineering, and how these 
can be incorporated into a model that leads a user into cultivating social engineering resistant 
behaviour. This model is then developed into a software implementation format and 
evaluated by a group consisting of ten information security experts. The software 
implementation is then used to conduct the exercise. 
 
Chapter 6: The SERUM Exercise 
This chapter identifies how one can successfully run an exercise based on the model. 
Additionally, the exercise is conducted. The results of the exercise are then analysed and used 
to answer the research questions and confirm whether the proposed model can indeed 
cultivate social engineering resistant behaviour.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes this research. First of all, there is a précis, highlighting the most 
important aspects of this research project. Subsequently, there is a discussion regarding how 
the research objectives were met and in what way the exercise in this study was different 
from related exercises. Further, some future research ideas are proposed and an epilogue is 
provided. 
1.9 Conclusion 
All users are highly vulnerable to social engineering attacks. This chapter has suggested a 
contribution towards producing a social engineering resistant community, by proposing a 
solution for mitigating social engineering attacks. This solution consisted of a model for 
cultivating social engineering resistance within a community. The model involves evaluating 
and improving users’ resistance to social engineering, by exposing them to such attacks. The 
model is described in Chapter 5.  
However, in order to understand all the concepts of the model, some background regarding 
information security, social engineering and phishing is necessary. Subsequently, the next 
chapter will provide a literature survey on information security today. 
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Chapter 2: Information Security Today 
2.1 Introduction 
Information has become the ‘lifeblood’ of organizations today (S. H. Von Solms & Von 
Solms, 2008). Therefore, information is one of the most valuable assets the organization can 
possess (Ernst & Young, 2009). Consequently, information needs protection (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2008).  
A breach in an organization´s information system, resulting in disclosure of sensitive 
information, could have far-reaching consequences for the organization, including disruption 
of services, damage to their public image, or even bringing the organization to a complete 
standstill (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). To mitigate the risk of sensitive 
information being disclosed, the discipline of ‘information security’ has been developed 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  
If an organization adheres to the principles of this discipline, the risk of a security breach may 
be reduced significantly (Bidgoli, 2006; Stavroulakis & Stamp, 2010; S. H. Von Solms & 
Von Solms, 2008; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a literature review of some aspects related to the 
importance of information and the protection thereof, including how information security is 
commonly implemented and utilised in organizations today. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Firstly, a discussion on why 
information is important in organizations today is provided. Secondly, the nature of and 
different types of threats to information are discussed. Finally, a discussion on what 
information security is, how this discipline can protect information from threats, and what 
should be considered when practising information security in an organization today will 
follow.  
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2.2 The Importance of Information in Organizations Today 
The information age has completely changed the way organizations conduct business 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Today, an organization’s business rival may not be its nearest 
neighbour. These days, an organization could have a rival in business residing in another 
town, or even in another country (O’Brien & Robertson, 2009). Therefore, the geographical 
location of where business is conducted has become less relevant (O’Brien & Robertson, 
2009).  
Since the geographical locations of businesses have become less relevant, most organizations 
have more competitors today (O’Brien & Robertson, 2009). For this reason, it has become 
harder to provide a competitive advantage over others in the industry (O’Brien & Robertson, 
2009). Consequently, it is important that an organization should create a globally competitive 
advantage over its rivals.  
To gain or maintain a globally competitive advantage, it is important that the right strategic 
decisions are made (Choo, 1996). Today, many of these decisions are based on information 
(E. Calvasina, Ramaswamy, Calvasina, & Calvasina, 2006).  
Information allows the organization to make the right decisions in business (E. Calvasina et 
al., 2006). For this reason, most business processes have become dependent on information. 
Consequently, information has become one of the most valuable assets within the 
organization (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
As one of the most valuable assets within the organization, information plays a huge role in 
providing a globally competitive advantage over others in the industry (E. Calvasina et al., 
2006). Therefore, it is important that information on strategic decisions is not disclosed to 
competitors, as well as being correct and available when required (Doll, Rai, & Granado, 
2003).  
If information on strategic decisions is disclosed to the competitors, or is incorrect or not 
available when requested, the organization could easily lose its competitive advantage 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Consequently, the organizations must ensure that the value of 
the information remains intact (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). This depends on the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of the information (S. H. Von Solms & Von 
Solms, 2008). Therefore, to ensure that the value of the information remains intact, the 
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organization must ensure the CIA of the information. In brief, confidentiality ensures that 
only those with authorized access can view the information; integrity ensures that the 
information is correct; while availability ensures that the information is available when 
needed (NSTISSC, 1994). However, the CIA of the information is continuously being 
assailed by numerous threats (Ernst & Young, 2009; S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008; 
Whitman & Mattord, 2008). 
2.3 Various Threats to Information 
Most organizations are vulnerable from parties or individuals who want to ‘harm’ or ‘steal’ 
their valuable information. Since information is one of the most valuable assets the 
organization can possess today, such vulnerability poses a big threat to most organizations 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Consequently, it is very important for the organization to 
identify every threat existing to its information. Information threats coming from individuals 
or parties may be divided into those that are internal and those that are external (Lammle et 
al., 2005). 
2.3.1 Internal Threats 
Internal threats are threats coming from the inside the organization. Experience and statistics 
have shown that internal threats may account for as much as 80 percent of all threats; with 
attackers either coming from the inside or having insider help in their attack (Mann, 2008). 
The individuals who perform these attacks are called insiders; and they are often employees 
of the targeted organization (Lively, 2003). 
As most employees are information-workers nowadays, and handle information 
electronically, they have authorized access to valuable information (Robinson, 2001). 
Additionally, most employees have intimate knowledge of where the most valuable 
information resides (Mann, 2008). Therefore, many employees know where to ‘hit’ the 
company to cause the most harm (Mitnick et al., 2003). Consequently, employees may 
sometimes represent the most severe threat to the valuable information of an organization 
(Mann, 2008). 
For instance, a disgruntled employee may get more satisfaction by destroying information 
than by actually displaying his/her dissatisfaction (Robinson, 2001). Mitnick et al. (2003) tell 
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the story of a disgruntled employee who managed to access the computer of the head of his 
department, download an important PowerPoint presentation, and replace some of the slides 
with exceptionally embarrassing pictures. Needless to say, the presentation turned into a 
disaster. 
Another motivation for employees to perform attacks against their parent organization 
includes financial motives. An employee with a financial motive may use the ability to access 
to steal valuable information and sell such information to the organization’s competitors 
(Robinson, 2001). 
Sometimes information is disclosed or destroyed unintentionally. Such a threat can be 
referred to as an unintentional threat (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Unintentional threats 
usually have no malicious intention and are often caused ‘accidentally’. With regard to 
internal unintentional threats, an example could include an employee who accidently, or 
without knowledge, executes a ‘malicious program’ attached in an email message, believing 
that it is a free and fun game. Such malicious programs are frequently distributed by external 
threats. 
2.3.2 External Threats 
External threats come from outside the organization; and these threats can arise anywhere 
from one individual to a whole criminal organization. These parties do not have authorized 
access to the system, and they usually infiltrate the organization through the Internet 
(Lammle et al., 2005).  
Using the Internet opens many doors for hackers. Phishing, for example, is a big problem to 
organizations and users of the Internet in general (Mann, 2008). When using phishing, the 
criminal may pretend to be a customer’s Internet-bank, or another agency, and thereby ‘fish’ 
for the customer’s credentials (Aburrous et al., 2010). Phishing will be covered in more detail 
in Chapter 4.  
Other common external threats over the Internet include: Trojan horses, viruses and worms 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  
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Trojan Horses 
The name ‘Trojan horse’ relates to the remarkable story of the mythological war between the 
city of Troy and the Greeks (Jones & Salvucci, 2005). In an attempt to end the war, the 
Greeks offered Troy a gift consisting of an enormous wooden horse. The Trojan people 
accepted this wooden horse and brought it into their city, which was surrounded by a wall to 
keep enemies out. However, when night came and the Trojan people fell asleep, they quickly 
discovered their mistake. A number of Greek warriors were hidden inside the wooden horse. 
These warriors came out from the wooden horse and opened the door to Troy from the inside.  
This allowed the Greek army to come inside and start killing all their unsuspecting enemies 
in their sleep (Jones & Salvucci, 2005). 
Today, similar methods still exist. Criminals send emails with attachments to susceptible 
users (Harley, 2007). These attachments, for example an executable file, can pose as an 
entertaining game. However, the attachment could, just like the wooden horse mentioned 
earlier, contain ‘warriors’ with malicious intentions. Such malicious intentions could include 
opening up ‘doors’, or ports on the victim’s computer in favour of their creator. This could, in 
turn, allow the creator to access the victim’s machine remotely (Harley, 2007).  
By accessing the machine remotely, the creator can conduct further malicious activity and, 
thus, steal or ‘destroy’ valuable information (Harley, 2007).  
A malicious program that uses the above principles is today known as a Trojan horse (Harley, 
2007). Nevertheless, a Trojan horse can be even more harmful if it can replicate itself. Such 
an ability is then referred to as a virus (National Research Council (U.S.), Computer Science 
and Telecommunications Board, & System Security Study Committee, 1991). 
Viruses 
Security expert Eugene Spafford (1991) defines a virus as “a segment of machine code 
(typically 200-4000 bytes) that will copy itself (or a modified version of itself) into one or 
more larger ‘host’ programs when it is activated. When these infected programs are run, the 
viral code is executed and the virus spreads further”. This code can produce relatively 
harmless outcomes, for example: displaying a silly message. However, the code can also 
produce more serious outcomes. For example, it could reduce CPU performance, damage 
files, erase hard disks, or crash systems (Helmreich, 2000).  
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Fortunately, viruses do not spread themselves ‘automatically’ over the network to other 
computers (Parsons & Oja, 2009). However, worms are programmed to do this (Lehtinen, 
Russell, & Gangemi, 2006). 
Worms 
A worm is an independent program, often with similar malicious intention and outcomes as 
viruses. It reproduces itself from one computer to another, usually over a network (Lehtinen 
et al., 2006). A worm can also be combined with a Trojan horse and/or a virus, making it 
even more hazardous, as it can disguise and/or replicate itself to other files within a 
computer. Melissa, for example, had all the characteristics of a virus, a worm and a Trojan 
horse (Shelly, Vermaat, & Quasney, 2008).  
Melissa was an ubiquitous ‘macro-virus’ during the end of the 20th century, which disguised 
itself within a ‘trustworthy’ document (Trojan-horse characteristics), spread itself within 
Microsoft Word files (virus characteristics) and then mass-mailed itself (worm 
characteristics) using the email client Microsoft Outlook (Bidgoli, 2006). When activated, the 
Melissa virus modified users’ documents by inserting comments from the TV series "The 
Simpsons".  
Some variants of Melissa also deleted important system files on the computer. Without such 
system files, the computer could fail to start (Bidgoli, 2006).  
A virus, a worm, a Trojan horse, or a combination of these, can be referred to as a malicious 
code, a malicious program or simply as malware (Sophos, 2009). Nowadays, such ‘cyber-
threats’ have become more sophisticated. Today’s malware might encrypt all files and 
demand a ransom. More commonly, though, the malware of today will not cause any 
apparent damage or announce its presence at all. Most victims are not even aware that their 
computer has been infected (Sophos, 2009).  
For example, a malicious program might silently instal a keystroke logger. The keystroke 
logger waits until the victim visits a banking website, and then records the victim´s account 
details and password. These credentials are then forwarded to the creator of the keystroke 
logger via the Internet (Sophos, 2009). Subsequently, the malware creator may then use the 
stolen credentials to plunder the victim’s bank account. Furthermore, once the malware has 
done its job, it may also delete itself – in order to avoid possible detection (Sophos, 2009). 
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Any type of external threat, as well as internal threats, can be unintentional (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2008). An external unintentional threat has no malicious intention (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2008). Such a threat may include a friend of an employee who, outside the 
organization, unknowingly forwards an email to the employee with malware attached, 
believing that the attachment is something of value.  
Whether internal threats or external threats, as most employees are information-workers 
nowadays and handle information electronically, they are very vulnerable to such threats 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008). A problem is that the employees do not realize how much 
damage can be done to themselves and their organization by sharing sensitive information. 
Consequently, it must be made clear that the information must be kept secure, and from 
whom it must be kept secure (Lafrance, 2004).  
The discipline that clarifies and ensures this is commonly known as information security (S. 
H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). 
2.4 An Introduction to Information Security 
Information security has become increasingly important within most organizations today; and 
many methods are commonly practised in order to make the organization’s information safer 
from various threats (Ernst & Young, 2009). However, even though some of the latest 
information security trends have made organizations safer, many organizations today still 
experience an increase in both external and internal threats (Ernst & Young, 2009).  
In a survey conducted by the company Ernst & Young (2009), 41% of the respondents noted 
an increase in external attacks, while 25% of the respondents witnessed an increase in 
internal attacks. According to Ernst and Young (2009), this may have been due to the recent 
economic crisis that globally shocked the world.  
Due to this recent economic crisis, many people sought new means to finance themselves 
(Symantec, 2010a). Some utilized their authorized access to acquire and sell valuable 
information (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2010). Others bought or developed sophisticated 
tools for creating unique malicious programs to steal valuable information (Symantec, 
2010a). Such tools made it possible for anyone to attack organizations or single individuals 
over the Internet (Symantec, 2010a).  
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Consequently, the number of malicious programs increased significantly.  
Before the peak of the economic crisis, Symantec (2008) detected 711,912 new malicious 
programs. Symantec (2008) stated that: "This brings the overall number of malicious code 
threats identified by Symantec to 1,122,311, as of the end of 2007”. However, in 2009, when 
the economic crisis had reached its peak, Symantec (2010a) identified another 240 million 
distinct new malicious programs.  
Such an increase in malicious activity makes it practically impossible for information security 
companies, such as Symantec, to keep up with the threats; and consequently, design, develop 
and implement countermeasures against all of them – in order to protect their information 
assets. Therefore, it is nowadays more important than ever for an organization’s employees to 
work together as one, especially in protecting information assets (Ernst & Young, 2009).  
However, such ‘commitment’ does not always occur within the organization (Axelrod, 
Bayuk, & Schutzer, 2009). One reason may be because the information-security department, 
within the organization, is often perceived as a separate process that is responsible for 
handling everything to do with protecting information (Axelrod et al., 2009). This may lead 
to negligent behaviour within the organization; and everyone may blame everyone else, 
should an organization be harmed by such an attack (Axelrod et al., 2009).  
In such an environment, protecting information can be a very tedious task. It is, therefore, 
important that every employee within the organization should realise that the responsibility of 
protecting their organization’s information assets lies with themselves (Axelrod et al., 2009).  
As most organizations consist of people working together as a team, it is important that such 
teamwork is also emphasized in information protection (Axelrod et al., 2009). It must, 
therefore, be emphasized within the organization that every employee should constantly be 
aware of new threats and act in the company’s best interests (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). For 
example, the employees must resist the temptation to open email attachments from strangers, 
as these may include malware that could disclose sensitive information, such as passwords 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  
However, the organization may be held accountable, should an employee disclose any 
sensitive information (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
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Since the organization is responsible for any incident of the disclosure of sensitive 
information, it is important that the right information-security countermeasures are 
implemented (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). However, the lack of adequate budget 
and resources to spend on information-security countermeasures continues to be a significant 
challenge for many organizations (Ernst & Young, 2009).  
Following one of the worst global economic crises in 30 years, it is now more important than 
ever to focus on the right risks in information protection and to prioritize spending based on 
the value of the information asset (Ernst & Young, 2009). To be able to focus on the right 
risks and priorities in a cost-effective manner, it is essential that an organization follows best 
practices and standards (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). 
2.4.1 Standards and best practices 
To help organizations practise information security in an effective and efficient manner, 
many expert committees have developed a range of standards and best practices (Calder, 
2009). Such standards and best practices may prevent an organization from ‘reinventing the 
wheel’ and prevent the organization from spending resources on excessive amounts of 
equipment or ineffective methodologies (Calder, 2009). Some standards or best practices may 
also be used to determine how ‘mature’ the organization is with regard to information 
security (ENISA, 2006).  
If well matured, the organization may have a number of advantages, such as a respected 
business image, competitive edge, business continuity and minimization of damages and 
losses (ENISA, 2006). However, to achieve a more respected business image and/or 
competitive edge, it is possible – on condition that all the requirements within the standard 
are complied with – for most organizations to achieve certification with some of the standards 
(S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
Although certification is generally very rare, some organizations do achieve certification with 
standards. The most common standards organizations achieve certification with are 
ISO27001 and ISO27002 (Ernst & Young, 2009). These standards are normally used together 
in practice. Thus, ISO 27001 provides a model for establishing, implementing, monitoring, 
reviewing, maintaining and improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS), 
whereas ISO 27002 outlines the potential controls and control mechanisms (discussed in 
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section 2.4.5) which may be implemented, based on the guidance provided within ISO 27001 
(Ernst & Young, 2009).  
An Information Security Management System secures the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the organization's information assets (Calder, 2009). To accomplish this, it is 
required to include some sort of assessment to evaluate and analyse what risks an 
organization and its assets could be facing (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). Such an 
assessment forms part of a risk-management exercise (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). 
2.4.2 Information Security Risk Management 
Information security risk management comprises the ongoing process of identifying and 
understanding the potential risks an organization may be vulnerable to, as well as assessing 
the extent of these risks, in order to remediate them. It also includes the necessary 
communication and risk reporting within the organization (Ernst & Young, 2009). In fact, 
according to a survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2009), improving information security 
risk management has been the top security priority of their participants over the year 2010.  
The ISO 27001 defines risk as a “combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequence.” This statement includes two variables, viz. a probability that an event will 
happen and its consequence (impact) on the organization. The combination of these two 
variables indicates the size of the risk (Mann, 2008). To determine the size, or extent of the 
risk, some sort of assessment may be necessary. 
When assessing risks, it is necessary to determine the type of threats to which an asset in the 
organization is vulnerable. As discussed earlier, the threat signifies who or what is going to 
make an attack, whilst an asset is something that provides value to the organization. 
Vulnerability indicates the different weaknesses that the organization has that would allow 
the threat to succeed. Thus, “the extent or size of the risk is determined by a combination of 
the impact it will have on the asset, as well as the frequency or probability that some threat 
might exploit some vulnerability” (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
To remediate the risk, a definite strategy may be required. Such a risk strategy may include 
transferring the risk to another party, or accepting some or all of the consequences of the 
particular risk (J. Hintzbergen, Hintzbergen, Baars, & Smulders, 2010).  
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If the risk of a threat reaching a sensitive information asset, through some vulnerability, is 
determined as being low, it may not be worth spending resources on mitigating such a risk; 
and the risk may, therefore, be ignored by accepting some or all of the consequences of the 
particular risk. However, if such a risk is high, either the impact and/or the probability should 
be reduced. This may be done by protecting the security characteristics of the information 
asset (discussed next) with suitable controls (discussed later) (Mann, 2008). 
2.4.3 The Security Characteristics of Information 
In order to protect the information assets, the three critical security characteristics of 
information must constantly be protected, namely: confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). 
The first characteristic, confidentiality, is the assurance that access controls, which will be 
discussed later, are enforced; while it also specifies who can view the information. The 
second, integrity, ensures the “quality” of information and identifies how closely the data 
represent reality, in other words, that the information is correct. Lastly, availability ensures 
that information and services are available to authorised users when requested or needed, and 
also act as a metric for determining the extent of information systems security breaches 
(NSTISSC, 1994).  
These security characteristics of information must constantly be protected when information 
resides in a particular state, or is moving between being transmitted, stored or processed 
(Ciampa, 2005).  
2.4.4 The states of information 
At any given moment, information is being stored, transmitted or processed. This is also 
referred to as the ‘states’ of information (NSTISSC, 1994). Just as water can have the states 
of being liquid, ice, or steam, information likewise also has three states. These three states 
exist, irrespective of the medium in which information resides (NSTISSC, 1994). Therefore, 
these states must be considered at all times, when designing countermeasures to protect 
information. Such countermeasures are generally referred to as controls (S. H. Von Solms & 
Von Solms, 2008). 
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2.4.5 Controls: Technology, Policies, Education 
A control, in terms of information security, is any type of countermeasure that may prevent a 
threat from impacting an information asset (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). The 
objective of a control is to reduce the vulnerability and, thereby to minimize the risk of a 
threat reaching the information asset (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). Nevertheless, 
such controls may be categorized as technology, policies and practices or education, training 
and awareness (NSTISSC, 1994). 
A technology control describes a ‘product’, which could be used to protect each of the critical 
characteristics (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability) of information, while the 
information moves between or resides in one of its states (NSTISSC, 1994). This ‘product’ 
could be a firewall, a thumbprint scanner, or any other desirable technical mechanism, which 
could enhance information security (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). However, while the 
adoption of new technologies to automate controls can help protect information, an 
organization should be careful of becoming too reliant on technology (Ernst & Young, 2009). 
Policies and practices state that information security cannot merely be ensured with a 
technology product or device, as rules are required to ensure the proper operation of the 
related technology. If there are no rules, then it is impossible to know whether someone has 
done something right, or wrong (NSTISSC, 1994). For example, if an organization has a 
building with the most expensive alarm system, and no-one who works in that building 
activates that alarm system when leaving the building, then that alarm system is rendered 
useless.  
Policies and practices are consequently needed to prescribe the desired behaviour of the 
employees (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). However, in order for the employees to 
be able to follow practices and procedures, they must be made aware of them. 
Education, training and awareness controls ensure that the employees become aware, trained 
or educated in effectively protecting information assets (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2008). No matter how much money organizations spend on technology, the weakest link in 
the protection of information assets remains the human being (NSTISSC, 1994).  
Since the weakest link, when it concerns information security, is the human element, it is 
important to focus on education, training and awareness controls. A control that educates, 
trains or makes people aware of information security-related aspects may be referred to as a 
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Security Education Training Awareness (SETA) program (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2008). 
2.4.6 Security Education Training Awareness 
The goal with a SETA program is to influence users into behaving more securely when 
protecting information (Straub, Goodman, & Baskerville, 2008). Nevertheless, it is important 
to distinguish between education, training and awareness. Therefore, these will now be 
explained with the threat in focus. 
Firstly, awareness describes what a threat is, with some information consisting of videos, 
newsletters and posters. The objective is to alert the participant, and the timeframe is 
generally short-term (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). Secondly, training describes 
how the threat functions, with some knowledge being presented in the form of lectures, 
workshops or hands-on practice. The objective is to give the participant a skill, and the 
timeframe is generally medium-term (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
Finally, education, describes why the threat is functioning in a certain manner, with some 
understanding presented in the form of seminars or literature studies. The objective is to give 
the participant some insight into the threat; and the timeframe is generally long-term (S. H. 
Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
Whether giving the participant insight, a skill, or an alert, if the program is not well-planned 
and implemented correctly, the program may be considered ineffective. Hence, there are 
many mistakes commonly made by organizations when deploying education, training and 
awareness programs.  
Firstly, many organizations try to put together education, training and awareness programs 
quickly – in order to meet either an auditor’s requirements, or to easily comply with legal 
requirement deadlines. Such training and awareness is seldom effective (Herold, 2010). 
Secondly, many organizations do not build the education, training and awareness program 
around the business environment. Instead, they purchase or copy a ready-made package. 
However, if the content does not fit the business environment, the program is likely to be 
ineffective, and is viewed as a waste of time (Herold, 2010).  
Thirdly, the effectiveness of the education, training and awareness programs are many times 
not evaluated nor measured. If the employees continually receive poor education, the 
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program will not be successful (Herold, 2010). Finally, CEOs frequently neglect to clearly 
support education, training and awareness programs. If the employees do not feel that their 
executive leaders support such programs, they may not be motivated to participate (Herold, 
2010).  
Thus, a security education training-awareness program should be well planned, unique to the 
organization, and be evaluated and supported by the CEO (Herold, 2010). In order to develop 
and implement such a program successfully, it may be important to understand how the 
human being adopts the knowledge that may change his/her behaviour. 
When educating, training or making an individual aware, the individual normally goes 
through four stages, before changing his/her behaviour (Chapman, 2010). These stages will 
now be explored further by means of an analogy between an employee learning information 
security and a learner obtaining a driver’s licence. 
 
 Stage 1: Unconscious Incompetence 
In order to understand that he/she is a risk to the company, the employee must first of 
all understand that he/she is incompetent to adequately perform his/her job securely 
(S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
As an analogy, a learner rushing for a driver’s licence may feel that driving a car is 
easy. However, when actually sitting inside the car, trying to make it go forward, the 
learner may realise that he/she is incompetent to drive the car. 
 
 Stage 2: Conscious Incompetence 
By understanding that he/she is incompetent to adequately perform a job properly, the 
employee is now consciously incompetent (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
The learner driver has now realised that it is actually ‘quite hard’ to drive the vehicle 
and might study theory, as well as taking practical driving lessons with an instructor. 
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 Stage 3: Conscious Competence 
When the employee masters the skills required to conduct a job in a proper manner, 
he/she can be seen as being consciously competent. However, at this stage, the 
employee still needs to concentrate in order to perform the necessary procedures 
correctly (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
This stage occurs when the learner driver knows what to do in certain situations. For 
instance, he/she knows that he/she must stop when there is a red light, and he/she 
knows that he/she must depress the clutch in order to change gears. However, the 
learner must first consciously evaluate every action before he/she proceeds. 
 
 Stage 4: Unconscious Competence 
This is the last stage, where the employee has mastered the necessary skills to do 
his/her job in a reliable manner, without having to evaluate each action. By being 
unconsciously competent, the employee will ignore thinking about doing his/her job 
properly, as it has become part of his/her natural behaviour. It may now be believed 
that the employee inherently performs his/her job in a reliable manner. When this 
happens for all the employees within the organization, it may be argued that an 
information security culture has been cultivated within the organization. This is one of 
the primary goals for most organizations as regards information security (S. H. Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2008). 
When the learner driver has reached the stage of being unconsciously competent, the 
learner may be unaware that he/she is pressing the clutch when changing gears, and 
braking when the traffic light is red. These actions happen automatically, as they have 
become part of the learner’s natural behaviour. The learner may now safely operate 
the car and apply for a driving test in order to obtain his/her driver’s license. 
 
Some of the controls that could prevent a threat from impacting the asset have now been 
discussed. Subsequently, the success of a potential attack depends on how educated, trained 
or aware the employees of the organization are, and what policies and practices, as well as 
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what technology the organization has enforced. Therefore, it is important for organizations to 
implement strong security policies and practices, and to keep the technology updated and 
educate employees on how to ward off any potential attackers (Dolan, 2004).  
However, in order to ensure that such information security practice is enforced and complied 
with, it is generally necessary to audit the organization (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2008). 
2.4.7 Auditing and Compliance 
All controls should be audited, or measured regularly – to ensure that they are being 
enforced, and work as intended (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). This is necessary 
because it is hard to manage what cannot be measured (Bashir, 2010). Additionally, attackers 
find different methods to exploit organizations every day (NSTISSC, 1994). Therefore, it 
must be ensured that the enforced policies and practices are complied with, that technology 
products are updated, and that the information-security education training or awareness of 
employees is evaluated (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). The employees cannot 
defend the organization against something with which they are unfamiliar, or of which they 
are unaware (Lively, 2003). Such an auditing process should be carried out regularly.  
In order to regularly audit an organization, a standard such as ISO 27001 should be used 
(Calder, 2009). Such a standard may indicate various flaws within the organization (Calder, 
2009). It is, however, important to be updated on the newest standards, best practices and 
latest information-security products, as new threats emerge every day (Whitman & Mattord, 
2008). 
2.4.8 A Holistic Information Security Model 
Since new technology, used by criminals to attack organizations, emerges every day, the 
former National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee 
(NSTISSC), currently known as the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), have 
founded a model, known as the NSTISSC 4011 (see Figure 2.1). This model can be used 
regardless of the technology involved. The model ensures that each of the critical information 
characteristics (confidentiality, integrity, availability) are maintained, while information 
resides in or moves between its states (transmitting, storing, processing) through the various 
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controls (technology, policies and practices, education, training and awareness) (NSTISSC, 
1994). 
 
 
 
Consequently, it can be determined that "information security protects the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information on the devices that store, manipulate, and transmit 
the information through products, people and procedures" (Ciampa, 2005). 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered some of the fundamentals of information security – by firstly 
explaining the importance of information in organizations today and why valuable 
information should be protected.  
Information is one of the most valuable assets in an organization today, because the 
organization is dependent on information to make the right decisions in business, and thus, 
Figure 2.1: NSTISSC model (NSTISSC, 1994) 
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maintain its competitive advantage (E. Calvasina et al., 2006). Therefore, it is important that 
such information is correct and available when requested – and that it is protected from 
threats (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008).  
The practice that ensures that valuable information is correct, available and protected may be 
referred to as information security (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Thus, information security 
protects the information from various threats, by reducing the probability and the impact of 
an incident (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). Such an incident may include an attacker 
that uses computer software to exploit some vulnerability, for example a ‘security hole’ 
within a web browser, in order to gain access to sensitive information illegally (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2008). 
To protect the valuable information from a threat, controls may be used (S. H. Von Solms & 
Von Solms, 2008).The objective of a control is to reduce the vulnerability; and thereby, to 
minimize the risk of a threat impacting the information asset (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2008). A control may consist of a technical product that, for example, prevents unauthorized 
users from entering the system (NSTISSC, 1994). However, if an authorized user shares 
his/her password, the product is then rendered useless (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2008). 
Policies and practices are, therefore, needed to prescribe the desired behaviour of the 
employees (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). However, if the employee is unaware of 
enforced policies and practices, these are also rendered useless (S. H. Von Solms & Von 
Solms, 2008). Consequently, education, training and awareness programs are required to 
advise the employees on how to act correctly and securely (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2008). However, education training and awareness controls are frequently neglected. This 
can be one of the biggest mistakes an organization can make regarding information protection 
(Mann, 2008).  
Criminals have come to realise that the human being is the weakest link when it concerns 
keeping information secure, and it might often be much easier to ask the victim directly for 
his password, rather than spending days, or even months, trying to crack it (Mitnick et al., 
2003). To increase the probability of success, in terms of obtaining the password, the criminal 
can even pretend to be a system administrator of the victim’s company (Mann, 2008). 
Additionally, the criminal could persuade the victim psychologically (Twitchell, 2009). Thus, 
if mastered, the easiest and quickest way to obtain confidential and sensitive information is 
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through deceiving the human being (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Such practices may be referred 
to as social engineering (Jansson & Von Solms, 2010; Mann, 2008; Mitnick et al., 2003). 
This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Exploiting Human Behaviour with 
Social Engineering 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the reasons why information should be protected and what 
measures an organization can adopt to protect its information. For example, implementing 
technology products and policies can frequently provide sufficient protection from threats to 
sensitive information (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). However, in most cases, implementing 
the newest technologies and policies will not necessarily provide adequate information 
protection (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). For example, if the technology is not used correctly 
and securely, or if security policies are not followed, such actions would be rendered useless 
(Jansson & Von Solms, 2010).  
For this reason, people play a critical role in the protection of information (S. H. Von Solms 
& Von Solms, 2008). Consequently, people have become the main target for many cyber 
criminals wanting to acquire sensitive information. 
Many criminals have realised that it is sometimes easier to manipulate an employee into 
providing the password rather than spending excessive time attempting to crack it (Jansson & 
Von Solms, 2010). Manipulating an individual into providing sensitive information or 
performing an action may be referred to as “social engineering” (Mitnick et al., 2003).  
A social engineer manipulates or deceives people by using one, or many, social techniques 
that influence people’s minds to alter their behaviour (Jansson & Von Solms, 2010). 
Therefore, to prevent social engineering, it is important to study human behaviour and how 
the human mind can be exploited (Mann, 2008). Consequently, this chapter will now discuss 
how the social engineer exploits the human mind in an attempt to alter human behaviour. 
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3.2 Exploiting Human Behaviour 
Humans are interesting creatures. While many people consciously believe they are 
independent thinkers, it is generally easy to get them to follow instructions. From early 
childhood, through school, and into employment, people naturally follow instructions (Mann, 
2008). 
People follow instructions because of a history of ‘reinforcement’ for this behaviour (Flora, 
2004). For example, if a caregiver instructs a child to open his mouth wide (while doing this 
himself) and the child conforms, then the child’s behaviour will probably be reinforced by 
appreciation or affection (Flora, 2004). When instructions, such as "after you have finished 
your homework, then you can play outside" are reinforced, then following instructions in 
general – as a habit – has then been reinforced.  
After thousands of instances, such as these, following instructions become quite natural 
behaviour for many individuals (Flora, 2004). 
The former theory builds on the reinforcement theory, which was originally coined by 
psychologist, B.F. Skinner (1954); only he called this “conditioning”. In brief, the theory 
argues that learning results from the association between behaviours and rewards. Positive 
reinforcement occurs when behaviour is followed by a reward; which increases the 
probability that the desired behaviour will be repeated.  
Many communities today build on the reinforcement theory (Bidgoli, 2006). By obeying 
rules and instructions, one may live a happy life and enjoy a rewarding salary. By disobeying 
rules and instructions, one may be fined, sent to jail, or even face the death penalty (Bidgoli, 
2006). Nevertheless, since following instructions becomes natural behaviour for many 
individuals, it follows that these individuals can also be exploited; and, consequently, be 
deceived into performing certain actions.  
These actions may not, however, always be in the deceived or exploited individual’s best 
interests.  
For example, many people are grateful when plagued by a problem and somebody with the 
knowledge, skill and willingness comes along offering to help. Many criminals understand 
this and know how to take advantage of this (Mitnick et al., 2003). Mitnick et al. (2003) 
relate a story about a criminal who called an employee, claiming to be from the Help Desk. 
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The criminal claimed he was trying to troubleshoot a computer networking problem, and 
asked the employee if he knew anyone who had had trouble with his or her connection. The 
employee responded that he had no knowledge of any connection problems. The criminal 
then requested the employee to call the criminal on his cellphone number if any connection 
problems were experienced. Additionally, the criminal queried the employee to check what 
'port number' his computer was connected to. The employee gave the criminal the port 
number information and responded that he would call the criminal if any problems were 
experienced. 
After two days, the criminal phoned the employee company’s Network Operations Centre 
and claimed that he was trying to troubleshoot a cabling problem in the employee's office, 
and therefore, needed the port number of the office to be disabled. The 'IT guy' responded 
that it would be done in ‘a few minutes’. About an hour later, the employee phoned the 
criminal claiming that the network connection was down and that he was panicking. The 
criminal replied that he would take care of this, and phoned back to the Network Operations 
Centre, requesting the employee´s port to be enabled again.  
Afterwards, the criminal phoned the employee again and requested him to check whether the 
network connection was 'up'. After a couple of moments, the employee claimed that the 
connection was indeed up and thanked the criminal. The criminal then suggested that the 
employee instal a software application in order to prevent further problems. The employee 
agreed and the criminal guided the employee through the steps of downloading a small 
application. This application, however, was a Trojan horse that allowed the criminal full 
access to the employee’s computer (Mitnick et al., 2003). 
The criminal in the former scenario convinced the target that he had a problem. In actual fact, 
this problem did not really exist. However, the criminal knew that the problem would occur 
because he was going to cause it. The criminal then presented himself as the person who 
could provide the solution. Any attacker who can make the target call him gains instant 
credibility (Mitnick et al., 2003). Thus, if the employee places a call to someone he thinks is 
on the help desk, the employee would probably not ask him to prove his identity (Mitnick et 
al., 2003). This technique may be referred to as ‘reverse social engineering’. Similar 
techniques will be discussed later.  
In order to fully understand these techniques, it may be necessary to discuss what deception 
really is and why some people deceive other people.  
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3.2.1 Definition of Deception 
According to Conte and Castelfranchi (1995), the lives of humans are regulated by goals. 
These goals are then pursued through beliefs. Nevertheless, sometimes one may have a 
personal goal for another person to pursue a specific goal. Consequently, to have the other 
person pursue a specific goal, one must influence that person´s beliefs (Poggi, Niewiadomski, 
& Pelachaud, 2008). This is explained by the following statement. 
“If A has the goal for B to pursue goal G1, and if believing belief X causes B to pursue goal 
G1, then A will have the goal for B to come to believe X. And conversely, if believing Y 
causes B to pursue goal G2, and A has the goal for B not to pursue goal G2, then A will have 
the goal for B not to believe Y (Poggi et al., 2008)” 
In some cases, one may have the goal for the other to believe something one knows is not 
true. In this case, one may have the goal to deceive. When one deceives, one uses some 
method to manipulate the other’s' beliefs, in order to, subsequently, influence the other to 
pursue the goals one wants. The methods used to deceive can be categorised, based on how a 
deceiver manipulates the beliefs of a person (Poggi et al., 2008). The following explains this 
with an analogy of an employee who realises that he has enabled a worm to shut down his 
organization´s network. 
 
 Omission: “A has the goal for B not to accept a belief K, but since B does not really 
know anything of K, for A it is sufficient not to do anything” (Poggi et al., 2008). For 
example, the employee A realises that he has opened a malicious file containing a 
hazardous worm, but fails to reveal the incident to his manager, fearing he will be 
fired.  
 Concealment: “A does an action which is not communicative to prevent B from 
believing a true belief” (Poggi et al., 2008). For example, the employee A deletes the 
email message containing the worm – in order to remove any evidence that would 
show that he was the one who opened it. 
 Falsification: “A provides B with a false belief that is a belief different from what A 
believes is true” (Poggi et al., 2008). For example, the manager queries the employee 
if he knows the reason why the network is down, fearing and believing that the worm 
  
34 
 
has caused the outage; the employee claims that he does not know why the network is 
down. 
 Masking: “A case of concealment brought about through falsification: providing a 
false belief in order to conceal a true belief” (Poggi et al., 2008). For example, the 
employee is nervous when queried about executing the file and, therefore, displays an 
angry facial expression in order to look offended by the claim that he might have done 
such an act. 
 Negation: Denying a true belief (Poggi et al., 2008). For example, the manager has 
found that a worm caused the network outage. The employee is queried by his 
manager on whether the employee executed the file that spread the worm; however, 
the employee claims he has not. 
 False confirmation: The opposite of negation. One makes a hypothesis that in fact is 
not true, but allows someone believe it is true (Poggi et al., 2008). For example, the 
manager has found out that the spreading of the worm came from the employee´s 
office, where his intern also works. Fearing the possibility of being fired, the 
employee claims that he noticed his intern downloading an illegal application from 
the Internet that might have contained the worm. 
 
From the former examples, it may be concluded that the goal of a deceiver often involves 
having his/her victim perform an action or refrain from performing an action (Poggi et al., 
2008).  
People are frequently unaware of their actions. Therefore, a deceiver often exploits such 
unawareness to have his/her victim pursuing the deceiver’s goal (Mann, 2008). This may be 
further explained by a discussion of the subconscious mind. 
3.2.2 The Subconscious Mind 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2009) defines the subconscious as something that is 
“concerning the part of the mind of which one is not fully aware, but which influences one's 
actions and feelings”. Chapter 2 explained this with an analogy between a user becoming 
aware of information security principles and a learner becoming aware of how to operate a 
  
35 
 
vehicle. It was concluded that the mind, eventually, learns how to operate the vehicle, or how 
to behave safely. Furthermore, it learns how to do these actions ‘automatically’. Thus, most 
decisions are made involuntarily by the subconscious mind (Mann, 2008). Ian Mann (2008) 
elaborates on this matter further. 
“[A]ll decisions we take are taken by the subconscious. If necessary, the conscious mind 
invents a 'logical' justification for the decision. In effect, the conscious brain is in a constant 
state of delusional belief.” 
This statement may be explained with the following ‘real life’ example from Ian Mann’s 
(2008) book: Hacking the human.  
Imagine a father sitting comfortably in his favourite chair, while his five-year old son enters 
the room. The child, unaware of his father’s presence, is moving very slowly and carefully as 
he carries a glass of milk. The father cries out: "Don’t Drop That!' As a result of the father’s 
cry, the child drops the milk on the carpet.  
One may think that this was the child's fault. However, it was in fact, the father’s fault. The 
subconscious mind cannot understand 'don´t'; and it will therefore just hear (and obey): 'Drop 
that!' 
The child reacted to the instruction of the father, taking the decision to let go of the milk 
glass. This happens very quickly (within the first second). By the time the conscious brain 
has worked out what ’don´t' in this context means, the glass has already hit the floor. Thus, 
the subconscious mind cannot think logically; instead it acts faster than the conscious mind 
(Mann, 2008). 
If the subconscious is mainly in control, then deceiving people by utilizing the subconscious 
should be effective. This can be achieved in many traditions, such as exploiting cognitive and 
cultural biases, as well as emotions (Twitchell, 2009). However, in order to understand how 
such techniques may be utilized, a discussion of how the human mind perceives reality may 
first be necessary. This may be explained through a discussion of Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming. 
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3.2.3 Neuro-Linguistic Programming 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2009) defines Neuro-Linguistic programming (NLP) as, "A 
system of alternative therapy based on that which seeks to educate people in self-awareness 
and effective communication, and to change their patterns of mental and emotional 
behaviour. In brief, “NLP is how to use the language of the mind to consistently achieve, 
modify and alter one’s specific and desired outcomes” (Hadnagy, 2010). 
 
 Neuro refers to neurological, meaning that the human experience of the world is 
filtered through the five senses: vision, auditory, kinaesthetic, smell and taste. In NLP, 
however, smell and taste are often part of the kinaesthetic (touch) sense. Nevertheless, 
these senses are interpreted by people to give them their perception of reality. Thus, 
all the senses are factors in forming the human experience (Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 
2004). 
 Linguistic refers to how people express themselves by means of languages in the form 
of pictures, sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, words (Hadnagy, 2010). Because people 
use language to communicate thoughts, the language they convey reflects how they 
think. When relating experiences, one uses the senses to identify these experiences 
and communicate them to others. Every individual has his/her own preferred sense to 
use, also referred to as the ‘predominant representational system’ (Silverstone & 
Sheetz, 2007). For example, people whose predominant representational system is 
visual may say phrases, such as “I see what you mean,” or “I get the picture.” In 
contrast, a person whose predominant representational system is auditory, will use 
language, such as “something tells me...,” “that rings a bell”. Finally, a person whose 
predominant representational system is kinaesthetic, will make statements, such as, 
“I’ll get in touch with you,” or “how do you think I feel?” (Sandoval & Adams, 2001). 
 Programming is a metaphor that refers to what people repeat or "run" in the form of 
habitual behavioural patterns without being aware of them. For example, watching 
one’s reflection when passing a mirror or scratching the nose when excited about 
something. “Usually people are not aware of the "software" that runs on their brain 
to form the life they experience and live.” (Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 2004)  
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To establish ‘rapport’, and thereby, build an atmosphere of trust and confidence (Davis, 
2005), many interviewers in the FBI listen closely to the choice of words interviewees use 
(their predominant representational system), as well as what body language and paralanguage 
(speech rate, volume, and pitch) they demonstrate (Sandoval & Adams, 2001). Paying close 
attention to an interviewee’s eye movements can also provide valuable insight into the 
interviewee’s predominant representational system (Sandoval & Adams, 2001).  
For example, if an interviewer observes that the interviewee consistently looks up at an angle, 
when responding to questions, the interviewer can conclude that the person may be “seeing” 
a picture. In NLP terms, the interviewee’s preferred representational system is then probably 
visual. The interviewer may now encourage the interviewee to recall an event through 
questions, such as: “How did it look to you?” or “Show me what you saw” (Sandoval & 
Adams, 2001). When interviewers intentionally match or mirror the interviewee’s preferred 
representational system or non-verbal language, the interviewee is more likely to respond to 
the interviewer and, consequently, reveal information (Sandoval & Adams, 2001).  
By mastering NLP, one can begin to understand how the mind and body work together, 
eventually taking control of the success of an event and learning to fully understand the 
structures of human interactions (Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 2004). Therefore, NLP may be one 
of the key studies, when learning how people can exploit or deceive other people.  
Another study in NLP involves becoming aware of the micro-movements of the face. These 
muscular movements may be referred to as ‘micro-expressions’; and they are based on 
emotions (Ekman, 2004). 
3.2.4 Micro-expressions and emotions 
R. S. Lazarus and B. N. Lazarus (1996) defined an emotion as a subjective, mental and 
physiological state in an individual’s mind, associated with a variety of feelings, behaviours 
and thoughts (1996). When the brain processes emotions it causes nerves to constrict certain 
muscle groups in the face. Such reactions, also called micro-expressions, can last from 1/25th 
of a second to 1 second; and they reveal a person’s true emotions (Hadnagy, 2010). In fact, 
micro-expressions often occur involuntarily; and they can, therefore, reveal emotions that 
people are trying to hide (Inc Icon Group International, 2008). 
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Paul Ekman (2004) did cross-cultural research; and he identified seven basic human 
emotions: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, contempt, surprise and enjoyment. Ekman identified 
these seven basic emotions by means of facial expressions. These seven facial expressions 
were found – no matter where one lived in the world, what culture one practised, or to which 
race one belonged.  
By learning to identify and recognise these seven facial expressions, one can get insight into 
just what people are experiencing (Ekman & Friesen, 2003). 
Ekman conducted an experiment; this involved presenting a subject with an image of a facial 
expression and a flash of a micro-expression consisting of 200 milliseconds. Ekman found 
that the micro-expressions altered the way the subject reacted. Even though the subject might 
not have consciously noticed the micro-expression, the subconscious mind did (Ekman & 
Friesen, 2003).  
Li, Zinbarg, Boehm and Paller (2008) did further research on micro-expressions. They 
connected wires between muscle points on the subject’s face and a device that could register 
any muscular movements in the face of the subject. The subject was then presented with a 
video that had a 1/25
th
 of a second flash of a micro-expression. It was found that in almost 
every case, the subject’s muscular movements would mirror the micro-expressions in the 
video. If the video flashed a micro-expression of fear, then the subject would subconsciously 
mimic fear as well. This was true for each emotion.  
When interviewed about the emotion, the subject was feeling, it was the same emotion as that 
displayed in the video. 
This could open up huge advantages (or disadvantages) in terms of deceiving people. The 
experiment proved that one could mimic micro-expressions, in order to get a desired 
emotional response from a potential target (Hadnagy, 2010). This will be elaborated on 
further in the next section. 
3.2.5 Neuro-Linguistic Hacking 
The term referred to as ‘Neuro-Linguistic Hacking’ is at the time of this writing a very new 
concept, as discussed in Hadnagy’s (2010) book: The art of human hacking. In brief, Neuro-
Linguistic Hacking is about using body language, vocal tones and expressions to manipulate 
the feelings and emotions of a target (Hadnagy, 2010). Neuro-Linguistic Hacking can exploit 
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the recent discovery by Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller (2008), as mentioned in the previous 
section, by mimicking micro-expressions in order to deceive individuals. 
As an exercise to prove the validity of Neuro-Linguistic Hacking, one could try the 
following: 
 
 Squeeze the eyebrows together.  
 Bring the eyebrows down and try tensing the whole forehead.  
 Tighten the lips together and glare ahead.  
 
If done properly, one should start to feel anger. By making the muscles on the face move in a 
certain direction, one can be manipulated to feel a desired emotion. If one can mimic the 
anger expression for just 1/25
th
 of a second, one could subconsciously deceive a potential 
target and make that target feel anger as well. This works with any emotional expression 
(Hadnagy, 2010).  
3.2.6 Subliminal Messages 
Similar to Neuro-Linguistic Hacking is subliminal messages. Used in advertising, subliminal 
messages can influence people’s preference for new products. Johan Karremans did a study 
by assessing whether subliminally priming people with a brand name of a drink would affect 
that person's choice of a drink (Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006). 
In the experiment, half of the participants were primed repeatedly with a flash consisting of 
the text "Lipton Ice" on a computer screen for 24 milliseconds, while the other half was 
primed with a flash that did not denote any brand. Karremans found that subliminally priming 
a subject with a “Lipton Ice”, made those who were thirsty want the Lipton Ice. However, 
those participants who were not thirsty were not influenced by the subliminal message, since 
their goal was not to quench their thirst (Karremans et al., 2006). 
Another type of subliminal message may involve using hypnotic language (Mann, 2008). By 
making use of people’s unawareness of the subconscious, a deceiver may use hypnotic 
language and hide secret messages in a sentence which would affect the victim’s 
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subconscious. For example, the sentence: “By now, you can see how this book is clearly right 
for you”, has many hidden messages. First of all, “by now”, would be treated by many 
individuals (subconsciously) as “buy now”. Secondly, the words “you can see”, can make the 
victim visualize buying the book. Finally, “is clearly right for you” is an instruction, which 
gives the victim the chance to insert his own picture of why the book is right for him (Mann, 
2008).  
This direct subconscious manipulation is one of many techniques used by criminals all over 
the world to influence people’s decisions (Mann, 2008).  
3.2.7 Cognitive and Cultural Biases 
Influencing decisions may also be achieved by exploiting any cognitive or cultural biases. 
Cognitive and cultural biases are human errors that may occur when people make decisions. 
They are mental short cuts, also called heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’. In general, these mental 
short cuts are quite useful; but sometimes, they lead to severe and systematic errors (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). However, people cannot function without their heuristics, as living 
would then be too difficult if everything that is perceived, said, and done must first be 
thought through. Psychologist, Robert Cialdini (2007), explains this with the following 
statement. 
“We can’t be expected to recognize and analyze all the aspects in each person, event, and 
situation we encounter in even one day. We haven’t the time, energy, or capacity for it. 
Instead, we must very often use our stereotypes, our rules of thumb, to classify things, 
according to a few key features, and then to respond mindlessly, when one or another of these 
trigger features is present.” 
This statement leads to the concept of probability, which resembles the subjective assessment 
of physical quantities, such as distance or size. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) explained 
probability by how an individual perceives the distance of an object. 
“The apparent distance of an object is determined in part by its clarity; the more sharply the 
object is seen, the closer it appears to be." 
Thus, the reliance on clarity as an indication of distance leads to biases, or simple systematic 
errors. This is one example of how systematic errors can be caused in the human mind. 
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This section has discussed what deception is and how the human element may be exploited or 
deceived by using various methodologies or principles. The next section will discuss how 
social engineers may use these manipulation methods to exploit or deceive their victims. 
3.3 Social Engineering and Related Techniques 
Ian Mann (2008) defines social engineering as: “A practice that can be used to manipulate 
people, by deception, into giving out information or performing an action”. Thus, using 
deception, social engineering influences people’s decisions on whether to perform an action, 
or not. As discussed in the previous section, decisions are subconsciously processed within 
the mind. A social engineer exploits decisions by using some kind of technique that (in many 
cases) either exploits emotions or cognitive or cultural biases inherent in his/her victim 
(Twitchell, 2009).  
These techniques will be discussed later in this section, since it may be impossible to 
influence someone into making a certain decision if he/she perceives the request to be a 
threat. Therefore, the concept of trust must first be discussed. 
3.3.1 Trusting the Social Engineer 
In order for a social engineer to influence an individual into making a certain decision, the 
individual must first trust the social engineer (Jansson & Von Solms, 2010). In the early days, 
before information technologies and telecommunications had become established, many 
people based their decision of trusting someone on how they introduced themselves. At a 
bank, for example, a customer would have to be physically identified when withdrawing 
money. To commit fraud, a social engineer had to control his body language, including: 
posture, eye movements, as well as his non-verbal behavior and paralanguage [speech rate, 
volume, and pitch] (Abagnale & Redding, 1980).  
When telecommunication evolved, a customer could do his/her errands via the phone, 
eliminating the need of having a trustworthy body language. To identify a customer, all that 
was needed was a little information about the customer and a code. To commit fraud in this 
way, a social engineer could simply call the customer, pretending to be from the bank, and 
ask the customer for some information – as well as the customer’s code – for whatever 
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reason. The social engineer could then call the bank, pretend to be the customer, use the code 
and, consequently, transfer money to another account (Mitnick et al., 2003). 
In this new age of a world dependent on information, people must make decisions on whether 
someone is trustworthy, not only face-to-face or via the phone, but also electronically via the 
Internet (Denning, 1999). If, for example, an employee receives an email from an individual 
who asks for the employee’s password, the probability that the individual is a threat (from the 
employee’s point of view), must then be based on what the employee perceives or believes.  
What the employee perceives or believes is then based on how the employee has been 
influenced by the individual, who could be a social engineer (Jansson & Von Solms, 2010).  
If the individual in the former example is a social engineer, the goal of the social engineer 
could be to obtain the password, in order to gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, 
the social engineer would have the goal for the employee to disclose his/her password. To do 
this, the social engineer must influence the employee´s beliefs (Poggi et al., 2008). This may 
be achieved by means of deception, through one or many techniques. These techniques can 
be divided into emotional exploits and exploits of cognitive and cultural biases.  
3.3.2 Exploiting Emotions 
As mentioned in section 3.2, an emotion is a subjective, mental and physiological state in an 
individual’s mind; and it is associated with a variety of feelings, behaviours and thoughts (R. 
S. Lazarus & Lazarus, 1996). Emotions can be divided into: being negative, positive or 
neutral (Twitchell, 2009).  
Negative emotions precede unpleasant feelings; and they can provoke a ‘fight or flight’ 
response, making a victim more likely to flout policies or to disclose sensitive information. In 
contrast, positive emotions are feelings that build a trusting relationship between the social 
engineer and the victim, making the victim more willing to comply with a request. Finally, 
neutral emotions can make the victim feel less accountable for any ensuing incidents 
(Twitchell, 2009).  
When the social engineer deceives a victim by triggering emotions, some sort of technique 
may be used. There are several techniques that can be used to exploit emotions. These 
techniques may be categorized by the type of emotion that the technique exploits [negative, 
positive or neutral] (Twitchell, 2009). 
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Negative emotional exploits 
 Overloading: Overloading a victim with new information, before previous 
information has been processed, can reduce the victim’s ability to think an argument 
through, since people need time to process information (Gragg, 2003).  
 Urgency: During emergencies, many employees often bypass policies and procedures. 
This opens up many opportunities for the social engineer (Mann, 2008). For example, 
a social engineer may claim there is a fire in the server room, and that he needs an 
employee’s password urgently to be able to save the employee’s data. 
 Fear: Here, a social engineer can pretend to be an important visitor or close friend of 
a victim’s CEO and threaten the victim that the incident will be reported, if some 
demands are not met. Another way in which a social engineer could invoke fear in a 
victim could be by deceiving the victim into believing that critical data might be lost, 
if the victim does not follow the social engineer’s instructions (Mitnick et al., 2003). 
 Scarcity: When something is believed to be available for a short time only. For 
example, a social engineer can distribute emails, claiming that the first 500 people to 
register at a web site will win a prize. Since many employees use the same password 
on different systems, the social engineer can, if lucky, get access to these employee’s 
email accounts (Mitnick et al., 2003).  
 
Positive emotional exploits 
 Reciprocation: Reciprocation is based on the social rule that if someone does (or 
promises to do) someone else a favour, then something is expected in return (Cialdini, 
2007). Cialdini (2007) explains this through the following behavioral experiments. If 
two people are in disagreement, and one person yields on some point, the other person 
will feel compelled to yield as well. A social engineer can use the Reciprocation 
technique by making two requests to a victim. After arguing for a while, the social 
engineer would simply yield to one of the requests; and then, the victim would feel 
obliged to yield to the other request (Gragg, 2003). Cialdini (2001) also argues that if 
one individual makes two requests and one request is “bigger” than the other one, it 
will be more likely that the smaller request is approved (after yielding to the bigger 
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request) than if only the smaller request were proposed. Another manner in which the 
reciprocation technique may be utilized is by sending a Christmas card to a victim. 
When the victim receives a Christmas card, he/she could feel obligated to send one 
back. A social engineer can use this method and establish a relationship with his 
victim; hence, utilize the Building Trust technique (Cialdini, 2007). 
 Building Trust: As discussed in section 3.2.5, the principles of Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming (NLP) may be used when one wants to ‘rapidly’ establish trust with 
other people (Davis, 2005). However, building a trusting relationship could also be 
achieved by being in contact with the same person regularly over a long period of 
time. Mitnick et al. (2003) describe a case where a social engineer called a video 
store, requesting the name and number of the manager, as well as the number to the 
video store’s headquarters, ostensibly to thank them both for the good service 
experienced in the store. After retrieving the name and numbers, the social engineer 
called the headquarters, pretending to be the manager asking for a small favour. This 
was repeated many times over the course of a month. With this method, the social 
engineer had by then built up a relationship with the headquarters, and could start 
requesting bigger favours. In this case, the bigger favour was the customer’s credit-
card number, which the headquarters gladly gave the social engineer.  
 Similarity: People commonly like other people they believe are like themselves. A 
social engineer can pretend to have the common interests and goals of a victim, in 
order to get close to the victim (Mann, 2008). Additionally, the social engineer may 
apply the principles of NLP and match the victim´s non-verbal behaviour. Such as the 
victim’s preferred representational system (Sandoval & Adams, 2001). 
 Helpfulness: People generally want to help other people. For example, an employee 
may feel obligated to hold the door open for someone, who may pretend be unable to 
open the door for various reasons, in order to get into the building (Mann, 2008). 
Mitnick et al. (2003) relate the story of a social engineer who waited for a snowstorm 
to enter the city of a company. The social engineer made a phone call to the company 
and claimed that it was impossible to get to work because of the blizzard, and 
consequently, needed the security code to dial-in remotely. Eventually, the operator 
understood the issue and, therefore, disclosed the security code. 
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 Integrity: Employees have strong tendencies to carry out commitments they believe 
were made by their fellow employees (Gragg, 2003). For example, if a social engineer 
gets hold of a vacation schedule, he could claim that an employee, currently on 
vacation, had promised something. The victim would then feel committed to carry out 
the request (Gragg, 2003). 
 Legitimacy: This makes the victim believe that the source is legitimate. Mitnick et al. 
(2003) relate a story of a social engineer who registered a web domain with the name 
"paypal-secure.com" and sent out emails to Paypal users, claiming that their credit-
card information must be up-dated. When a user attempted to up-date the credentials 
on the website (believing the website was a legitimate Paypal-site), all the information 
was redirected to the social engineer. This type of ‘scam’ is often referred to as 
‘Phishing’ (Mann, 2008). Phishing will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 Authority: According to Cialdini (2007), people have a tendency to comply when a 
request is made by a person in authority. A social engineer could claim to be an 
executive or an individual who works for an executive in a company; and thereby, 
trade on the victim's natural instinct of wanting to be helpful. This could also make 
the victim believe that helping out with the request could benefit the victim’s future in 
the company (Mitnick et al., 2003). 
 Conformity: By using the conformity technique, the social engineer can make the 
victim believe that a request has previously been approved by other fellow employees; 
thereby, making the victim feel less responsible, as the responsibility is extended to 
the other fellow-employees (Lively, 2003). Thus, the victim merely wants to comply 
by doing what others have already done in the past (Twitchell, 2009). For example, a 
social engineer may claim that a request, contrary to policies, has been approved by 
other fellow-employees before. This may influence a victim into feeling uncertain 
about the policy; and consequently, carrying out the request (Lively, 2003). 
 Curiosity: The social engineer can make use of curiosity, by tempting the victim with 
a desire to know or see something (Twitchell, 2009). For example, sending a message 
to a victim, with a Trojan horse attached, which offers something enticing, such as 
confidential information or free pornography. When the victim opens the attachment, 
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the worm will spread over the network, retrieving and then sending all the desired 
information to the social engineer (Mitnick et al., 2003). 
 
Neutral Emotional Exploits 
 Carelessness: When people are careless, it opens up many opportunities for a social 
engineer. Any sensitive information that an individual throws away (such as unwanted 
credit-card applications, bank advertisements etc.), could simply be collected and 
replicated by the social engineer, until he/she discovers what is desired. This tactic is 
also called “dumpster diving”. Another way of exploiting carelessness could be by 
looking for passwords written down and left out in the open. “Anything from a sticky 
note on the monitor to a note stuck under the desk drawer is an obvious security risk” 
(Lively, 2003). Consequently, carelessness can be exploited when the social engineer 
takes advantage of the victim's lack of vigilance (Twitchell, 2009). 
 Diffusion of Responsibility: Diffusion of responsibility is a social phenomenon that 
occurs when a group of people spread their responsibility among each other. Freeman 
et al. (1975) explained this phenomenon by relating how people in restaurants give 
tips. Members in a large group of diners tend to leave smaller tips than those in a 
smaller group. In a large group, each individual believes that the difference will be 
made up by someone else who ‘over-tips’; while in a small group, each individual 
knows that his contribution will make a difference. Likewise, in an organization, it is 
easy for end-users to believe that security is not their responsibility, since there are 
individuals in the organization who are assigned specific information security posts 
(Mitnick et al., 2003). Consequently, a social engineer can make a victim believe that 
an incident is not, or will not be, the victim's fault. 
 
Either Negative or Positive Emotional Exploits 
 Strong Affect: This influences the victim into feeling a strong sense of surprise or 
anger. For instance, a social engineer can propose a lottery win, or could frighten an 
employee into believing that his/her job is on the line (Twitchell, 2009). 
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 Name-dropping: This influences the victim into believing that the social engineer 
knows somebody the victim knows, by mentioning that person’s name. According to 
Mitnick et al.(2003), a victim is more likely to do a favour for the social engineer, if 
the victim believes that the social engineer has a close relationship with somebody the 
victim knows. 
 Flattery: The social engineer makes the victim feel special by giving him/her a gift or 
paying him/her a nice compliment. Frank Abagnale, a famous social engineer during 
the mid 1900s, used flattery to get what he wanted, while simply pretending to be 
someone else. To get a loan in a bank, he would first dress up as a person with high 
status, such as a pilot – and then approach women working as cashiers and 
compliment them. This made them do everything in their power to help him. 
“Abagnale wrote $2.5 million in bad checks, practised law without a licence, 
practised medicine with no medical training, and co-piloted a Pan-Am jet with a fake 
licence, all by mastering the art of social engineering” (Abagnale & Redding, 1980). 
3.3.3 Exploiting Cognitive or Cultural Biases 
As discussed earlier, another method a social engineer may use to attack his victim is by 
exploiting the victim’s cognitive or cultural biases. Cognitive or cultural biases are human 
errors that occur when people make decisions. Some of these errors were given as examples 
in section 3.2.7. However there are other kinds of biases that are more conducive to social 
engineering. 
 
Cognitive and Cultural Bias Exploits 
 Representativeness: When stories contain details, they seem more credible. This 
phenomenon is called representativeness. For example, a social engineer may phone a 
victim, and claim he is calling from the server room and sees strange activity on the 
network, and consequently needs the victim's password. Because details including, 
location and reason, are used, the victim may be more likely to believe the social 
engineer, than if only the password claimed were needed (Twitchell, 2009). 
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 Anchoring: People make (in many situations) estimates by starting from an initial 
value. This phenomenon is called “anchoring” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Once a 
more unusual request is established as a baseline, a less unusual request would seem 
more reasonable (Cialdini, 2007). For example, a social engineer may just want to 
know what operating system is being run in a victim’s organization; but by asking for 
the password to the system first, he may influence the victim into giving out the 
details of the operating system (Twitchell, 2009). 
 
Some of the many techniques a social engineer may employ to deceive a victim have now 
been defined. These techniques may change the perceptions and beliefs of a victim’s reality, 
and could, consequently, allow the social engineer to pursue his/her goal. Being aware of 
these techniques may allow employees or individual users to identify, mitigate or even 
prevent social engineering-related attacks.  
3.4  Conclusion 
When one has the intention to deceive people, one can influence their beliefs. These beliefs 
may persuade a person into performing some action or desist from performing an action 
(Poggi et al., 2008). Using social skills to deceive an individual into giving out information or 
performing an action may be referred to as social engineering. A social engineer can use 
many methods to deceive the human being (Mitnick et al., 2003). By simply making use of 
various techniques to gain trust with employees, the social engineer can obtain confidential 
information, such as passwords (Twitchell, 2009). Any medium may be used to perform such 
techniques (Denning, 1999).  
When using the Internet medium, phishing is a very common method (Aburrous et al., 2010; 
Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mann, 2008; 
McCall, 2007; Symantec, 2010b). Phishing commonly involves using emails to persuade 
people to disclose sensitive information, such as passwords or bank account details (Aaron, 
2010). Many people have lost large amounts of money, by responding with their sensitive 
information to phishing attacks (McCall, 2007). Likewise, companies lose millions of dollars 
each year due to phishing attacks (Symantec, 2010b). Therefore, phishing is a big problem 
nowadays. Consequently, the next chapter will discuss Phishing in more detail. 
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Chapter 4: Phishing 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 discussed the phenomenon of social engineering and the related techniques. A 
social engineer uses various techniques to deceive people; and thereby, to manipulate their 
decisions – for example, to give out information and to perform certain actions (Jansson & 
Von Solms, 2010). If the social engineer succeeds with an attack, the attacked individual or 
organization can be seriously harmed (Mann, 2008).  
Any medium can be used to carry out such an attack. However, many criminals are currently 
using email to carry out their attacks. This practice is commonly known as phishing (Aaron, 
2010; Aburrous et al., 2010; Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007; Jagatic et al., 2007; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mann, 2008).   
Phishing attacks have increased tremendously in recent times; and the lack of awareness and 
know-how regarding such attacks can have devastating effects on any organization or 
individual (Symantec, 2010a). Some organizations lose millions of US dollars every year 
through attacks that involve these phishing attacks in one or other manner (Symantec, 2010a). 
These attacks cost American citizens over three billion dollars per year, according to a survey 
by Gartner (McCall, 2007).  
The aim of this chapter is to give some background on what phishing is, why criminals use 
phishing, and how the users of the Internet and ICT-related services can protect themselves 
from falling prey to phishing attacks. To do this, it is important to define and discuss phishing 
in detail. Consequently, this chapter will begin with some history of phishing; and then it will 
define phishing. Thereafter, the motives for using phishing to attack individuals or entire 
organizations will be discussed. This will then lead into a discussion regarding the 
distribution of phishing attacks and how criminals fabricate ‘spam’ services – in order to 
distribute their phishing attacks. Following this, a discussion regarding where phishing 
attacks originate from today, as well as some common characteristics of phishing messages, 
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will also be discussed. Finally, the chapter will focus on how to mitigate these phishing 
attacks. 
4.2 The History of Phishing 
The company America Online (AOL) was one of the first to provide online services to users 
at a fee. However, soon afterwards, many criminals began to use these services free of 
charge. By providing a false identity, together with a random credit card number, criminals 
could register ‘false’ accounts at AOL (Jakobsson & Myers, 2006).  
When AOL attempted to bill a false account, they found that the credit card information was 
incorrect. Consequently, AOL deactivated the false accounts and adopted countermeasures to 
prevent false accounts from being registered. As a result, the criminals changed their way of 
thinking (Jakobsson & Myers, 2006). 
Instead of creating new accounts with false information, some criminals ‘hijacked’ accounts 
from legitimate users. To ‘hijack’ an account, the criminals posed as employees of AOL, and 
then contacted legitimate users, requesting their passwords for various reasons. For example, 
the criminal could claim that the legitimate user needs to verify his/her password for security 
reasons (Jakobsson & Myers, 2006).  
Many of the legitimate AOL users were deceived into following the instructions for verifying 
the password; and subsequently, they disclosed their passwords to the criminals. These 
attacks may have been the first ones to be known as ‘Phishing’ (Jakobsson & Myers, 2006). 
Nowadays, ‘phishing’ does not only exploit accounts, such as those of AOL, to gain access to 
free online services. Today, ‘phishers’ attempt to gain credit card numbers and bank account 
details – in order to steal money, commit fraud, or launder money (Jakobsson & Myers, 
2006). Additionally, some attacks are launched at specific targets, in order to obtain user-
names and passwords. These can then be used for corporate espionage and similar criminal 
activities (Jakobsson & Myers, 2006). 
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4.3 Definition of Phishing 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2009) defines phishing as: “The fraudulent practice of 
sending emails purporting to be from reputable companies in order to induce individuals to 
reveal personal information, such as passwords and credit card numbers, online.” The 
process of a phishing attack normally follows the steps listed below: 
When a user is presented with a phishing email message, the user is requested to conform to 
some action, such as updating his/her credentials or verifying his/her identity by clicking on a 
link in the message. But when the user accesses the link, the user is redirected to a fake 
website that looks as authentic as the company’s website. Nevertheless, this website is 
designed to elicit sensitive information from the user, which is then sent to the attacker 
instead of the user’s company (Aburrous et al., 2010).  
An example of a phishing message is illustrated in Figure 4.1. This phishing message uses 
some of the social engineering techniques, as discussed in Chapter 3, including: 
 
 Legitimacy: The company’s logotype is illustrated in the message. 
 Fear: If the user does not follow the instructions, there may be future problems with 
the user’s Internet-banking access. 
 Helpfulness: “It is all about keeping you safe online”. 
 Urgency: “You are required to adhere to this as quickly as possible”. 
 
If a user responds with sensitive information, such as his/her bank account password or credit 
card details, an attacker could drain the user´s bank account completely (Mann, 2008). 
Therefore, the user should never respond to an email requesting such information.  
A phishing message may also deceive the user into opening a malicious file attachment (He 
et al., 2011). When a user opens such a malicious attachment, the attachment might harm the 
user’s computer system and/or send all desirable information to its creator (Mann, 2008). An 
example of a phishing message containing a malicious attachment is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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This message also uses many of the social engineering techniques, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
including: 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Latest phishing scam (ABSA, 2011) 
 
 Legitimacy: The company’s logotype is illustrated in the message. 
 Overloading: There are many instructions in the message; this could overload the 
victim with information and; subsequently, reduce the victim’s ability to judge 
whether the message is legitimate or false.  
 Fear: The message claims that there are “new charges” in the statement. 
 Helpfulness: “For your security it has been decrypted”.  
 Curiosity: The message may tempt the victim into looking at the statement. 
 Representativeness: The message contains many technical details. For example, 
“encrypted”, “decoder”, “dialogue box”.  
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Sometimes an attack is directed towards a specific target. In such cases, the attack is often 
referred to as ‘spear-phishing’. Spear-phishing attacks a specific target by using specifically 
crafted phishing email messages, unique for that target. A potential target could range 
anywhere from a whole organization to only one individual. The goal of these attacks is, 
generally, to gain access to corporate online banking systems, corporate Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), and other online resources (Symantec, 2010a).  
In fact, spear-phishing often begins with some reconnaissance on the potential target. This 
can include researching publicly available information about the company and its employees, 
such as from social networking sites (Symantec, 2010a). Consequently, employees should be 
careful what information they put on social networking sites. 
From the former discussion, it may be concluded that one of the main motives for conducting 
phishing attacks is money. The next section will discuss this, together with other motives for 
conducting phishing attacks. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Latest phishing scam using a malicious attachment (ABSA, 2011) 
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4.4 Phishing Motives 
Figure 4.3 lists the range of prices for various items for sale on the black market. For 
example, the most frequently advertised item observed on underground economy servers was 
credit card information, accounting for 23 percent of all goods (Symantec, 2010b). “Prices 
for credit card information ranged from $2 to $20, depending on the type of card, the country 
of origin and the amount of bundled personal information used for card-holder verification. 
Symantec observed bulk purchase offers of 50 credit cards for $100, 100 credit cards for 
$100 to $150, and 1000 credit cards for $300”(Symantec, 2010b).  
Acquiring such credit-card information may be accomplished by means of phishing attacks 
(Mann, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers (Symantec, 2010b) 
 
As seen in Figure 4.3, one can also purchase email accounts (username and password) on the 
black market. These have in many cases been extracted by means of phishing (Mann, 2008). 
If a criminal obtains a user´s email password, the criminal may get full access to the user´s 
email account. This could allow the criminal to: 
 
 Extract information from the user´s email messages and use this information to steal 
the user´s identity. 
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 Search the user´s email system for user-names and passwords to services or websites 
where the user is registered. 
 View sensitive or confidential information the user has sent or received. 
 ‘Hijack’ the user’s account and use the account to distribute ‘spam’ messages 
(discussed later) or send other types of messages, originating from that account. 
 
Figure 4.3 also lists email addresses. The phrase ‘10$ - $20 per MB’ refers to the fact that a 
one megabyte ‘text file’ consisting of email addresses may be sold for between 10 to 20 US 
dollars on the black market (Symantec, 2010b).  
The IEEE Standards Board have decided that Mega means 1 000 000. 1 megabyte refers to 1 
million bytes and 1 byte refers to one character in ‘text files’ (Brain, 2005). Should each 
email address contain 20 characters, then 1 megabyte contains 50 000 email addresses. Thus, 
for around 50 000 email addresses, one may gain 10 to 20 US dollars. This may not sound 
like a lot of money. However, there were, according to Radicati (2009), 1.4 billion email 
accounts on May 2009. This number increased to 2.9 billion email accounts in Radicati’s 
report from April 2010; and this is expected to increase to 3.8 billion email accounts in 2014 
(The Radicati Group, Inc., 2010).  
Thus, the amount of email accounts increased by 1.5 billion in less than one year. This 
implies that there were around 1.5 billion new email addresses available for criminals to 
obtain during this time. Based on the ’20 characters per email address’ quota, this implies that 
30 000 megabytes of emails were accessible between May 2009 and April 2010 (1.5 billion / 
50 000 = 30 000). Therefore, 300 000 US dollars’ worth of email addresses could have been 
‘extracted’ during this time (if the average size of each email address is 20 characters).  
To extract as much as 1.5 billion email addresses may seem to be a complicated process. 
However, using phishing may automate such processes. Additionally, to spread the phishing, 
emails SPAM services are used in a widespread manner (Mann, 2008). 
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4.5 SPAM 
According to HarperCollins (2010), the term 'spam' derives from the show Monty Python´s 
Flying Circus. One sketch shows a café in which spam (the trademark name for 'spiced ham') 
is part of every dish. The café is filled with Vikings who sing a song – endlessly repeating the 
word 'spam', thus preventing any normal conversation. “This mirrors the irritating ubiquity 
of junk email and its disruptive effect on the internet discussion boards, hence the term” 
(HarperCollins, 2010). 
While many users see spam as the ‘irritating ubiquity of junk mail’, for an organization it can 
represent a significant expense. According to Radicati (2009), a typical 1,000-user 
organization can spend upwards of three million US dollars a year to fight and manage spam.  
To manage and fight spam there are many solutions. For example, ‘spam filtering’ examines 
the sender’s address or email ‘header’ content (Drucker, Wu, & Vapnik, 1999). Spam 
filtering may complicate the process of sending spam, since the ‘spammer’ must disguise the 
message in order to get it through the spam filters (Cormack, 2007). However, although a 
spam filter may make the process of sending spam more difficult for the spammer, the spam 
filter may sometimes block a ‘valid message’ also (Drucker et al., 1999).  
As this chapter focuses on phishing, it is outside the scope to go any deeper into the definition 
of spam. However, it should be noticed that SPAM simplifies the process of distributing 
phishing for a criminal, since the criminal does not have to subscribe for ‘legitimate’ email 
services and risk being reported to the authorities. Additionally, tracking from where the 
phishing email originates may then be harder for the authorities.  
4.6 The Origin of Phishing Attacks 
There are many methods adopted by researches to find out from where phishing messages 
originate (Symantec, 2010b). Symantec (2010b), for example, has more than 240 000 sensors 
situated all over the world that monitor ‘attack activity’ – through a combination of products 
and services. For instance, according to Symantec (2010b), most attacks (including phishing), 
originated from the United States between July and September 2010.  
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To identify the country from which attacks are originating, Symantec (2010b) maps the IP 
addresses of the attacking systems. However, since attackers often use compromised systems 
to launch attacks remotely, the location of the attacking systems may differ from the actual 
location of the attacker. Consequently, the statistics that indicate from which country an 
attack originates from should be taken with caution.  
Since it is difficult to determine where many threats (including a phishing threat) originate, 
one may have to base such a decision on where a threat ‘appears’ to originate. Thus, if the 
threat is internal, it ‘appears’ to originate from inside an organization, and if the threat is 
external, it ‘appears’ to originate from outside the organization. 
To launch an attack that appears to be internal, criminals may, as discussed above, 
compromise a system to launch attacks remotely (Mann, 2008). If an attacker acquires an 
employee’s email account credentials (user-name and password), then the email account’s 
‘email system’ may be exploited, as a message would appear to be originating from within 
the organisation (Jagatic et al., 2007).  
For example, many email systems and spam filters are often designed to permit entry from 
any email that originates from inside the organization (Drucker et al., 1999). Therefore, the 
criminal can exploit this vulnerability and, consequently, avoid spam filters or other 
countermeasures. Additionally, if the message appears to originate from a fellow employee, 
other fellow employees may be more likely to believe that the message is legitimate, than 
would be the case if the message originated from an unknown address.  
There are also occasions when an individual who is internal to the organization may want to 
launch an attack that appears to be external. For example, if a disgruntled employee’s motive 
is money, a message that appears to be coming from a bank, may provide more profit than a 
message that appears to come from a fellow employee. 
4.7 Common Characteristics of Phishing Messages 
To be able to mitigate a phishing attack, one must first be able to identify such an attack. 
There are some common characteristics of phishing messages. Firstly, frequently the message 
is not addressed to the addressee. For example, the message might start with “Dear 
customer”, instead of the customer’s real name (Drake, Oliver, & Koontz, 2004). Secondly, 
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frequently a message contains bad spelling (Aburrous et al., 2010). The reason for this may 
be because many phishing attacks originate from countries where the victim’s language is not 
spoken.  
Consequently, if there are many spelling mistakes in a message, it might well be a scam. 
Thirdly, often a message seems to be ‘too good to be true’. Examples involves ‘Nigerian 
scams’, where the sender claims he/she is a rich person who wishes to deposit funds in the 
victim’s bank account, and therefore, needs the victim’s bank account details (Stajano & 
Wilson, 2011). Finally, a phishing message that includes a link to an organization’s website 
often has the incorrect address to that website. Sometimes the link can even be ‘hidden’ 
inside some code and, thus, display a ‘valid’ address to the victim.  
To confirm whether a link is valid, the receiver could choose to ‘copy the link location’ and 
paste it in ‘notepad’ before clicking on the link. If the text does not contain the organization’s 
real website address, the email message might well be a scam (Drake et al., 2004). 
Nevertheless, there are many other ways to detect or mitigate phishing attacks. Some of these 
methods will now be discussed in the next section. 
4.8 Mitigating the Phisher 
To mitigate a phishing attack, many solutions in the form of models, policies, awareness 
programs and technical controls have been developed. All of them have some advantages and 
disadvantages.  
One technical solution is to use anti-phishing security toolbars. These connect to a database 
or list, where known phishing websites are blacklisted. Examples include, Websense, 
McAfee’s anti–phishing filter, Netcraft anti-phishing system and Microsoft Phishing Filter 
(Aburrous et al., 2010). However, phishing sites are cheap, easy to build and their average 
lifetime is only a few days. Therefore, a blacklist may not always be adequate. 
Shahriar & Zulkernine (2011) have developed and implemented a technical approach in the 
form of a tool named PhishTester to automate the process of testing whether a website is a 
phishing website or a legitimate website. The tool has evaluated 33 unique previous phishing 
websites and 19 legitimate websites that belong to 45 organizations. Their results show that 
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the tool detected all previous phishing and legitimate websites. However, their tool does not 
detect phishing attacks that use embedded objects (e.g. Flash).  
Furthermore, malicious attachments cannot be detected by their tool. 
Jansson and von Solms (2010) adopted an educational approach, and developed a flowchart 
that employees can follow – to identify, mitigate or even prevent social engineering attacks. 
This flowchart considers each medium, including the email medium, used for phishing 
attacks. Subsequently, following the steps through the flowchart may hopefully prevent the 
user from falling prey to phishing attacks.  
The former approaches may be sufficient in many cases to prevent the success of some 
phishing attacks. However, it may be inefficient to adopt every single countermeasure 
regarding phishing attacks in an organization, as spending resources on inefficient or 
ineffective countermeasures could involve big financial losses – both in terms of resources 
spent on the countermeasures and successful phishing attacks (Mann, 2008). Therefore, it is 
important that the organization should be able to find out what countermeasures work best for 
them. 
To find information on which are the best countermeasures, an organization needs 
information on how well the countermeasure will protect them against an attack (S. H. Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2008). As phishing attacks involve deceiving humans, the effectiveness 
of such countermeasures may be obtained by evaluating the level of phishing awareness of 
the organization’s end-users (Dodge et al., 2007).  
To evaluate the phishing awareness of end-users, many researchers have used security 
exercises that simulate real phishing attempts (Dodge et al., 2007; Hasle, Kristiansen, Kintel, 
& Snekkenes, 2005; Jagatic et al., 2007; Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz, 2006).  
Jagatic et al. (2007) studied the vulnerability of a university community to a phishing email 
that pretended to come from somebody in their own social network. Hasle et al. (2005) 
developed a social engineering metric, called Social Engineering Resistance (SER), to 
evaluate the effectiveness of social engineering countermeasures. Furthermore, they 
conducted an email exercise that involved distributing ‘fake’ socially engineered emails to 
120 subjects; and it then measured their resistance.  
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Dodge et al. (2007) conducted a number of exercises over a couple of years on the United 
States Military Academy (USMA) – in order to evaluate the success of their awareness 
programs. These exercises involved sending ‘fake’ phishing messages to 4118 students and 
recording their actions.  
Some have also simulated real phishing attacks, in an attempt to cultivate phishing 
awareness. For example, Kumaraguru et al. (2009) sent 515 volunteers a series of 3 
legitimate and 7 ‘fake’ phishing emails over the course of 28 days, and trained these subjects 
with an automated training component called ‘PhishGuru’. 
PhishGuru is an ‘embedded’ training system that teaches users to avoid falling prey to 
phishing attacks. PhishGuru does this by sending ‘fake’ phishing emails to the users and 
recording their action. Reacting users receive a ‘training message’ when falling for the attack. 
Each simulated phishing email acts not only as a mechanism to deliver training, but also as a 
test to determine whether the user has learnt how to distinguish between legitimate messages 
and phishing messages. Therefore, one can identify and present training interventions only to 
those users who continue to fall for simulated phishing attacks.  
This principle is similar to what is often referred to as ‘education on-demand’ (Gordon & 
Pawlowski, 2002). 
The results of the study by Kumaraguru et al. (2009) show that: Firstly, users trained with 
PhishGuru retain this knowledge, even after 28 days. Secondly, adding a second training 
message to reinforce the original training decreases the likelihood of people giving 
information to phishing websites. Thirdly, training does not decrease users’ willingness to 
click on links in legitimate messages. Finally, most participants enjoyed receiving training 
during their normal use of emails. 
The author of this dissertation has used this latter approach in an attempt to develop a model 
to cultivate social engineering resistance within an organization. This model will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the term ‘phishing’. Many criminals have adopted social 
engineering skills to electronically commit fraud. This practice can be referred to as phishing. 
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One of the key motives for conducting phishing attacks is money. Email-addresses, email-
accounts and credit-card numbers and suchlike are sold extensively on the black market 
today. Using phishing makes it relatively easy to obtain such information.  
A user or whole organization that has been a victim to a phishing attack can face disastrous 
consequences in terms of loss of reputation, financial losses and suchlike (McCall, 2007). 
Therefore, it is important that the right countermeasures be implemented in an organization. 
Many researchers agree that education, training and awareness are the right countermeasures 
to phishing (Dodge et al., 2007; Jakobsson & Myers, 2006; Jansson & Von Solms, 2011a; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mann, 2008).  
In order to protect users against phishing attacks, a model for cultivating social engineering 
resistance within an organization is proposed. This model simulates real phishing attacks – in 
an attempt to educate vulnerable users in real time, thereby providing ‘education on-demand’. 
This model will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Developing a Social Engineering 
Resistant User Model 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 discussed information security in general; and came to the conclusion that people 
are commonly deemed as the weakest link in keeping information secure. As a result, a 
discussion of the human element and how the human mind can be ‘hacked’ evolved. Hacking 
the human mind is another term for social engineering (Mann, 2008).  
Social engineering can be described more specifically as a practice one can use to deceiving 
people into making decisions or performing an action (Jansson & Von Solms, 2010). This can 
be done using any medium. Recently, the Internet has been a popular ‘tool’ for criminals to 
carry out social engineering attacks (Symantec, 2010c). When such an attack involves 
obtaining information via email, the attack may be referred to as a phishing attack (Aburrous 
et al., 2010). 
Most researchers agree that education, training and awareness are the key countermeasures to 
protect users and organizations from falling prey to social-engineering attacks, including 
phishing (Dodge et al., 2007; Jagatic et al., 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mann, 2008). 
Consequently, this chapter proposes a model for mitigating the problems associated with 
social engineering. This proposal is based on how the human immune system can educate 
itself – after having fallen victim to a foreign micro-organism. This micro-organism could be 
anything ranging from a dangerous flu virus to a harmless vaccine (World Health 
Organization, 2005).  
Vaccines typically expose the human immune system to the harmless portion of a bacterium 
or virus (World Health Organization, 2005). When the immune system encounters this 
harmless portion, it destroys and memorises it. Subsequently, similar ‘attacks’ can be 
destroyed in future more rapidly. Hence, a vaccine may be thought of as a ‘fake’ attack on the 
immune system, with the intention of preventing any attack in the future.  
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The former principle may also be used when educating people on social engineering-related 
attacks. Thus, conducting a ‘fake’ social engineering attack, in order to identify vulnerable 
users, and then educating these vulnerable users accordingly is analogous to a biological 
vaccine´s effect on the human immune system.  
To represent this principle, a Social Engineering Resistant User Model (SERUM) was 
developed (Jansson & Von Solms, 2011b). The aim of this chapter is to propose this model – 
by using the analogy between a human vaccine and a social engineering vaccine. 
Furthermore, the intention is to develop and explain a software implementation of the model 
that may be used to make end-users aware of phishing. Nevertheless, in order to understand 
the analogy mentioned above, the human immune system must first be discussed. 
Consequently, the following section will briefly discuss the human immune system. 
5.2 The Human Immune System 
The human immune system fulfils many important functions. For example, the immune 
system makes most people resistant to dangerous micro-organisms (microbes) that would 
normally, without the immune system, make most people sick, or even kill some (World 
Health Organization, 2005). These microbes include bacteria, biological viruses and suchlike. 
The mission of these dangerous microbes is to infect the cells within a human body, which 
they can utilize to replicate themselves, and ultimately destroy the body in which they reside 
(Cummings, 2006).  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that if one were never infected, the immune system 
would not be able to ‘teach’ itself; and consequently, to recognize a potentially more 
dangerous attack in the future.  
To recognize an attack, the immune system distinguishes the body’s own (self) cells and 
microbes from other (foreign) cells (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 
2008a). All cells and microbes wear a “uniform” made up of molecules that cover their 
surfaces. Each human cell displays distinctive marker-molecules unique to the body. Foreign 
microbes display different marker-molecules, which are unique to them. The immune system 
uses these markers to distinguish between the cells that are part of the body, harmless bacteria 
that reside inside the body, and harmful invading microbes that need to be destroyed 
(National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2008a).  
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The marker-molecules on a microbe that identify it as foreign and stimulate the immune 
system to attack it are called “antigens” (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, 2008a).  
When an antigen is encountered, the immune system destroys the microbe ‘wearing’ the 
antigen. This work is carried out by an army of various specialized cells, each designed, or 
‘educated’, to fight diseases in a particular way. One of these specialized cells includes white 
blood cells called macrophages (literally, “big eaters”). The macrophage’s job is to engulf as 
many of the microbes as it can (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2008a). 
Macrophages digest most parts of the microbes, but save the antigens and ‘notify’ other cells, 
such as specialized defensive white blood cells, called lymphocytes, so that these can 
recognize and destroy the dangerous microbes more rapidly (National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases, 2008a). 
When the immune system eliminates the dangerous microbes faster than they can reproduce, 
the immune system finally gains the upper hand. Gradually, the disease disappears from the 
body. After the body eliminates the disease, some immune system cells are converted into 
memory cells (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2008a). The memory 
cell’s mission is to remember previous encounters with the same antigen, allowing a more 
rapid, massive response to any future exposure (Cummings, 2006). 
Thus, the immune system recognizes dangerous microbes based on their ‘foreign uniform’; it 
then destroys the microbes and later remembers what the ‘uniform’ looks like. Consequently, 
the immune system can destroy the dangerous microbe next time it enters the body, before it 
can infect the body (Cullen, 2009). Some of these principles are similar to the computer´s 
‘immune system’, commonly known as an antivirus program (Helmreich, 2000; Spafford, 
1991; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). 
5.3 An Infectious Analogy 
Like humans, many computers also have an ‘immune system’ installed. This is normally 
referred to as an antivirus program (Helmreich, 2000). Just as the human immune system 
detects foreign microbes based on the antigen (its uniform), the Antivirus program may detect 
‘foreign’ malicious programs based on their ‘signatures’ (Helmreich, 2000). These are unique 
‘snippets’ of the code of the malicious program.  
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Although an antivirus program may protect or destroy a virus once it is inside the computer, 
it does not protect the user from being deceived into disabling the antivirus program (Mann, 
2008). Furthermore, it can happen that a virus is newer than the antivirus program. In such 
cases, the antivirus program may not recognise the virus (Sophos, 2009). Consequently, the 
virus would have full access to the computer system. 
As in the above case, an antivirus program does not normally protect the user from being 
deceived into disclosing sensitive information (Mann, 2008). Although, many anti-phishing 
tools exist, a user can still be deceived into disabling these. Additionally, new means on how 
criminals can avoid or get through anti-phishing tools appear almost every day (Symantec, 
2010a). Consequently, it would be much better if a virus could never get into the computer in 
the first place, or that the user would refrain from disclosing sensitive information.  
Since the user of the computer system plays an important role in protecting the system, it is 
critical that the user is trained on how to protect the system, because an antivirus program 
cannot protect the system against most human errors (Mann, 2008). Neither can the antivirus 
protect against attacks that are ‘unknown’ to the antivirus program (Leszczyna, Nai Fovino, 
& Masera, 2008). Therefore, an alternative approach, focusing on training the human mind, 
instead of ‘training’ the computer, may be necessary. 
5.3.1 Vaccinating the User 
Since the user is the one using the computer, it is proposed that the user should be 
‘vaccinated’ as well as the computer. Thus, the user should be educated on how he/she can be 
protected from malicious attacks. This principle is very similar to the way in which a 
biological vaccine educates the human immune system. 
A biological vaccine is a weakened, often harmless antigen, taken orally or by injection, that 
provokes a primary immune response to a particular disease and the production of memory 
cells (World Health Organization, 2005). In other words, a vaccine tricks the immune system 
into teaching the body important lessons on how to defeat its opponents (National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2008b). Likewise, a social engineering ‘vaccine’ may teach 
individuals important lessons on how to ‘defeat’ a malicious request.  
It is therefore proposed that the individual should be exposed to ‘fake’ attacks in a controlled 
manner – in order to (like the immune system) be educated on which requests are malicious 
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(dangerous microbes) and which are not. In other words, learn how to distinguish dangerous 
(foreign) from safe (one’s own) emails. Additionally, and as in memory cells, the learning 
skills may improve with continuous exposure to the same malicious or ‘fake’ request.  
For example, if a user is exposed to a ‘fake’ phishing attack, and the user believes the attack 
is real, the probability (from the user’s point of view) that phishing messages can appear in 
this user’s inbox could thereby be influenced by the increased frequency of phishing attacks. 
Thus, like the human immune system, the user may recognize the fake attack as being 
foreign, and then ‘destroy’ the attack (delete the email message), while later remembering it.  
This could, subsequently, make the user more cautious towards other similar email messages 
in the future. However, if the user is unaware of phishing attacks, and responds with sensitive 
information or opens an attached file, the users’ future behaviour may also be influenced. 
This, in turn, may be countered by notifying and training the user.  
5.4 Cultivating Social Engineering Resistance 
As discussed in Chapter 2, to cultivate any type of security awareness a person normally 
needs to become educated through four stages, as presented in the conscious competence 
learning model (Chapman, 2010). These stages may be encapsulated into a model for 
cultivating social engineering resistance. The stages of the conscious-competence learning 
model will now be explained in terms of how they may apply in a model for cultivating social 
engineering resistance within an organization to emails (phishing).  
In the following scenario, a man receives a simulated phishing attack in his email system. 
The attack is distributed, in order to make the man aware of phishing attacks. The message 
requests the man to respond with his email user-name and password, with the reasoning that 
some database has apparently crashed. The man believes that the ´fake´ message is a 
legitimate message, and responds with his email user-name and password. To positively 
influence the future behaviour of the man, learning and education – through the following 
stages of the conscious competence learning model – must necessarily take place: 
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 Stage 1: Unconscious incompetence 
The man is at first unconsciously incompetent. He is unaware that he can be a risk to 
his organization or to himself, when using the email-system insecurely. For example, 
this can happen when responding with sensitive information or opening email 
attachments from strangers. To be able to advance from this stage, the man must first 
realise that he is currently unable to behave securely in his organization’s email 
system. Thus, the man must become ‘consciously incompetent’, which is normally 
done through some awareness exercise. 
 
 Stage 2: Consciously incompetent 
Through some awareness exercise, the man has realised that he is incompetent with 
regard to behaving securely in his organization’s email system. This can be 
accomplished through an automated educational component that could instantly notify 
the man of his insecure behaviour, whenever he behaves insecurely. Additionally, the 
educational component could involve some awareness of the type of attack that the 
man has, in the past, already been exposed to. Thus, in this stage the man has realised 
that he is incompetent and that some skills are required to securely deal with potential 
threats through email attacks. 
 
 Stage 3: Consciously competent 
The man has now realised that he may be a risk to himself or his organization when 
using emails in an insecure manner. The man has been skilled in the correct way to 
deal with company emails. However, the man must consciously judge each decision 
on whether to respond to an email or not, requesting sensitive information. Even 
though the man may be educated and skilled regarding phishing attacks, it is not yet 
natural for the man to correctly handle phishing attacks. 
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 Stage 4: Unconsciously competent 
At this stage, the man is resistant to most phishing attacks. Identifying, ignoring 
and/or reporting phishing attacks have become part of the man’s natural behaviour. 
However, becoming unconsciously competent takes practice. By repeatedly being 
exposed to the same or similar attacks (regardless of whether the attack is fake or 
real), the man may eventually advance to this stage.  
 
To further encourage correct behaviour continuously, the reinforcement theory – coined by 
psychologist, B.F. Skinner (Skinner, 1954), could be utilized. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
reinforcement theory argues that learning results from the association between behaviours 
and rewards. Positive reinforcement occurs when behaviour is followed by a reward, which 
increases the probability that the desired behaviour will be repeated.  
Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) compared the effects of various rewards and found that simple 
recognition or feedback (knowledge of the results of one´s actions) can be effective in 
encouraging the desired behaviour. Therefore, after an attack has occurred, ‘correct’ 
behaviour may be encouraged by giving positive feedback to users who have detected or 
ignored the attack, regardless of whether the attack were fake or real. However, the feedback 
must be given after the user has detected/ignored a malicious request. Thus, in a phishing-
attack simulation, the feedback must be given after the user has logged in on the email 
system, checked his/her inbox and logged out again.  
Failing which, it may be difficult to measure whether the user has actually behaved correctly 
or not towards the ‘attack’. 
As discussed above, most people adopt a skill by stepping through four stages (Chapman, 
2010). Therefore, it would make sense to encapsulate these stages into a model for cultivating 
social engineering resistance. Consequently, the next section will discuss the proposed model 
for cultivating social engineering resistance.  
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5.5 The Social Engineering Resistant User Model 
To continuously measure, evaluate and improve users’ resistance to social engineering, a 
model called the Social Engineering Resistant User Model (SERUM) was developed, as part 
of this research project. The model encapsulates all the principles discussed in the previous 
section, as well as the principles of a biological vaccine and its effect on the human immune 
system.  
The SERUM acronym was agreed upon because: Firstly, using a serum in the real world to 
vaccinate people against biological threats is analogous to how one may use some of the 
aspects of the SERUM model to ‘vaccinate’ users against social-engineering attacks (Jansson 
& Von Solms, 2011b). Secondly, Social Engineering Resistance is already an acronym for 
measuring social engineering vulnerability (Hasle et al., 2005). Finally, white blood cells in 
the human body react to a vaccine serum in the same way as a user can react to a ‘fake’ 
social-engineering attack. Thus, the user may report the incident to security staff, just as 
white blood cells ‘report’ a biological attack to the rest of the human immune system 
(National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2008a).  
Nevertheless, the model is illustrated in Figure 5.1 and works as follows:  
First of all, a user is attacked. When attacked, the user’s behaviour is stored, for example, 
inside a database. The behaviour is one of the following: 
 
 Incorrect behaviour: The user responds incorrectly to the request. 
 Correct behaviour: The user ignores/reports a dangerous request.  
 
If the user behaves incorrectly, the user enters the Non-Social Engineering Resistant (SER) 
zone. When inside this zone, the user is notified about his/her ‘inappropriate’ behaviour, and 
then educated by, for example, an online learning module. In contrast, if the user behaves 
correctly, the user enters the Social-Engineering Resistant (SER) zone. Inside this zone, the 
user is notified about his/her behaviour, and receives some type of reward, such as for 
example, recognition or feedback of his/her behaviour.  
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Figure 5.1: Social Engineering Resistant User Model 
5.6 The SERUM Software Implementation 
To verify whether the Social Engineering Resistant User Model contributes towards 
cultivating users’ social engineering resistance, it was prototyped into a software 
implementation and tested by means of an exercise. The exercise will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Nevertheless, the objective of the software implementation was to 
measure, evaluate and improve the user´s resistance to phishing attacks. It should be noted 
that only the ‘left part’ (SER) of the model is incorporated into the software implementation. 
Thus, the software implementation only addresses ‘wrong behaviour’.  
5.6.1 General Principles of SERUM 
To minimize the chance of failure, some general principles for conducting phishing in an 
institution were identified – before the software implementation of SERUM was developed. 
Based on related research, the following principles were identified. 
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 Before Developing the Software implementation 
Before a software implementation is developed, it is important to clearly define the 
objective of the exercise on which the software implementation will be used (Dodge 
et al., 2007). After the objective has been clearly defined, then follows the process of 
applying for ethical clearance. Since a ‘phishing exercise’ involves deceiving people, 
it is essential that ethical clearance is obtained from the institution (Kumaraguru et al., 
2009). 
 
 During the Development of the Software implementation 
There are some principles that must be considered during the development of the 
software implementation. Firstly, the ‘fake’ attack should be designed in such a way 
that each subject either discloses or does not disclose sensitive information (Hasle et 
al., 2005). Secondly, when the subject reacts to a ‘fake’ phishing email, the subject 
should be alerted on the exercise (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). Finally, in order to 
maintain privacy, it must be ensured that no identifiable user data will be collected or 
transmitted if a subject reacts outside the institution (Dodge et al., 2007).  
 
 Test-running the Software implementation 
It is important to test the software implementation, to ensure that everything is 
working correctly. For example, it must be ensured that the ‘fake’ emails reach the 
subjects' inboxes and that the ‘anti-phishing tools’ in the web-browsers do not identify 
the ‘phishing scam’ (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). Additionally, it is important to query 
the subjects of the test run on whether they find the ‘fake’ emails enticing (Dodge et 
al., 2007). 
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5.6.2 Developing the SERUM v1 Software implementation 
The objective of the exercise on which the software implementation would be used was clear: 
To evaluate whether the ‘left part’ of the SERUM could be effective in cultivating users’ 
social engineering resistance to phishing attacks. After obtaining ethical clearance from the 
institution, the software implementation of the ‘left part’ of the SERUM model was 
developed. The software implementation reflected all the principles and considerations from 
related research. The software implementation first involved the following: 
 
 A web interface for sending emails with customized headers. By customizing the 
headers, the emails could appear to be originating from any address.  
 Two types of emails were used; one requesting the user to disclose information and 
one that requests the user to open an attached file. 
 An SQL database that stores every action of each user. 
 A form field where users are required to disclose their user-name and password. The 
user-name is stored inside the SQL database. However, the password is not recorded.  
 An EXE file records the user-name of the person who is logged in on the computer 
when clicking on the file. The user-name is stored inside the SQL database. 
 A notification email would be sent to each user who reacts, involving some education 
and a hyperlink to confirm that the message has been received and read. 
 
The software implementation was tested on a focus group consisting of ten information 
security experts – in order to find any flaws within the software implementation. The 
following flaws/possible improvements were identified: 
 
1. The text inside the notification message was too long. 
2. The email spam filter on the internal email system that uses the Microsoft Outlook 
application was far more advanced than the spam filter for the external ‘live@edu’ 
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email system (accessed through www.outlook.com). Emails sent to internal Outlook 
addresses (accessed through the Microsoft Outlook application) were continuously 
classified as spam and discarded. 
3. A user may wait a long time until he/she checks his/her email inbox and may, 
therefore, not associate the notification email message with the act of disclosing 
information or executing an attached file. 
4. It is hard to determine whether a user actually reads through the educational content. 
 
Based on the former findings, the following approaches were taken, respectively: 
 
1. The educational content in the notification email was moved into an online web-
awareness program for both phishing and malicious file attachments. This would 
make the notification email much shorter. 
2. Users on the internal (Microsoft Outlook) email system would be ignored in the final 
experiment. 
3. When a user opens the fake malicious attachment or discloses information in the web 
form, a red warning screen (Figure 5.5) would appear, in addition to the notification 
email message. 
4. An evaluation consisting of three multiple-choice questions would be included after 
the online-awareness program. 
 
After these changes were incorporated into the software implementation, the software 
implementation was further tested – until everything was working correctly.  
5.6.3 The Sequence of the SERUM v1 Software implementation 
To explain the SERUM v1 software implementation, the ‘sequence’ of how one can use the 
software implementation to distribute ‘fake´ phishing emails will now be explained. 
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First of all, the conductor of the experiment needs to distribute the ‘fake’ emails to the users 
(Dodge et al., 2007). The example below (Figure 5.2) illustrates the form for sending emails. 
By customizing the ‘SMTP FROM EMAIL’ field, the email can appear to be originating 
from almost anywhere.  
Figure 5.3 illustrates the user receiving the ‘fake’ email. In this example, the user receives a 
message that claims that there is a problem with the database. The message urges the user to 
update his/her credentials ‘as soon as possible’, by clicking on the embedded link. When the 
user accesses this link, the user is diverted to the form in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the form where the user is requested to divulge his/her user credentials. 
If the user tries to proceed without entering his/her password, the user will be notified that the 
password is required. Nevertheless, the form does not record any password information.  
After the user has clicked the OK button in Figure 5.4, the user is notified by the red warning 
screen illustrated in Figure 5.5, as well as by receiving the notification email illustrated in 
Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.2: Form for sending 'fake' emails 
 
 
Figure 5.3: User receiving the ‘fake’ phishing emails (Database Crash) 
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Figure 5.4: Form requesting the user to disclose sensitive information 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Red warning screen informs the user about his behaviour 
 
The notification email illustrated in Figure 5.6, notifies the user of his/her ‘incorrect 
behaviour’ and attempts to rationalize why it may be important to participate in the online-
awareness program. The user also has the option to withdraw from the study, by clicking on 
the related link. Nevertheless, if the user clicks the link to participate in the awareness 
program, the user is redirected to the webpage, as illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the online phishing-awareness program. It informs the user what 
phishing is, why it is important to be aware of phishing, and how the user can avoid falling 
prey to such an attack.  
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In order to ensure that the user understands the risk associated with such phishing attacks, the 
user is given the option to be evaluated, after reading through the contents in the awareness 
program. The evaluation is illustrated in Figure 5.8. 
After the evaluation, the user can choose to read more about phishing at related websites. 
However, this ends the sequence of the software implementation. 
The same sequence of events applies for ‘fake’ emails with malicious attachments. However, 
the contents in the notification email awareness program and the evaluation are different. The 
sequence of ‘fake’ emails with malicious attachments can be found in Appendix A3.  
Thus, the aim of the SERUM v1 software implementation is to train users on phishing 
attacks. To do this, the SERUM v1, uses the principles of the SERUM model, as discussed in 
the first part of this chapter. The next chapter will conclude whether the SERUM v1 software 
implementation will indeed work, as intended.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Notification Email 
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Figure 5.7: The online phishing awareness program 
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Figure 5.8: The evaluation 
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5.7 Conclusion 
Social engineering, especially phishing attacks, cause huge problems today. This chapter has 
proposed a contribution, in the form of a model, to cultivate a user’s resistance to social 
engineering attacks. The model is called the Social Engineering Resistant User Model 
(SERUM). This acronym was agreed upon because the principles of a human vaccine serum 
and its effect on the human immune system are similar to the principles of a ‘social 
engineering’ vaccine and its effect on the user.  
The latter part of this chapter has described a software implementation of SERUM. Some 
general principles for developing a software implementation to measure, evaluate and 
improve users’ resistance to phishing was identified and followed. To evaluate whether the 
software implementation can measure and improve users’ resistance to phishing attacks, an 
exercise was conducted at a higher education institution in South Africa. The next chapter 
will discuss this exercise.  
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Chapter 6: The SERUM Exercise 
6.1 Introduction 
Social engineering attacks can have devastating consequences for an organization and/or its 
employees (Mann, 2008). Therefore, it is essential that an organization implement necessary 
countermeasures to control these attacks (Mann, 2008). The previous chapter proposed a 
model called the Social Engineering Resistant User Model (SERUM) for cultivating social 
engineering resistance in an organization; and furthermore, it discussed a software 
implementation of this model. The software implementation was named SERUM v1. The 
objective of SERUM v1 is to improve social engineering resistance to phishing attacks in an 
organization.  
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate whether SERUM can contribute to cultivating 
social engineering resistance to phishing attacks. To do this, the software implementation 
(SERUM v1) program, was evaluated by means of a phishing exercise on all the students of 
the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in South Africa.  
The remainder of this chapter aims to describe this evaluation exercise. This exercise is 
divided into three parts. Firstly, the exercise design will be discussed and some general 
principles regarding conducting phishing exercises at an institution will be identified. 
Additionally, the exercise methodology will also be discussed. The second part addresses the 
general principles followed in the SERUM exercise. Finally, the third part discusses the 
findings and results of the exercise. This part also concludes whether SERUM can actually 
contribute to cultivating social engineering resistance to phishing attacks.  
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6.2 Designing the SERUM exercise 
To design an exercise for simulating phishing attacks at an institution, it is important to study 
related exercises and the lessons learnt from these. Therefore, some principles which need to 
be considered when conducting phishing exercises were identified.  
6.2.1 General Principles for Conducting Phishing Exercises 
Based on literature studied on related research, the following principles were identified for 
conducting a phishing exercise at an institution. It should be stressed that the relevant ethical 
clearance is essential before designing the exercise (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). However, this 
issue was already dealt with in the previous chapter. 
 
 Before Conducting the Exercise 
Before the exercise is conducted, it is important to adhere to some general principles. 
Firstly, it must be ensured that the subjects are a random and representative sample of 
the population (Hasle et al., 2005). Secondly, the total number of subjects must be 
recorded (Hasle et al., 2005). Thirdly, it is essential to not disclose any information on 
the exercise to the subjects, as this could result in the distortion or invalidation of the 
test data (Hasle et al., 2005). Fourthly, the timing should be such that the test can 
accurately assess the defined objective (Dodge et al., 2007). Finally, system 
administrators should be provided with a predetermined response to any enquiries 
from the participants (Kumaraguru et al., 2009).  
This minimizes the likelihood of the administrators distributing warnings about the 
‘fake’ phishing emails. 
 
 During the Exercise 
There are also some general principles to consider during the exercise. Firstly, each 
subject should be exposed to the phishing attack (Hasle et al., 2005). Secondly, the 
privacy of the subjects should constantly be maintained (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
Thirdly, the ‘fake’ email must be enticing and request the subject to proceed with an 
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‘inappropriate’ action (Dodge et al., 2007). Finally, security staff should not be 
referred to in the ‘fake’ emails, as this may compromise the trust between the users 
and the security staff (Dodge et al., 2007). 
 
 After the Exercise 
When the exercise has ended, it is important to adhere to the following principles: 
Firstly, the total number of active subjects must be recorded. Being active means that 
the user has logged in on his/her email system (Hasle et al., 2005). Secondly, all the 
subjects should be debriefed on the study, and be provided with opportunities to give 
their feedback (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). Finally, the necessary statistics should be 
gathered and any private data should be erased (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
 
It must be noted that all the principles for developing a software implementation (discussed in 
Chapter 5, section 5.6.1) also apply when designing or conducting a phishing exercise, in 
addition to those mentioned above. 
6.2.2 Exercise Methodology 
The exercise methodology is illustrated in Figure 6.6. The methodology was devised from 
previous exercises studied, and it also took into consideration the environment where the 
study was conducted. The methodology obviously took into account all the principles 
discussed above.  
The exercise was conducted in two cycles, in which each cycle consisted of one week. The 
sequence of each week is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In each week, each participating user 
received an email that invited him/her to react (in an incorrect manner), by responding with 
private information (user-name and password) through a link to a website, or to open a 
potentially dangerous .exe attachment. Each user’s action was then recorded. Users that 
responded via the website were identified, based on the user-name that they supplied. 
However, users that executed the .exe attachment were recorded, based on the user-name that 
they used for accessing the Internet.  
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The users who reacted in an insecure manner received a red warning screen, alerting them of 
their insecure behaviour, as well as an email message making them aware of their insecure 
behaviour. This message also provided a hyperlink to the online-awareness program, giving 
the user an option to be trained further in protection from phishing attacks. Within this 
awareness program, the user also had the option to be evaluated by three short questions on 
phishing or malicious email attachments.  
 
Figure 6.1: The SERUM exercise sequence 
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Users that reacted in a secure way did not receive any notification; neither was their 
behaviour recorded. However by comparing the email log of each week with the exercise log 
of that week, it was possible to identify the users who had logged in on the email system 
during each week, but had not reacted incorrectly to the ‘fake’ phishing attack. This 
concluded whether a user actually ignored (or did not notice) the phishing attack. 
Consequently, it was possible to discern whether a user had behaved ‘securely’. 
By comparing the individual behaviour of the actions of the participants in cycle one (week 
one) and cycle two (week two), it was possible to determine whether the individual users 
could, in fact, learn to act more cautiously to phishing attacks. Consequently, this allowed 
one to conclude whether the SERUM model had contributed towards cultivating users’ social 
engineering resistance. 
Four different types of email attacks were distributed by email to the participants.  
 
Database Crash  
The ‘fake’ Database Crash email (illustrated in Figure 6.2) claimed that some database had 
crashed; and therefore, the user was requested to submit his/her user-name and password. 
Nevertheless, this message used the following social engineering techniques: 
 
 Urgency: The message requested the user to update his/her credentials “ASAP”. 
 Legitimacy: The message appeared to originate from within the institution, since the 
institution’s email domain was used. 
 
The user should have doubted whether the message was valid for the following reason: 
 
1. The message requested the user to update his/her credentials. This is one of the most 
common methods ‘phishers’ use to gain sensitive information (Mann, 2008).  
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Figure 6.2: Database Crash 
 
 
Lottery Win  
This message (illustrated in Figure 6.3) requested the user to submit his/her user-name and 
password in order to claim a ‘price’ (notice the misspelling). This message used the following 
social engineering techniques: 
 
 Legitimacy: The message appeared to originate from within the institution, since the 
institution’s email domain was used. 
 Strong Affect: The user may have felt a strong sense of surprise. 
 Curiosity: The user may have been tempted to witness what he/she had won. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Lottery Win 
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The user should have doubted whether the message was valid for the following reasons: 
 
1. The message was sent to every student inside the faculty group. Thus, the ‘to address’ 
was Faculty@domain.com and not user@domain.com 
2. The word ‘price’ was misspelt. 
3. The message was not addressed to any individual. 
 
Virus Scanner 
This message (illustrated in Figure 6.4) claimed that the attached file vscan.exe would 
remove a dangerous virus. The message requested the user to open the ZIP file and launch the 
.exe file residing inside the ZIP file. This message used the following social engineering 
techniques: 
 
 Fear: The user may have feared that the virus that was detected could harm the user’s 
computer. 
 Legitimacy: The message appeared to originate from within the institution, since the 
institution’s email domain was used. The message also referred to “COMPUTER 
MANAGEMENT”. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Virus Scan 
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The user should have doubted whether the message was valid for the following reasons: 
 
1. The message was sent to every student inside a faculty group. Thus, the ‘to address’ 
was Faculty@domain.com and not user@domain.com.  
2. The message was not addressed to the name of the student.  
3. The room for the computer is not mentioned in the message.  
4. A student´s computer is in most cases not individual (it is not tied to the student’s 
email-account). Therefore, an email-message that is sent to a user´s email-address – 
claiming that a virus has been detected – should raise some suspicion. 
 
PrettyGirl  
This message (illustrated in Figure 6.5) claimed that the attached file’ PrettyGirl.exe’ 
promised pictures of ‘hot’ girls. This message used the following social engineering 
techniques: 
 
 Curiosity: Many users could have been tempted to open the attachment, as it 
promised pictures of ‘hot girls’. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: PrettyGirl 
 
The user should have doubted whether the message was valid for the following reasons: 
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1. The message was sent to every student inside a faculty group. Thus, the ‘to address’ 
was Faculty@domain.com and not user@domain.com.  
2. No name regarding the sender of the message was included in the message. Only, “A 
Friend” appeared. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: SERUM exercise methodology 
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As illustrated in Figure 6.6, the type of email attack a user received depended on the faculty 
group where the user was registered, as well as the week when the email attack was 
distributed. For example, users registered in faculty 1 received a ‘Lottery Win’ message for 
both week one and week two. However, users within faculty 7 received a ‘Database Crash’ 
message in week one and a ‘PrettyGirl’ message in week two. This method was integrated to 
make it possible to conclude whether the fake ´attack’, together with the training material was 
effective in training users on different phishing attacks. 
Thus, four different types of ‘fake’ attacks with related ‘embedded’ training were distributed 
in two cycles, consisting of one week for each cycle. By comparing the number of reactions 
for each cycle, it was possible to determine whether the SERUM had indeed contributed to 
cultivating social engineering resistance to differing phishing attacks.  
6.3 How the Principles were Applied 
An ‘attack’ was distributed to each faculty twice during the two weeks, as specified in the 
SERUM exercise methodology in Figure 6.6. However, to ensure the ‘reliability’ of the 
exercise, it is important to describe how all the principles for conducting a phishing exercise 
were followed in the SERUM exercise.  
Before Conducting the Exercise 
 The subjects were random and a representative sample of the population because there 
was no control implemented over who responded to the emails and the exercise was 
run only amongst students (Hasle et al., 2005). 
 The test population was recorded as 25 579 subjects (Hasle et al., 2005). 
 No information regarding the research exercise was disclosed to any subjects in 
advance, as this could well result in distortion or invalidation of the test data (Hasle et 
al., 2005). 
 The timing of the exercise was such that the test could accurately assess the defined 
objective (Dodge et al., 2007). To meet the objective, the ‘phishing’ emails were 
distributed twice during the two weeks. The exercise was conducted towards the end 
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of the year, to allow all the subjects the necessary time to familiarise themselves with 
the email system in use.  
 System administrators were alerted to the exercise, and were provided with a 
predefined response, which they could use to respond to any enquiries from the 
subjects. This minimized the chance of the administrators distributing warnings on the 
‘fake’ phishing emails (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
During the Exercise 
 Each subject was exposed to a phishing attack (Hasle et al., 2005). 
 The subjects were provided with an email message that invited them to open and/or 
react on. However, if they read the message carefully, they should have realized that it 
was not an authentic email request (Dodge et al., 2007).  
 To make the subjects aware of their 'wrong' behaviour, the subjects received both 
immediate notification and delayed notification – after such behaviour (Dodge et al., 
2007).  
 Users’ user-names or email addresses were collected and stored to cross-reference 
data between the two cycles and to gather statistics. However, no other personal 
information was collected (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
 Although the subjects were requested to divulge their password in a form field, no 
passwords were collected and/or stored (Kumaraguru et al., 2009).  
 The outcome of an attack was either disclosure of sensitive data (username or email 
address, with a related password) or no disclosure of sensitive data (Hasle et al., 
2005). Although the passwords were not verified, user-names and email addresses 
were considered to be sensitive data, since these could be sold on the black market 
(Symantec, 2010b).  
 The institution’s computer security staff were not referred to in any email message, 
since this might compromise the trust between them and the subjects (Dodge et al., 
2007). 
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 Subjects were not allowed to access the link in a message, or to open an attachment 
outside the institution. This minimized the chance that personal information was 
leaked outside the institution (Dodge et al., 2007).  
After the exercise 
 Logs, which recorded all the actions, were examined in order to find the number of 
active users (an active user was one who had logged in on the email-system to check 
his/her email-inbox) (Hasle et al., 2005). 
 All private data were deleted after the exercise, in order to maintain privacy 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
 A week after the exercise, a general email was distributed to all the subjects, making 
them aware of the exercise, and providing them with the contact details for questions 
or feedback (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
All the principles listed above were strictly adhered to in the formal SERUM exercise. This 
ensured that the formal SERUM exercise ran as efficiently and authentically as possible. The 
next section discusses the findings and results of the SERUM exercise. 
6.4 Findings and Results 
This section discusses the findings and results of the SERUM exercise. These are divided into 
a number of sub-sections. Firstly, the responses that were received by email during the 
exercise from the end-users are disclosed. Secondly, some necessary ‘cleansing’ of the results 
is discussed. Thirdly, the statistics of week one and week two are discussed. Finally, a 
discussion of these statistics and what can be concluded from them follows. 
6.4.1 Responses during the SERUM Exercise 
During the exercise, many users replied via email to the attack. Most of the replies queried 
the legitimacy of the message.  
In the lottery scam, for example, one user wrote:  
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“What competition? Because I don’t wanna be the victim of phishing.” 
In the virus scam, one user responded with the following email message: 
“Please verify your identity, what is the name of the main office/admissions building of our 
university? Please explain how you detected a virus on my pc.” 
The PrettyGirl scam received, for instance, the following response: 
“Brilliant scheme. Like anyone is going to open a file called prettygirl.zip and then run an 
exe!“ 
This implies that some users knew how to behave with confidence in reaction to phishing 
attacks. However, the results in the following sections show that this was not the general 
norm. 
The following sub-sections reveal the statistics of the findings and the results of the research 
exercise reported per week. Nevertheless, to ensure that these are as realistic as possible, the 
results were first analysed and ‘invalid’ data records were cleansed. 
6.4.2 Analysing and Cleansing the Results 
After analysing the results, it was found that in order to ensure the validity of the statistics, 
some cleansing of the exercise log had to be made. These cleansing actions are explained 
below. 
 
 Some users were recorded multiple times during the same week. This can happen, for 
instance, if they clicked the ´update button’ in the web-browser or reacted to the same 
‘scam’ more than once. To ensure that each user was only counted once in the 
statistics, all duplicate data recordings during the same week were removed from the 
database.  
 Many users provided false user-names. To ensure that a user-name that was provided 
was indeed the user-name of the person who had logged in on the email system, the 
log of the email system was compared with the log of the exercise. Records in the 
exercise log that did not match the email system log were removed. This ensured that 
users providing a false user-name were not counted in the final statistics. 
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The results were extracted with differing ‘SQL queries’. Each result of an SQL query was 
inserted into Microsoft Excel in order to compute reliable statistics. The next sub-sections 
disclose these statistics. 
6.4.3 Statistics of Week One 
A total of 9 273 (36.25% of all the users) checked their emails during week one (active 
users). A total of 1 304 users reacted in an incorrect manner, while 165 of the reacting users 
took part in the awareness program. Additionally, 108 of the incorrectly reacting users 
evaluated themselves after the awareness program. Thus, 14.06% of all the users who had 
logged in (active users) during week one reacted in an incorrect manner; 12.65% of these 
users took part in the awareness program, and from those users 65.4% evaluated themselves. 
In addition, PrettyGirl was the most enticing email message during this week (Figure 6.7). It 
can also be argued that 7 969 users ignored the email, as these were active on the email 
system, but did not react incorrectly to the attack. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Incorrect reactions of active users per attack-type in week one 
 
6.4.4 Statistics of Week Two 
In week two, 8 231 (32.18% of all the users) checked their emails (active users). A total of 
664 users reacted in an incorrect manner, while 62 of these users took part in the awareness 
19.26% 
9.07% 8.78% 
11.91% 
PrettyGirl Virus Scan DB Crash Lotto
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program. Additionally, 35 users evaluated themselves afterwards. Thus, 8.06% of all the 
users who had logged in during week two reacted in an incorrect manner; 9.3% of these users 
took part in the awareness program and from these users, 56.4% evaluated themselves. In 
addition, PrettyGirl was again the most enticing email message during week two (Figure 6.8). 
It can also be argued that 7 567 users ignored the email, as these were active on the email 
system, but did not react incorrectly to the attack.  
A discussion regarding the statistics of the two weeks follows in the next sub-section. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Incorrect reactions of active users per attack-type in week two 
 
6.4.5 Discussion 
Based on the results, it may be concluded that the number of ‘incorrect’ reactions had 
decreased by 640 in week two (Figure 6.9). However, it must be noted that the number of 
active users comprised 1 042 less in week two. Therefore, based on the difference between 
the active users during the weeks, it may be concluded that there were 42.63% less ‘incorrect’ 
reactions in week two. Consequently, it may be argued that SERUM, i.e. sending ‘fake’ 
phishing attacks to users’ email addresses and educating them accordingly, does influence the 
behaviour of such users in a positive sense. 
 
10.56% 
7.07% 
5.24% 
6.53% 
PrettyGirl Virus Scan DB Crash Lotto
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Figure 6.9: Number of users that reacted incorrectly during week one and week two 
 
A group of 976 users reacting in week one did not react incorrectly in week two. However, 
these users logged in (active) on their email during week two. This implies that 976 users 
(11,85%) had learnt from the first attack in week one, since they had logged in on the email 
system during both week one and week two, but did not react incorrectly in week two. Out of 
these 976 users, 129 users participated in the awareness program, and 80 of these users 
evaluated themselves. Thus, it may be assumed that 13.21% of the users who ‘learnt’, had 
learnt from the awareness program, while 8.19% of the users who had learnt, had probably 
learnt by evaluating themselves. 
As illustrated in the SERUM exercise methodology (Figure 6.6), faculties 5, 6 and 7 received 
a different fake phishing message in the second cycle (week two) compared with the first 
cycle (week one). Since a total of 201 users in these faculties ‘learnt’ from the exercise 
(Figure 6.10), this implies that the SERUM is indeed effective in mitigating different types of 
phishing attacks. 
From the data and findings discussed above, it may be concluded with reasonable certainty 
that users can learn and positively adapt their email-related behaviour – in response to 
simulated phishing exercises – followed by appropriate awareness programs. Therefore, it 
may be deduced that SERUM can indeed be used to ‘vaccinate’ users to successfully resist 
subsequent phishing attacks. 
 
1304 
664 
Week One Week Two
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Figure 6.10: Amount of users that have learnt per Faculty (in total 976 users have learnt) 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
With an increase in criminal activity on the Internet (Symantec, 2010a), it is essential that 
users learn how to protect themselves in cyberspace. Security education, training and 
awareness are commonly recognised as being the key countermeasures to protect email users 
against social engineering, and specifically phishing attacks (Dodge et al., 2007; Hasle et al., 
2005; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mann, 2008; Mitnick et al., 2003).  
This chapter has evaluated a contribution in the form of a Social Engineering Resistant User 
Model (SERUM). The model was evaluated by means of an exercise on the email system of a 
tertiary institution in South Africa, with 25 579 users participating. 
Based on the exercise, it was found that: Firstly, a user is most likely to fall victim to an 
enticing 'pornographic scam'. Secondly, by exposing the user to a fake attack, the user can 
learn to behave correctly towards either identical phishing attacks, or to phishing attacks that 
are different in nature. Finally, training after reacting to a fake attack reduces the user’s risk 
of becoming a victim to any future phishing attack. Consequently, it may be concluded that 
SERUM contributes towards cultivating users´ social engineering resistance. 
107 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were based on a thorough literature study and provided some background 
information to information security, social engineering and phishing. After these chapters, the 
following two chapters provided relevant information regarding the mitigation of social 
engineering attacks. These two chapters proposed and evaluated the contribution made to 
cultivating social engineering resistance within a community. 
This chapter concludes this research project; by firstly, providing a précis of the important 
aspects and conclusions in this dissertation. Secondly, there is a discussion highlighting the 
extent to which the research objectives were met. Thirdly, there follows a discussion 
indicating why the research exercise in this dissertation is different from all other related 
studies. Fourthly, some suggestions for future research are discussed; and finally, an epilogue 
is provided.  
7.2 Précis 
As most employees in an organization are highly vulnerable to social engineering attacks, the 
organization is consequently put at risk. Therefore, this research has contributed to a solution 
– in the form of a model for cultivating social engineering resistance within an organization. 
This model, called the Social Engineering Resistant User Model (SERUM), exposes 
vulnerable users in a community to ‘fake´ social engineering attacks. Users that react 
inappropriately to these ‘fake’ emails are automatically notified and invited to participate in a 
relevant education and awareness exercise.  
This education exercise is referred to in this dissertation as: ‘Education-on-demand’. 
The SERUM acronym was agreed upon because; firstly, using a serum in the real world to 
vaccinate people against biological threats is similar to the use of the SERUM to ‘vaccinate’ 
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users against social engineering attacks. Secondly, ´Social Engineering Resistance’ is already 
an acronym for measuring social engineering vulnerability (Hasle et al., 2005). Finally, white 
blood cells within the human body react to a vaccine serum in the same way that a user can 
react to a ‘fake’ social engineering attack. Thus, the user may report the incident to security 
staff in the same way as white blood cells report a biological attack to the rest of the human 
immune system (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2008a). 
After the model was designed, a software implementation, called SERUM v1 was developed. 
The software implementation’s aim was to evaluate and improve users’ resistance to phishing 
attacks. The software implementation was demonstrated and tested on a number of 
information security experts. The reason for demonstrating and testing SERUM v1 was to 
evaluate whether the software implementation was ready to be used in a more realistic 
exercise.  
When everything was tested, SERUM v1 was used to conduct a realistic phishing exercise on 
all the students at a university in South Africa. This exercise provided useful data that were 
used to conclude whether the SERUM can indeed contribute to cultivating social engineering 
resistance.  
In order to evaluate whether a user can learn from the notification and/or the awareness 
program, the SERUM exercise was conducted in two cycles over a period of two weeks. The 
results of the first cycle (first week) were compared with the results of the second cycle 
(second week). Each cycle involved distributing ‘fake’ phishing emails, and then recording 
the users’ behaviour. Users reacting in an unsafe way were notified and requested to 
participate in the online awareness program.  
The SERUM exercise was conducted as follows: Each user on the email system received an 
email that tempted them to react inappropriately – by responding with private information 
through a link to a website or opening an .exe attachment. If the user reacted, the phishing 
website requested each user to disclose his/her email-address or username as well as his/her 
password. However, the phishing website only recorded the user´s user-name or email-
address, thus, the user´s password was ignored. The .exe attachment retrieved the user-name 
of the reacting user automatically from the user’s workstation. 
To ensure that the user-name or email-address was valid, it was compared with the user-name 
or email-address in the email-system log.  
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There were in total four different types of email messages distributed as ‘fake’ social 
engineering attacks.  
 
 Database Crash: This message claimed that some database had crashed and requested 
the user to disclose his/her user-name and password in order to have the database 
fixed. 
 Lottery Win: This message claimed that the user had won a competition and requested 
the user to disclose his/her password in order to obtain a prize.  
 Antivirus: This message claimed that there was a virus in the user´s computer, and 
that the attached file would remove the virus. 
 PrettyGirl: This message enticed the user to launch the attached file, promising 
pictures of ‘hot’ girls. 
 
After the user-name had been recorded, the reacting users received a warning screen in red, 
alerting them of their ‘insecure’ behaviour, as well as another email message alerting them of 
their ‘insecure’ behaviour. This message also provided a hyperlink to the online awareness 
program. 
Comparing the individual behaviour between the two cycles made it possible to conclude 
whether the individual users had learnt to act more securely to phishing attacks. 
Consequently, this concluded whether SERUM contributes to cultivating users’ social 
engineering resistance. 
The Social Engineering Resistant User Model was evaluated by means of an exercise on the 
email system of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in South Africa, with 25 579 
users participating. Based on the exercise, it could be concluded that: 
Firstly, simulating malicious attacks on the email system can have a huge effect in cultivating 
social engineering resistance in a community. This can be concluded, since the insecure 
reactions were 42.63% less in week two. One contributing factor to this drop in reactions may 
have been that the users influenced each other; and thus, they ‘spread the word’ that ‘fake’ 
  
101 
 
phishing attacks were being distributed on the email-system. This could have made some 
users more vigilant. 
Secondly, a user is most likely to fall victim to an enticing 'pornographic scam'. This can be 
concluded, since this type of scam (called PrettyGirl in the exercise) had the most user 
reactions in both week one and week two.  
Thirdly, by exposing the user to a ‘fake’ phishing attack, the user can learn to behave 
correctly to identical phishing attacks. This can be deduced, as several users were exposed 
twice to identical ‘fake’ phishing attacks. Thus, it was possible to conclude that some of these 
users had learnt from being exposed to a ‘fake’ attack – since some of the users reacted in the 
first week, but did not react in the second week. 
Fourthly, some users were exposed twice to identical phishing attacks, whilst some users 
were exposed to different ‘fake’ phishing attacks the second time round. For example, a user 
was exposed to the Database Crash scam in week one, and to the PrettyGirl scam in week 
two. Since some users reacted in the first week, but did not react in the second week, it was 
concluded that a user can learn to behave correctly to phishing attacks that are different in 
nature. 
Finally, the cultivation of social engineering resistance can be improved with training. Thus, 
training after reacting to a ‘fake’ phishing attack reduces the risk of becoming a victim to any 
future phishing attack. This can be concluded, as some users who were trained reacted in the 
first week, but did not react in the second week.  
Consequently, it may be concluded that SERUM can contribute to cultivating users´ social 
engineering resistance.  
7.3 Addressing the Research Objective 
The primary objective of this study was to contribute to cultivating a social engineering 
resistant community by proposing a contributing solution, in the form of a model, to assist a 
community in cultivating social engineering resistant behaviour. 
The primary objective was substantiated by means of three sub-objectives.  
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7.3.1 Sub-objective One 
The first sub-objective was to conduct a literature survey to determine why users are 
susceptible to social engineering, in general. To meet this objective, most recent books, 
conference papers, journal articles and suchlike – on social engineering, information security 
and phishing were studied. Additionally, some articles in the field of psychology, specifically 
behaviour-related studies, were also studied. Consequently, a paper called Social 
Engineering: Towards a Holistic Solution (Jansson & Von Solms, 2010) resulted and this 
paper was presented at the South African Information Security Multi-Conference in Port 
Elizabeth, South Africa. 
Many examples of really successful phishing and social engineering attacks were identified 
and studied. These examples provided realistic information on how an attack occurred and 
why the attack succeeded. Consequently, it was possible to deduce what these attacks had in 
common.  
Most real social engineering attacks succeeded, because the user trusted the social engineer, 
and because the user followed the social engineer´s instructions. Additionally, in most cases, 
sophisticated psychological techniques were used by the social engineer to deceive the users. 
For this reason, psychology-related articles focusing on instruction-following, trust and 
deception were also studied. As a result, it was possible to conclude why users are susceptible 
to social engineering in general. 
In brief, people naturally follow instructions, because based on a history of reinforcement of 
such behaviour (Flora, 2004), people naturally trust other people, due to the fact that most 
people are rewarded for trusting in early age (Kramer, 2009), and people can be deceived 
because they have inherited certain emotional natures and cognitive biases (Twitchell, 2009). 
Thus, having conducted a thorough literature study on social engineering and related aspects, 
it can be argued that sub-objective one has been met. 
7.3.2 Sub-objective Two 
The second sub-objective was to identify the most essential countermeasures that could assist 
in addressing social engineering. To meet this objective, recent literature in the field of social 
engineering and its countermeasures was studied. It was found that most social engineering 
attacks depend on the user´s awareness levels of such attacks. Consequently, most researchers 
agree that the most effective and efficient countermeasures in mitigating social engineering 
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attacks are education, training and awareness (Dolan, 2004; Gragg, 2003; Jansson & Von 
Solms, 2010; Mann, 2008; Mitnick et al., 2003; Twitchell, 2009).  
Many researchers also agree that it is important to have sound data sets to help in determining 
whether the particular education, training or awareness program is indeed effective in training 
the users (Dodge et al., 2007; Hasle et al., 2005; Herold, 2010). In order to measure the 
effectiveness of an organization’s awareness programs, many researchers expose employees 
to some sort of ‘fake´ social engineering attacks (Dodge et al., 2007; Hasle et al., 2005; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2009).  
By exposing the users to such ‘fake’ attacks, both before and after an awareness program 
takes place, it is possible to conclude whether the awareness program has indeed been 
effective. 
As most of the researchers in the literature that was studied agree that education, training and 
awareness are the most essential countermeasures in mitigating social engineering attacks; 
and, since this can be proved through evaluating the users with ‘fake´ attacks, it can be 
argued that sub-objective two has also been met.  
7.3.3 Sub-objective Three 
The third sub-objective was to explore how the countermeasures involved with addressing 
social engineering can be presented in the form of a model. To meet this objective, the 
practice of exposing users to ‘fake’ social engineering attacks to measure the effectiveness of 
an awareness program (Dodge et al., 2007) was combined with the principles of education- 
on-demand (Gordon & Pawlowski, 2002). Thus, exposing all the users within a community to 
‘fake’ social engineering attacks and recording their actions made it possible to identify 
vulnerable users.  
Then the vulnerable users could be trained accordingly. As a result, the vulnerable users 
would become aware of ‘real’ social engineering attacks.  
The former principles were incorporated into a model called the Social Engineering Resistant 
User Model (SERUM). This model was published in a paper called: Towards a Social 
Engineering Resistant User Model (Jansson & Von Solms, 2011b) and, subsequently, 
presented at the ZA-WWW conference in Johannesburg, South Africa. To conclude whether 
the model is effective in cultivating social engineering resistance in a community, a software 
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implementation of the model was developed. The software implementation was evaluated by 
a focus group consisting of 10 information security experts. Additionally, the software 
implementation was published in a paper called: Simulating Malicious Emails to Educate End 
Users on-Demand (Jansson & Von Solms, 2011c) and presented at the IEEE SWS 2011 
conference in Port Elizabeth, South Africa.  
The software implementation was used to evaluate the principles of the model in a ‘phishing 
exercise’ conducted at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in South Africa. The 
results from the exercise were published in an article called: Phishing for Phishing 
Awareness (Jansson & Von Solms, 2011a) and this article were submitted to the journal 
Behaviour and Information Technology. 
Sub-objective three was indeed met, since the model incorporated the most essential 
countermeasures in addressing social engineering, and because the ‘phishing exercise’ 
evaluated the model. Thus, the exercise determined whether the model was indeed effective 
in cultivating social engineering resistance in a community.  
Consequently, since the three underlying sub-objectives were met, it may be argued that the 
overarching primary objective was also met.  
7.4 Why the SERUM Exercise was Different 
Many related phishing exercises have already been conducted (Hasle et al., 2005; Jagatic et 
al., 2007; Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz, 2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Steyn, Kruger, & Drevin, 
2007). The research in this thesis was partly based on some of these exercises. However, the 
research in this thesis differed from previous research exercises in the following ways: 
Firstly, the research exercise was conducted on a much larger group of subjects (25 579). 
Secondly, the geographical location of the study was different, as the exercise was conducted 
in South Africa.  
Although Steyn, Kruger and Drevin (Steyn et al., 2007) conducted a similar exercise to 
evaluate user awareness of phishing in South Africa, their exercise did not evaluate whether a 
user can learn from previous ‘fake’ phishing attacks – along with some related training. 
Thirdly, the research concludes whether a user can learn from both identical and different 
types of phishing attacks from a related training-and-awareness component. Finally, although 
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Kumaraguru et al. (Kumaraguru et al., 2009) did similar research and trained and evaluated 
users’ resistance to phishing in two cycles, their subjects were volunteers.  
The research exercise described in this dissertation involved no volunteers. Thus, the subjects 
had no prior knowledge of any research exercise in advance. 
7.5 Future Research 
Simulating social engineering attacks can, as mentioned, provide many benefits to an 
organization. Therefore, researchers are urged to conduct further research based on the serum 
model; in particular, to test the right-hand side of SERUM, as depicted in Figure 5.1. In this 
way, they should be able to determine whether giving rewards can contribute in making users 
more resistant to phishing.  
It must be noted that SERUM is not limited to cultivating social engineering resistance to 
mere email attacks. Thus, research to test the model on other mediums is also suggested. For 
example: mobile messaging, face-to-face, or via the phone. If a community can cultivate total 
social engineering resistance towards any type of attack, it may be argued that such a 
community is much closer to being resistant to attacks of this nature.  
7.6 Epilogue 
As most people are information-workers nowadays, and they handle information 
electronically, they can be very vulnerable to such threats (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). As a 
result, many criminals have realised that sometimes the easiest way of accessing information 
is by deceiving the user working with such information (Mann, 2008). Deceiving a user into 
performing an action like one that results in disclosure of sensitive information is referred to 
as social engineering (Mann, 2008).  
In order to mitigate social engineering attacks in a community, this dissertation has proposed 
a contribution in the form of a solution for cultivating social engineering resistance in a 
community. The solution consists of a model called the Social Engineering Resistant User 
Model. This model was developed in the form of a software implementation, and then tested 
by means of a ‘phishing exercise’ at a university in South Africa.  
  
106 
 
The exercise found that the SERUM contributed towards cultivating users´ social engineering 
resistance. As a result, it may be claimed that the research objectives were indeed met. 
Using SERUM can provide many benefits for an organization. It was concluded that the 
model can have the following benefits for the organization: Firstly, SERUM enhances the 
security of the system of an organization significantly, as many users will refrain from 
opening suspicious email attachments, or responding to criminals with sensitive information. 
Secondly, SERUM contributes to cultivating an overall information security culture, as users 
become more aware of information security in general (in this case various phishing attacks). 
Thirdly, by being able to spot vulnerable users, the idea of education-on-demand reduces the 
costs of training employees, as the education takes place automatically and continuously.  
Finally, since the users come to acknowledge to themselves that they are vulnerable, or 
incompetent in behaving securely, they themselves choose to be educated in related attacks. 
This acknowledgement of ´incompetency’ is the first step in changing the user´s ‘insecure’ 
behavior – and thus, the first step in cultivating an information security culture in the 
organization (S. H. Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008). 
Although there are many benefits in using SERUM to cultivate social engineering resistance 
in a community, it must be noted that there may also be some drawbacks. For instance, a user 
may develop ‘too much resistance’ and ignore important ‘non-fraudulent’ requests, since the 
user may believe that these are fraudulent. For this reason, it is important that an organization 
exercise SERUM with caution and design a ‘fake’ social engineering attack to be as realistic 
as possible. 
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Appendix A 
The following conference papers resulted from this research project: 
 Jansson, K., & von Solms, R. (2010). Social Engineering: Towards a Holistic 
Solution. Presented at the South African Information Security Multi-Conference, Port 
Elizabeth, South Africa. 
o This paper provides a literature survey regarding the social engineering 
techniques used by criminals to deceive people. The paper also provides a set 
of guidelines — presented as a flowchart — that can assist employees in 
identifying, mitigating or even prevent a potential social engineering attack. 
 Jansson, K., & von Solms, R. (2011b). Towards A Social Engineering Resistant User 
Model. 13th Annual Conference on WWW Applications. Presented at the ZA-WWW, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. 
o The principles of a biological vaccine and a potential “social engineering 
vaccine” are compared in this paper. The paper also presents a model for 
cultivating users’ social engineering resistance. 
 Jansson, K., & von Solms, R. (2011c). Simulating Malicious Emails to Educate End 
Users on-Demand. Presented at the 2011 IEEE 3rd Symposium on Web Society 
(SWS 2011) in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
o The paper identifies important principles that need to be considered when 
developing software for running phishing exercises. 
These papers are attached as appendices A1 to A3. 
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Abstract 
 
As most employees are information-workers nowadays, they are very vulnerable to various malicious attacks. 
However, some threat sources have realized that it is far easier to obtain wanted information directly from 
authorized users than using software or other means to obtain such information. This is generally referred to as 
Social Engineering. Therefore, organizations are at risk, because most information-workers are very vulnerable 
to socially malicious attacks. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to present guidance in the form of a 
flowchart which should give employees some guidance on how to act when faced with a potential Social 
Engineering attack. The flowchart was deduced from information gathered in an extensive literature survey. If 
followed correctly, it should reduce the risk related to Social Engineering significantly. 
 
Keywords 
 
Information Security, Social Engineering, Risk Management, Risk Assessment, Policies 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The main goal of most organizations is to make as much money as possible while keeping 
their clients satisfied. However, it is impossible to reach this goal if the clients cannot be 
assured that all the services provided by the organization are constantly available and that the 
information the customers entrust in the ‘hands’ of the organization, is handled with care 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009).  
Many organizations spend large amounts of money to ensure that their information is 
protected. However, the focus is unfortunately too often on Technology. It is commonly 
believed that a product will ‘fix’ everything, but unfortunately this is far from the truth 
(NSTISSC, 1994). Some important aspects (i.e. the human aspect) are often neglected.  
Employees tend to believe that Information Security is not their concern, believing that 
this is the IT-Department’s responsibility. However, this is indeed not the case (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002). Ensuring the well-being of the organization is the CEO´s responsibility (King, 
2002). If services are unavailable when needed or sensitive information is compromised, 
unavailable or unprotected, the organization can in fact come to a standstill. This will, in turn, 
compromise the well-being of the organization (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). Therefore it 
is critically important that the organization creates safe environments in which the business 
can function (Whitman & Mattord, 2009). Organizations have employed various methods to 
create these safe environments. However, the importance of educating their employees about 
how information should be handled is often neglected. For example, a threat to the 
organization can deceive an employee into compromising sensitive information, unaware that 
this is against the rules of the organization. This is called Social Engineering (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002). 
A Social Engineer would make use of his social skills to gain trust with employees in 
order to obtain confidential information, such as passwords. However, the success of such an 
attack depends on how educated the employees of the organization are. Therefore, this paper 
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will focus on a holistic solution in the form of a flowchart, helping employees how to behave 
when getting suspicious requests. However, in order to understand the flowchart, it is first 
necessary to understand some of the concepts of Human Behavior and Social Engineering. 
 
2. THE HUMAN ELEMENT 
 
The desire to be liked by other people is common to all humans (Mann, 2008). By being 
helpful to other employees, such as holding the door open when another employee has boxes 
in his hand, meets this desire. This is especially true for new employees who want to make a 
good impression on the “employee” carrying the boxes. However, the “employee” with the 
boxes, could actually have been an individual with the intention to do harm, who just 
pretended to be busy with boxes, in order to get inside the building. In contrast, the individual 
could also pretend to be a new employee who other employees in the organization do not yet 
know (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Likewise, a new employee would also not be a suspicious 
person, should he ask too many questions (Mann, 2008). 
As a real case scenario, Steve Stasiukonis, founder of Secure Network Technologies Inc., 
tells his story in an article by DarkReading (2006) about a penetration test on one of his 
clients. The client asked specifically that the human element be tested, as they had problems 
with employees disclosing sensitive information. Therefore, Stasiukonis uploaded a Trojan 
horse on a couple of USB sticks and scattered these in different areas outside the client’s 
building. Once the employees showed up, they became curious, picked up the USB drives, 
and plugged them into their computers to see what was on them. The Trojan horse collected, 
as expected, a lot of sensitive information and emailed this back to Stasiukonis. After a few 
days, Stasiukonis, concluded that of 20 USB drives that was planted, 15 were found by 
employees, and all of them had been plugged into the client’s computers. With this 
information, Stasiukonis could compromise the client’s system. This client was, in fact, a 
credit union company. If this was a real attack, the company’s customer-accounts could have 
been disclosed, resulting in unauthorized money-transfers to a potential attacker’s account. 
This attack can also be referred to as a Social Engineering attack. 
Social Engineering is the art of manipulating a victim into making certain decisions 
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002). These decisions are processed in the mind of people, in a way they 
are not consciously aware of (Mann, 2008). A Social Engineer exploits these decisions by 
using some kind of technique that will either exploit emotions in the victim or will exploit the 
victim’s cognitive or cultural biases (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). These biases are human errors 
that occur when the victim is making a decision (Cialdini, 2001). 
 
3. THE SOCIAL ENGINEER 
 
Ian Mann (2008) defines Social Engineering as a way of manipulating people, by 
deception, into giving out information or performing an action. However, in order to 
manipulate an individual into disclosing information or to perform a certain action, the 
individual must (in most scenarios) first of all trust the Social Engineer. As mentioned earlier, 
the decision whether an individual will trust another individual, is influenced in the 
subconscious mind of the deceived, in a way that the deceived is not consciously aware of 
(Mann, 2008). 
In the early days before Information Technology and Telecommunication had taken a 
stable ground, employees of an organization would base their decision of trusting another 
individual on the way individuals introduced themselves. At a bank, for example, a customer 
would have to physically go to the bank and be identified when withdrawing money 
(Abagnale & Redding, 1980). To perform fraud, a Social Engineer had to control the body 
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language which includes posture and eye movements, as well as the voice. The Social 
Engineer also needed the skill to think rapidly and clearly (Mann, 2008). However, when 
telecommunication evolved and organizations such as banks adopted call-in-services, the 
customer could do his errands via telephone, thereby eliminating the need to have a 
trustworthy body language. To identify the customer, all that was needed was a little 
information about the customer and a code. To perform fraud this way, a Social Engineer 
could simply call the customer, pretending to be from the bank, and ask him for some 
information and the code, for whatever reason. The Social Engineer could then call the bank, 
pretending to be the customer, using the code and could then transfer money to an anonymous 
account (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
In this age of Information Technology, employees must make decisions whether someone 
is trustworthy, not only face-to-face or via the phone, but also electronically via the Internet 
(Denning, 1998). However, people would live a difficult life if they always had to mistrust 
others (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Social Engineers know this, and use the human nature of 
trust to deceive an organization’s employees or customers (Mann, 2008). However, when 
establishing trust, the Social Engineer uses some sort of method. As mentioned earlier, these 
methods include psychological techniques that exploit emotions as well as cognitive and 
cultural biases inherent in the victim.  
A Social Engineer who uses ‘psychological triggers’ to exploit emotions, influences the 
victim’s emotions whereas a Social Engineer who uses cognitive and cultural biases exploits 
mental shortcuts that the victim uses when making decisions (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). 
Nevertheless, Gupta & Sharman (2009) divide the emotions into being Negative, Positive or 
Neutral.  
Negative emotions precede unpleasant feelings in the victim and can provoke a fight or 
flight response, thus making the victim do what is possible to get liberated from the incident, 
which could involve breaking Policies and Procedures and disclosing sensitive information 
(Gupta & Sharman, 2009). In contrast to negative emotions, positive emotions are feelings 
that build a trusting relationship between the Social Engineer and the victim, making the 
victim more willing to comply with the Social Engineer’s requests (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). 
Neutral emotions can make the victim feel less accountable to incidents. The Social Engineer 
can make use of neutral emotions by making the victim believe that a specific incident is not 
the victim’s fault or exploiting a victim who is being irresponsible in the organization (Gupta 
& Sharman, 2009). 
As mentioned earlier, the other way a Social Engineer can exploit a victim, is by 
influencing the victim’s Cognitive and Cultural Biases. These biases are, as mentioned earlier, 
mental shortcuts that people use when making decisions in uncertain situations (Gupta & 
Sharman, 2009). These mental shortcuts are also called heuristics or rules of thumb (Cialdini, 
2001). In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and 
systematic errors. However, people cannot function without their heuristics as their lives 
would be too difficult if everything that was perceived, said, and done first had to be thought 
through (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As mentioned earlier, people would live a difficult life 
if they always had to distrust others (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Psychologist Robert Cialdini 
(2001) explains this with the following statement: 
 
“We can’t be expected to recognize and analyze all the aspects in each person, event, and 
situation we encounter in even one day. We haven’t the time, energy, or capacity for it. 
Instead, we must very often use our stereotypes, our rules of thumb, to classify things 
according to a few key features and then to respond mindlessly when one or another of these 
trigger features is present.”  
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This statement leads to the concept of probability which resembles the subjective 
assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
explain probability with how an individual perceives the distance of an object: "The distance 
of an object is determined in part by its clarity, the more sharply the object is seen the closer 
it appears to be." This is one example on how systematic errors are caused in the human 
mind. Distances are often overestimated when visibility is poor because the contour of the 
object is blurred. In contrast, distances are often underestimated when visibility is good, 
because the object is seen sharply.  Thus, the reliance on clarity as an indication of distance 
leads to biases, or simply systematic errors. Therefore, a Social Engineer can exploit these 
types of biases and lead a victim into making a certain decision (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). 
However, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) also argue that prior-probability or, base-rate 
frequency also plays a big roll when an individual makes a decision. Should one have to 
choose between whether an individual is a farmer or librarian, the chances are bigger that the 
individual is a farmer, since there are more farmers than librarians in this world. Therefore, 
the base-rate frequency is based on odds.  
The frequency (odds) and the probability that a threat might exploit some vulnerability 
can, therefore, be based on the victim’s own belief. If, for example, an individual walks inside 
a building, and asks an employee if he can have his password, the probability that the 
individual is a threat (from the employee’s point of view) is then based on what the employee 
perceives. What the employee perceives is (as mentioned earlier) based upon how the 
employee has been influenced by the individual, who could be a Social Engineer. 
To protect an organization’s information, countermeasures, or controls are (as mentioned 
earlier) needed in the organization. However, when it concerns guarding towards Social 
Engineering the focus should be at implementing Policies and Practices as well as educating 
all people in the organization. Therefore, to prevent a Social Engineer’s attack to succeed, a 
holistic solution is (as mentioned earlier) needed.  
The aim of this paper is (as mentioned earlier) to develop a solution in the form of a 
flowchart which employees can use to help from falling victim to a potential Social 
Engineering attack. However, to know when to use this flowchart, the employees of an 
organization must first of all be able to recognize a potential attack. Therefore, it is critical 
that the employees are educated on the techniques a Social Engineer makes use of. 
 
3.1 Social Engineering Techniques 
 
A Social Engineer exploits (as mentioned earlier) Emotions or Cognitive and Cultural 
Biases inherent in the victim. However, there are many techniques associated with these 
exploits. Therefore, these techniques, partly identified by Gupta and Sharman (2009), will 
now be defined. 
 
3.1.1 Exploiting Neutral Emotions 
 
Carelessness: The Social Engineer takes advantage of the victim's lack of vigilance 
(Gupta & Sharman, 2009). For example, by looking for passwords written down and left 
out in the open, or that are thrown away (dumpster diving) (Lively Jr, 2004). 
 
Diffusion of Responsibility: When the victim is made to believe that an incident is, or will 
not be, the victim's fault. In an organization, it is easy for end users to believe that security 
is not their responsibility, since there are individuals in the organization who are assigned 
specific information security posts (Gragg, 2003). 
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3.1.2 Exploiting Negative Emotions 
 
Overloading: By overloading a victim with new information before previous information 
has been processed can reduce the victim’s ability to think an argument through (Gragg, 
2003). 
 
Urgency: During an emergency, employees often bypass Policies and Procedures, which 
gives the Social Engineer an excellent opportunity to get otherwise almost impossible 
requests approved (Mann, 2008). 
 
Fear: For example, the Social Engineer pretends to be an important visitor or a close 
friend to the CEO of the victim’s company and threatens the victim that the incident will 
be reported to the CEO if the Social Engineer’s demands are not met (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002). 
 
Scarcity: When something is believed to only be available for a short time. For example, a 
Social Engineer sends emails claiming that the first 500 people to register at a Web site 
will win a prize. The Web site would simply have a field where users provide their 
company email address and a password for the site. Since many employees use the same 
password on different systems, the Social Engineer can, if lucky, get access to these 
employee’s email-accounts (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
 
3.1.3 Exploiting Positive Emotions 
 
Reciprocation: This is based on the social rule that if someone does (or promises to do) 
someone a favor, then something is expected in return. Cialdini (2001) explains this 
through the following behavioral experiments. If two people are in disagreement, and one 
person yields on some point, the other person will feel compelled to yield as well. A 
Social Engineer can use the Reciprocation technique to trigger a positive emotional state 
by making two requests to a victim. After arguing for a while the Social Engineer would 
simply yield to one of the requests and then, the victim will feel compelled to yield to the 
other request (Gragg, 2003).  
 
Building Trust: Building a trusting relationship could take time and is done by being in 
contact with the same person regularly. Mitnick and Simon (2002) describe a case where a 
Social Engineer called a video-store, requesting the name and number for the manager, as 
well as the number to the video-store’s headquarters, ostensibly to thank them both for the 
good service experienced in the store. After retrieving the name and numbers, the Social 
Engineer called the headquarters, pretending to be the manager asking for a small favor. 
This was repeated many times over a period of a month. With this method, the Social 
Engineer had by then built up a relationship with the headquarters and could start 
requesting bigger favors. In this case, the bigger favor was a customer’s credit-card 
number, which the headquarters gladly gave the Social Engineer. 
 
Similarity: People like other people they believe are similar to themselves (Mann, 2008). 
If the victim shares the same thoughts or has the same interests and goals in life as the 
Social Engineer, the victim can get a positive feeling and thereby easier approve a 
proposed request (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
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Helpfulness: People generally want to help other people (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
Therefore the Helpfulness technique can trigger a positive emotional state when the victim 
feels motivated to help the Social Engineer (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). 
  
Integrity: Employees have a strong tendency to carry out the commitments that they 
believe were made by their fellow employees. If, for example, a Social Engineer gets hold 
of a vacation schedule, he could claim that an employee, currently on vacation, had 
promised the Social Engineer something. The victim can then feel committed to carry out 
the request (Gragg, 2003). 
 
Legitimacy: The Social Engineer makes the victim believe that the source, or the Social 
Engineer, is credible or legitimate (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). Mitnick & Simon (2002) 
relate a story about a Social Engineer who registered a Web site with the name "paypal-
secure.com" and sent out legitimate looking emails to people who were Paypal users (a 
service where users can pay other users over the Internet) claiming that the users’ credit-
card information must be updated. When a user attempted to update the credentials on the 
Web site (believing it was a legitimate Paypal-site), all the information was redirected to 
the Social Engineer. This type of scam is often called ‘Phising’. 
 
Authority: According to Cialdini (2001), people have a tendency to comply when a 
request is made by a person in authority. For example, a Social Engineer could pretend to 
be a CEO or a friend to the CEO. 
 
Conformity: If the victim believes that a request has previously been approved by other 
fellow employees, this makes the victim feel less responsible as the responsibility is 
extended to the other fellow employees (Lively Jr, 2004). 
  
Curiosity: Tempting the victim with a desire to know or see something (Gupta & 
Sharman, 2009). For example, sending a message to a victim, with a worm attached, that 
offers something enticing, such as confidential information or free pornography. When the 
victim opens the attachment, the worm will spread over the network, retrieving and then 
sending all desirable information to the Social Engineer (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
 
3.1.4 Exploiting Either Positive or Negative Emotions 
 
Strong Affect: Triggers a heightened emotional state making the victim feel a strong sense 
of surprise, anticipation or anger (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). For instance, proposing a 
lottery-win could trigger positive emotions while frightening an employee that his job is 
on the line could trigger negative emotions. Therefore, strong affect can exploit either 
positive or negative emotions (Gragg, 2003).  
 
Namedropping: Influences the victim to believe that the Social Engineer knows 
somebody the victim knows, by mentioning that person’s name (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
Therefore, as individuals can feel both negative and positive feelings towards another 
individual, namedropping can exploit both positive and negative emotions. 
 
Flattery: The Social Engineer makes the victim feel special (Abagnale & Redding, 1980). 
Dorf (1999) argues that if a person is being flattered, that person will have two possible 
reactions. The person will either think that the flatterer is lying and therefore experience 
bad, negative feelings towards the flatterer.  Alternatively the individual will accept the 
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flattering remark and believe everything the flatterer says, and consequently feel good, 
positive feelings towards the flatterer. Therefore, flattery can exploit both negative as well 
as positive emotions. 
 
3.1.5 Exploiting Cognitive and Cultural Biases 
 
Anchoring: For example, The Social Engineer asks directly for a password, and if denied, 
he asks what kind of system is being run. Once the more extreme request is established as 
a baseline, the less extreme case will seem more reasonable (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). 
 
Representativeness: When stories contain details, they seem more believable. This 
phenomenon is called Representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, a 
Social Engineer may phone a victim, while pretending to be an administrator, and tell the 
victim that he is calling from the server room and sees strange activity on the network, and 
therefore needs the victim's password. Because the Social Engineer uses details like 
location, reason etc., the victim would be more likely to believe the Social Engineer, than 
if he only claimed that the password was needed (Gupta & Sharman, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, if any of the techniques are recognized, the employee should be extra 
suspicious. Thus, when an employee gets a request from an individual, and the request does 
not seem correct, the flowchart in Figure 1 should be followed. 
 
4. THE SOCIAL ENGINEERING FLOWCHART 
 
The Social Engineering Flowchart (Figure 1), deduced from all prior information gathered 
in this research, was (as mentioned earlier) created to help employees ‘do the right thing’ by 
giving some guidance on how the user should act when faced with a potential Social 
Engineering attack. Therefore, this section will focus on explaining the sequence of the Social 
Engineering Flowchart in detail. However, it is assumed that the necessary Technology and 
proper Policies and Procedures are already in place.  
First of all, an individual will make some sort of request to a user in the organization. This 
can be some kind of favor or a query for some Information, etc. At this point, it must be 
concluded whether the individual is Internal or External to the organization. This is important 
so that it can be determined what kind of Information the individual can access. According to 
Whittman and Mattord (2009), Information should be classified as Confidential, Internal or 
External.  
Information that is intended to remain within the organization and is only to be viewed by 
individuals with authorized access can be classified as Internal Information (Dulaney, 2009). 
Such individuals include: corporate employees, authorized contractors, and other third parties 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009). These individuals are, therefore, Internal Individuals. 
 Information that has been approved by management for public release can be classified as 
External Information (Whitman & Mattord, 2009). Therefore, an External Individual is 
allowed to view any Information classified as External Information.  
Access to Confidential Information must be strictly controlled on a need-to-know basis, 
even within the company. Therefore, Confidential Information is only to be viewed by 
approved Internal staff (Whitman & Mattord, 2009). However, if the individual is Internal, a 
procedure for identifying the individual must be conducted by the user (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002). This identification procedure depends on what type of medium the individual is using. 
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When being Face-to-Face with the individual, the individual should be queried to show 
some type of identification. This identification should include a picture of the individual 
(Lively Jr, 2004).  
If the individual is using a phone, it must be verified that the displayed phone-number 
matches the identity of the caller. Additionally, some type of code should be used. This code 
can be either a daily code (code that is different depending on what type of day it is) or a 
personal code that is specific for each employee (Mitnick & Simon, 2002).  
Figure 1: Social Engineering Flowchart 
 
In the case of the individual using e-mail, it should be requested that the individual 
digitally signs the email with a certificate which provides proof that the email is originating 
from the correct person (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
Then, if the individual claimed to be Internal and cannot be identified as being Internal, 
the incident should be reported and the request should not be proceeded with (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002). Nevertheless, if the individual is identified as Internal, his details must be 
logged. This is also the case for External individuals. 
External individuals should (as mentioned earlier) not have access to Confidential or 
Internal information. If this type of information is requested, the individual should be reported 
to security authorities and the user should not proceed with the request. However, if an 
individual identified as Internal requests Internal information, it can be handed over to the 
individual, but if Confidential Information is requested, the owner of the information should 
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be queried as all such Information should have an owner assigned to it (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002). The owner must approve whether the requested Information can be handed over to the  
individual or not. If the Information Owner has not given his approval, the incident should be 
reported to security and the request should not be proceeded with (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
However, if the Information Owner has given his approval or the individual is not asking for 
any Information, the next question (can request harm the organization?) can be considered.  
If a request can harm the organization, that request should not be proceeded with (Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2009). However, in many cases it can be hard to determine if something 
can do harm or not. Therefore, in the case of uncertainty, the manager should be queried for 
advice as the wrong decision could make the organization come to a standstill (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002).   
The next consideration to determine is if any Policies or Procedures will be broken by 
proceeding with the request as Policies and Procedures should always be followed (Whitman 
& Mattord, 2009). Therefore, if any of these will be broken the request should not be 
proceeded with and the individual should also be reported to the security department. 
However, if an Internal individual has a valid reason to omit or change something written in a 
policy, the owner of the policy, or responsible person should be queried for advice.  
There are endless amounts of Policies and Procedures that can defend against Social 
Engineering and it would be impossible to list them all. It is important though that the end-
users are taught how to protect themselves. For more information on these, the book The Art 
of Deception by Mitnick and Simon (2002) can be referred to. 
Lastly, if a request seems to be an attack on the organization, the individual should, as in 
the other cases, be reported to security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002) and the request should not be 
proceeded with.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper explained the problem associated with Social Engineering. Social Engineering 
is a major threat nowadays as the human element is often neglected as part of securing an 
organization. People working in an organization are, therefore, very vulnerable to socially 
malicious attacks. However, if the right security measures are implemented correctly, this 
vulnerability can be reduced significantly. One of these security measures should include 
educating employees. There are several campaigns and awareness programs that have been 
raised to educate people. However, when a real attack actually occurs, it is often difficult for 
users to remember how to behave (Mann, 2008). Therefore, this paper proposed a solution in 
the form of a step-by-step flowchart that employees can follow to identify, mitigate or even 
prevent a potential attack. However, the flowchart has not been tested extensively in practice. 
Therefore, the authors of this paper propose future research in testing and improving the 
flowchart. 
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Abstract. Everyday people rush to the Internet in search of free information, to participate 
in social networking or make use of commercial opportunities etc, but at the same time 
most of them are totally unaware of the many dangers that are associated with these 
activities. Criminals and individuals with bad intensions run havoc on the Internet and 
defraud many people in many ways. Therefore, it is important that individuals learn to 
protect themselves when active in cyber-space, or when dealing with cyber-related 
technologies. Education can indeed play a critical role in this regard and can help prevent 
users from falling prey to any such malicious attacks. The objective of this paper is to 
propose some solution towards educating users regarding cyber-related services in order 
to become more aware of the associated risks and to learn to protect themselves more 
effectively. The educational principle proposed in this paper is based on the theory of how 
the human immune system educates itself after falling victim to a foreign microorganism. 
This principle is also utilised in preparing vaccines for various ailments. Similarly, ‘fake’ 
cyber-related attacks may be used to identify vulnerable users and then to educate them 
accordingly. Thus, the intension of this paper is to contribute towards a Social Engineering 
Resistant User Model (SERUM) that could “vaccinate” users against similar real-life 
attacks. 
Keywords: Information Security, Social Engineering, Phishing, Education, Training, 
Awareness 
 
1. Introduction 
As people rush to the Internet in search of free information, to participate in social 
networking or to have the opportunity of doing business online, they are mostly unaware of 
the associated dangers and consequently their insecure actions are making it easier for 
criminals with malicious intent. Phishing scams, malicious email attachments and other 
such social engineering attacks have increased tremendously in recent times and the lack 
of proper education and knowhow regarding these aspects can have devastating effects 
on any organization or individual (Symantec 2010).  
 
Many researches and security companies have conducted various social engineering tests 
in order to evaluate countermeasures or to measure a company´s resistance to social 
engineering (Dodge et al. 2007; Hasle et al. 2005). Indeed, most researchers agree that 
education, training and awareness are the primary responses or countermeasures to 
social engineering attacks (Mann 2008; Biegelman 2009; Twitchell 2009; Jansson & von 
Solms 2010).  
 
Therefore, due to the fact that education can prevent many users from falling prey to such 
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attacks, this paper proposes a solution. This solution is based on the idea of how the 
human immune system educates itself after having fallen victim to a foreign 
microorganism. This microorganism could be anything ranging from a dangerous flu virus 
to a harmless vaccine (WHO 2005).  
 
Vaccines typically provide the immune system with harmless copies of an antigen: a 
portion of the surface of a bacterium or virus (WHO 2005). Therefore, a vaccine could be 
thought of as a ‘fake’ attack on the immune system, with the intention of preventing an 
attack in future. This principle may be used when educating people about various 
information security related aspects. Thus, it is proposed that a ‘fake’ attack be conducted 
in order to identify vulnerable users and then these users have to be educated accordingly.  
 
Consequently, this paper´s intention is to contribute towards devising a Social Engineering 
Resistant User Model (SERUM) by applying the principles of a vaccine and its effect on 
the human immune system. 
2. The human immune system 
People are often vulnerable to quite a variety of dangerous microorganisms, or microbes, 
including biological viruses, bacteria etc. The mission of these dangerous microbes is to 
infect cells within a human body which they can utilize to replicate themselves, and 
ultimately annihilating the body in which they reside (Cummings 2006). In order to counter 
this, the human body has an immune system. The immune system exists because it 
makes most people resistant to dangerous microbes that would normally, without the 
immune system, make most people sick, or even kill some (WHO 2005). However, if one 
were never infected, the immune system would not be able to ‘teach’ itself and, 
consequently, recognize a potentially more dangerous attack in future.  
 
To recognize an attack, the immune system distinguishes the body’s own (self) cells and 
microbes from other (foreign) cells and microbes. All cells and microbes wear a “uniform” 
made up of molecules that cover their surfaces. Each human cell displays distinctive 
marker molecules unique to the body. Foreign microbes display different marker molecules 
unique to them. The immune system uses these markers to distinguish among the cells 
that are part of the body, harmless bacteria that reside inside the body, and harmful 
invading microbes that need to be destroyed. The molecules on a microbe that identify it 
as foreign and stimulate the immune system to attack it are called “antigens” (National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 2008a).  
 
When an antigen is encountered, the immune system destroys the microbe ‘wearing’ the 
antigen. This work is carried out by an army of various specialized cells, each designed, or 
‘educated’, to fight disease in a particular way. One of these specialized cells includes 
white blood cells called macrophages (literally, “big eaters”). The macrophage’s job is to 
engulf as many of the microbes as it can (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases 2008a). Macrophages digest most parts of the microbes but save the antigens 
and ‘notify’ other cells, such as specialized defensive white blood cells called lymphocytes, 
so these can recognize and destroy the dangerous microbes more rapidly (National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 2008a). 
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When the immune system eliminates the dangerous microbes faster than they can 
reproduce, the immune system finally gains the upper hand. Gradually, the disease 
disappears from the body. After the body eliminates the disease, some immune system 
cells are converted into memory cells (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
2008a). The memory cell’s mission is to remember previous encounters with the same 
antigen, allowing a more rapid, massive response to a future exposure (Cummings 2006). 
However, before a dangerous microbe is able to actually infect the body, it must first of all 
enter the body (Cullen 2009).  
3. An infectious analogy 
Biological viruses, bacteria etc. can infiltrate the human body by residing in the food one 
eats, by being concealed in the air one breathes or, by residing within the people one 
meets (Cullen 2009). This may relate directly to computer viruses.  
 
A computer virus could get into a computer by its food (physical storage media including: 
USB flash disks and CD-ROMs.), by the air (Internet or a network of computers) or through 
uneducated people who touch a hand infected with viruses and later rubbing their eyes 
(extracting an attached zip file and opening an infected EXE attachment inside that zip 
file).  
 
When it concerns computer viruses and other malicious code, many solutions exist for the 
food (physical storage media) and air (Internet). These include antivirus/phishing software 
and firewalls, respectively (Whitman & Mattord 2008). However, the decision whether to 
shake a hand and rub the eyes (open an infected file within a compressed file), depends 
on an individual himself, and his awareness of the threat.  
 
A medical doctor, for instance, must follow certain guidelines in order to avoid getting 
infected by his patients. A doctor may wash his hands with disinfectants, which could kill 
bacteria and some viruses on his hands (Lages et al. 2008). Likewise an antivirus software 
program may delete a computer virus before it gets into the system of a computer 
(Whitman & Mattord 2008). 
 
A doctor may also use a facemask or respirator mask to prevent some air-borne bacteria 
and viruses to enter his body (Health and Human Services 2006).  Likewise, a firewall or 
intrusion prevention system could prevent malicious code to spread to a computer via the 
Internet (Whitman & Mattord 2008).  
 
The former countermeasures are not one hundred percent reliable, but they minimize the 
risk of getting infected. Since many doctors consult infected patients in person, they have 
to be educated about the guidelines they have to follow to reduce the probability of 
contracting an infection from their patients. Likewise, the probability of an infected 
computer file being opened depends on how educated a user is (Jansson & von Solms 
2010).  
 
The body’s immune system learns (as mentioned earlier) from previous encounters with 
dangerous microbes (Cummings 2006). Likewise a user may learn from previous 
encounters with a malicious computer virus or a fraudulent email message. However, such 
malicious encounters could, like some biological microbes, have a disastrous effect on the 
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user. But, for many biological viruses, or other dangerous microbes, there exists a holistic 
solution which may eliminate any disastrous effect. Additionally, this solution is also 
independent from the method it uses to enter the human body. Whether the microbe 
enters via food, air or direct contact with other people, a ‘vaccine’ may prevent it from 
doing any harm (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 2008b). 
4. Towards a SERUM 
A vaccine is a weakened, often harmless antigen, taken orally or by injection, that 
provokes a primary immune response to a particular disease and the production of 
memory cells (WHO 2005). In other words, a vaccine tricks the immune system into 
teaching the body important lessons about how to defeat its opponents (National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 2008b). Likewise, a social engineering ‘vaccine’ may 
teach individuals important lessons about how to ‘defeat’ malicious emails. It is therefore 
proposed that: 
 The individual should be exposed to ‘fake’ attacks in order to (like the immune 
system) educate the individual regarding which emails  are malicious or socially 
engineered (dangerous microbes). In other words, to distinguish dangerous 
(foreign) from safe (self). 
 Similar to memory cells, the learning skills will improve with continuous exposure to 
the same malicious or ‘fake’ email.  
 
For example, if a user is attacked by an email with a ‘fake’ computer virus attached and 
the user believes this is a real virus, the probability (from the user’s point of view) that 
viruses can appear in this user’s inbox could thereby be influenced by the raised frequency 
of ‘email viruses’. Thus, like the human immune system, the user may recognize the fake 
attack as foreign, ‘destroy’ it (delete the email message), remember it, and, consequently, 
be more cautious towards other similar email messages in future. However, if the user 
does not believe the attachment is a virus, and opens it, his future behaviour may also be 
influenced. As mentioned earlier, this may be countered by educating the user.  
 
When the user opens a ‘fake’ malicious email attachment or responds with sensitive 
information, an automated educational component could instantly notify the user about 
his/her insecure behaviour. Additionally, the educational component could involve some 
awareness about the type of attack that the ‘incorrectly behaving’ user has been exposed 
to. This component can also require the user to complete a short evaluation. Thus, like a 
vaccine, it teaches the user important lessons in order to prevent or mitigate a future 
attack.  
 
To encourage correct behaviour, the reinforcement theory coined by psychologist B.F. 
Skinner (Skinner 1954), could be utilized. The reinforcement theory argues that learning 
results from the association between behaviours and rewards. Positive reinforcement 
occurs when behaviour is followed by a reward, which increases the probability that the 
desired behaviour will be repeated. Stajkovic and Luthans (Stajkovic & Luthans 2001) 
compared the effects of various rewards and found that simple recognition or feedback 
(knowledge of the results of one´s actions) can be effective in encouraging desired 
behaviour. 
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Therefore, after an attack has occurred, ‘correct’ behaviour may be encouraged by giving 
positive feedback to users that have detected or ignored the attack, regardless of whether 
the attack was fake or real. However, the feedback should be given after the user has 
logged in on the email system, checked his/her mail and logged out again. Otherwise it 
may be difficult to measure whether the user has ignored the email. 
5. Developing the serum 
To continuously measure, evaluate and improve users’ resistance to social engineering, 
the model in Figure 1 has been developed. The model works as follows: 
 
First of all, a user is attacked. The user either behaves incorrectly (responds with sensitive 
information or opens an unexpected attachment etc.) or the user behaves correctly 
(ignores and/or deletes the ‘fraudulent’ message). The user’s behavior is then stored in a 
database. When the user behaves incorrectly and is, therefore, in the left SER zone (NOT 
Social Engineering Resistant), he will be notified about his behavior and then be educated, 
and, evaluated. In contrast, when the user behaves correctly, and is, therefore, in the right 
SER zone (Social Engineering Resistant) he is notified about his behavior as well as 
getting some reward.  
 
Figure 1: Social Engineering Resistant User Model (SERUM) 
 
 
To verify whether this model will have any effect on the user’s behavior, it will be 
developed into a software implementation and tested by means of an experiment at a 
higher education institution. The idea is as follows: 
 
The subjects (all users on the institution´s email system) will receive an email that entices 
them to respond incorrectly with information (phishing) or opening an exe attachment. 
Information regarding the action of the subject who responds will be stored in a database. 
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Only a username or email address will be stored, and no other personal information will be 
collected.  
 
The subjects who respond will then receive another email, making them aware of their 
insecure behavior and providing related educational information as well as some 
evaluation. The cycle (sending a fake email and determining whether a user responds) will 
then start over again to see whether the individual subjects have learnt to act more 
securely regarding potential Social engineering attacks, scams and malicious code via 
emails. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Organizational communities need to be educated on how to handle emails in a secure 
manner and avoid falling prey to email scams and phishing attempts. Many security 
companies have conducted various social engineering tests in order to find vulnerable 
companies and users. These tests include sending fake emails to users within a company 
to determine whether the company is vulnerable. However, the methods researched do 
not involve any automated educational component that educates vulnerable users on 
demand (Dodge et al. 2007; Hasle et al. 2005). Therefore, since the success of a social 
engineering attack depends on the target’s education, training or awareness (Biegelman 
2009; Twitchell 2009; Jansson & von Solms 2010; Mann 2008), an educational component 
may also be necessary to cultivate social engineering resistant behaviour. Therefore, this 
study aims to devise a model where organizational users of email will be educated and 
occasionally 'tested' to process emails, whether official or personal, in a safe and secure 
manner. This model will build on the principles of how a vaccine educates the human 
immune system. Thus, a vaccine stimulates the body's immune system (WHO 2005), 
similar to how a ‘fake’ email attack may stimulate a victim receiving it. 
 
When a real social engineering email attack actually occurs, previous simulations may 
have influenced users to behave correctly and, consequently, make them delete and/or 
ignore malicious emails in future.  
 
Additionally, this idea may have the following benefits: 
 The security of the system of an organization may be enhanced significantly as users 
may stop opening suspicious email attachments or they may stop responding to 
criminals’ requests to divulge sensitive information. 
 The solution may also contribute towards cultivating an overall information security 
culture, as users may become more aware of Information Security in General. 
 Also, by being able to spot vulnerable users, the idea of education on-demand may 
reduce costs of training employees. 
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Abstract—Many organizations are very vulnerable to 
malicious emails. To protect end users from such, this paper 
discusses how a simulation exercise can be successfully 
conducted to educate vulnerable users on-demand. By 
simulating malicious emails and ‘catch’ vulnerable users, the 
organization may reduce costs and time regarding mitigating 
the weakest link—the human being.  
Malcicous Emails; Phishing Awareness; Education On-
Demand 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Many criminals are currently using the Internet to 
distribute malicious emails [1]. To protect end users from such 
malicious emails, many countermeasures have been developed. 
Such countermeasures include; antivirus software, spam filters, 
policies etc. However, these are not hundred percent reliable 
since many fraudulent messages are ‘disguised’ to avoid 
detection [2]. Additionally, just because a policy exists, does 
not mean that the users follow such policy [3].  
Security education, training and awareness programs have 
proved to be the most successful regarding protecting end users 
against malicious attacks [1], [4], [5]. However, most current 
approaches concerning educating users in this regard fail 
because many users do not pay adequate attention to the 
training material [6-8]. One reason for this may be that the 
users believe that they are already familiar with the material 
[8]. On the other hand, many users are actually less vulnerable 
since they are aware of such attacks. Therefore, spending 
resources on training these ‘aware’ users would be pointless. 
Likewise, if all the users, including ‘aware users’ spend several 
minutes a day learning how to protect themselves, the cost in 
terms of ‘user time’ would often be greater than the resultant 
cost of such an attack [9]. 
In order to train users about malicious attacks in a cost-
effective manner and to have the users paying adequate 
attention to the training material, this paper presents an 
approach generally referred to as; education on-demand [10], 
[11].   
By simulating malicious emails through the organization’s 
email system and applying the general principles of education 
on-demand, it may be possible to train end users effectively 
regarding malicious emails. Thus, when an end user opens a 
simulated email and reacts in a ‘wrong’ manner (e.g. responds 
with his/her password), the user will be notified of the 
inappropriate action taken and related education material can 
be offered to user. From here the principle of education on-
demand [10], [11].   
The objective of this paper is to provide an organization 
some guidelines on how to conduct such a simulated malicious 
email exercise that educates vulnerable users on-demand. This 
objective will be achieved by firstly, conducting a literature 
survey to identify some general principles for simulating 
malicious emails. Secondly, by presenting some information 
regarding lessons learnt from the process of developing such an 
exercise. Finally, by demonstrating how such a simulation 
exercise can be conducted. 
II. BACKROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Background 
 
Malicious emails can take many forms. In the early days, 
such emails usually contained a malicious program that erased 
files on a computer or displayed a silly message [12]. However, 
nowadays such malicious emails have become much more 
sophisticated [13].  
Today, a malicious email might contain a program that 
encrypt all files on the computer and demand a ransom. More 
commonly, though, such a program will not cause any 
noticeable damage or announce their presence at all. Most 
victims are not even aware that their computer has been 
infected [13].  
For example, a malicious program, attached to an email, 
might ‘silently’ install a keystroke logger. The keystroke logger 
waits until the victim visits a banking website and then records 
the victim´s account details and password. These credentials 
are then forwarded to the creator of the keystroke logger via the 
Internet [13]. Consequently, the creator may then use the stolen 
credentials to plunder the victim’s bank account. Furthermore, 
once the malicious program has done its job, it may also delete 
itself to avoid detection [13]. 
Several times, a malicious email does not contain any 
attachments. Instead the email requests the user to go to a 
webpage and provide ‘sensitive’ information [14]. Such 
sensitive information could include the user’s bank details or 
password to some online service [14]. Needless to say, if a 
criminal obtains such details, some serious harm could be done 
to the user. An email that has the intention to ‘harvest’ 
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sensitive information is frequently referred to as ‘phishing’ 
[14].   
To entice the user into responding to a ‘phishing request’ or 
into executing a malicious program, the email usually contains 
some deceptive message [14]. The aim of this message is to 
influence the user into ‘go ahead’ with the request [15]. Using 
deception to influence an individual into performing an action 
or divulging sensitive information may be referred to as ‘social 
engineering’ [1]. 
There are many social engineering techniques, frequently 
used by criminals to obtain sensitive information. For more 
information regarding social engineering techniques, please 
refer to Twitchell [16] or Jansson & von Solms [15]. The next 
section discusses related work to this paper. 
B. Related Work 
Several researchers have conducted exercises that simulate 
malicious emails [4], [5], [17-20]. Dodge, Carver and Ferguson 
[4] conducted several exercises on the United States Military 
Academy (USMA) in order to evaluate the success of their 
awareness programs. These exercises involved sending 
simulated phishing emails, including ‘phishing messages’, to 
4118 students and record their resultant actions. Kumaraguru et 
al. [6] sent 515 volunteers a series of 3 legitimate and 7 
simulated phishing emails over the course of 28 days and 
trained these subjects with an automated training component 
called ‘PhishGuru’. Likewise, Jansson and von Solms 
“unpublished” [21] conducted an exercise based on some 
aspects of a model, called the Social Engineering Resistant 
User Model (SERUM) [22], to measure and improve users’ 
resistance to phishing. This exercise involved sending 
simulated malicious emails to 25579 subjects. The reacting 
users where requested to attend an online awareness program. 
The exercise was conducted in two cycles in order to conclude 
whether sending simulated malicious emails is effective in 
training users regarding malicious emails, including phishing 
attacks. This latter exercise is the only one that included 
suitable ‘automated’ education following a ‘successful’ email 
‘attack’ while all subjects were unaware of the attack. 
The principles of how to successfully conduct an exercise 
to simulate malicious emails, as advocated in this paper, build 
on SERUM, previous exercises and lessons learnt from the 
recent exercise conducted by the authors of this paper. 
III. PRINCIPLES FOR SIMULATING MALICIOUS EMAILS 
There are many principles that must be followed regarding 
conducting an exercise that simulates malicious emails. The 
authors have divided these principles into two stages: The 
development of a software implementation of SERUM to 
conduct the exercise and the actual exercise. 
A. Principles of a SERUM Software Implementation  
To successfully conduct an exercise that simulates 
malicious emails to educate vulnerable users on-demand, a 
software implementation of the SERUM needs to be developed 
and tested first. There are some important principles regarding 
the development of such a software implementation. Based on 
related research, the following principles were identified. 
 
1) Before Developing a SERUM Software Implementation 
 
Before a SERUM software implementation is developed it 
is important to clearly define the objective of the exercise that 
the software implementation will be used on [4]. After the 
objective has been clearly defined, follows the process of 
applying for ethical clearance. Since an exercise that simulates 
malicious emails involves deceiving people, it is essential that 
ethical clearance is obtained from the institution [5]. 
 
2) During Development of a SERUM Software 
Implementation 
 
There are some principles that must be considered during 
the development of the software implementation. Firstly, the 
simulated email message should be designed such that each 
subject either discloses or does not disclose sensitive 
information [17]. Secondly, when the subject reacts to a 
simulated malicious email, the subject should be alerted about 
the exercise [5]. Thirdly, the simulated email must be enticing 
and request the subject to proceed with an ‘inappropriate’ 
action [4]. Fourthly, in order to maintain privacy, it must be 
ensured that no user data will be collected or disclosed if a 
subject reacts [4]. Finally, security staff should not be referred 
to in the simulated emails as this may compromise the trust 
between the users and the security staff [4]. 
3) Test Running the SERUM Software Implementation 
 
It is important to test the software implementation to ensure 
that everything is working correctly [5]. For example, it must 
be ensured that the simulated emails reach the subjects' inboxes 
and that ‘anti-phishing tools’ in the web-browsers do not 
identify the ‘scam’ [5]. Addtionally, it is important to query the 
subjects of the test run whether they find the simulated emails 
enticing [4]. 
 
B. Principles of an Exercise to Simulate Malicious Emails 
Based on related research, the following principles were 
identified regarding conducting an exercise that simulates 
malicious emails. 
1) Before Conducting the Exercise 
 
Before the exercise is conducted, it is important to adhere 
to some general principles. Firstly, it must be ensured that the 
subjects are a random and a representative part of the 
population [17]. Secondly, the total number of subjects must be 
recorded [17]. Thirdly, it is essential to not disclose any 
information about the exercise to the subjects as this may result 
in distortion or invalidation of the test data [17]. Finally system 
administrators should be provided with a predetermined 
response to any inquires from participants [5]. This minimizes 
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the chance of the administrators distributing warnings about the 
simulated emails. 
2) During the Exercise  
 
There are also some general principles to consider during 
the exercise. Firstly, each subject should be exposed to the 
attack [17]. Secondly, the timing should be such that the test 
can accurately assess the defined objective [4]. Finally the 
privacy of the subjects should constantly be maintained [5]. 
3) After the Exercise 
 
When the exercise have ended it is important to adhere to 
the following principles: Firstly, the total number of active 
subjects should be recorded. Being active means that the user 
has read his/her email [17]. Secondly, all the subjects should be 
debriefed about the study and be provided with opportunities to 
give their feedback [5]. Finally, necessary statistics should be 
gathered and sensitive data should be erased [5]. 
 
IV. A SOFTWARE IMPLEMENATION FOR SIMULATING 
MALICIOUS EMAILS 
Following the principles provided above, a software 
implementation of SERUM was finally developed. The first 
version of the software implementation was called SERUMv1. 
A. Developing The SERUMv1 Software Implementation 
The SERUMv1 reflected all the principles and 
considerations from related research. The SERUMv1 first 
involved the following: 
 A web interface for sending emails with customized 
headers. By customizing the headers, the email could 
appear to be originating from any address. 
 Two types of emails, one requesting the user to 
disclose information and one that requests the user to 
open an attached file. 
 An SQL database that stores every action of each 
user. 
 A form field where users are enquired to disclose 
their username and password. The username is stored 
inside the SQL database. However, the password is 
not recorded. 
 An EXE file that records the username of the person 
that is logged in on the computer when clicking on 
the file. The username is stored inside the SQL 
database. 
 A notification email that would be sent to each user 
that reacts, involving some education and a hyperlink 
to confirm that the message have been read. 
B. Evaluating The SERUMv1 Software Implemenation 
The SERUMv1 was tested on a focus group consisting of a 
number of information security experts in order to find flaws 
within the SERUMv1. The following flaws/possible 
improvements were found: 
 The text inside the notification message was too long. 
 The email spam filter inside the Microsoft Outlook 
application was far more advanced than the spam 
filter for the ‘live@edu’ email system. 
 A user may wait a long time until he/she checks 
his/her email inbox and may, therefore, not associate 
the notification email message with the act of 
disclosing information or executing an attached file. 
 It is hard to determine whether a user actually reads 
the educational content. 
C. Fine-Tuning The SERUMv1 Software Implemenation 
Based on the former findings the following approaches 
were taken, respectively: 
 The educational content within the notification email 
was moved into an online web awareness program. 
This would make the notification email much shorter. 
 Users on the internal email system were ignored in 
the final exercise. 
 When a user opens the fake malicious attachment or 
discloses information in the web form, a red warning 
screen (Figure 3) would appear in addition to the 
notification email message. 
 An evaluation consisting of three multiple choice 
questions would be included after the online 
awareness program. 
 
After the changes were incorporated into the SERUMv1, 
the SERUMv1 was further tested until everything was working 
correctly. 
D. The SERUMv1 Sequence 
To explain how the SERUMv1 works, the ‘sequence’ of the 
SERUMv1 will now be demonstrated. 
First of all, the conductor of the experiment needs to 
distribute the simulated emails to the users [4]. The example 
below (Figure 1) illustrates the ‘web-form’ for sending emails. 
By customizing the ‘SMTP FROM EMAIL’ field, the email 
can appear to be originating from anywhere. 
Figure 2 illustrates the user receiving the simulated email. 
In this example, the user receives a message that entices the 
user to open an EXE file inside a ZIP file. The message claims 
to contain pictures of a ‘hot girl’. However, if the user executes 
the file inside the ZIP file, the user is presented with the screen 
in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 illustrates a red warning screen, notifying the user 
regarding his/her behavior. In addition to this warning screen, 
the user will receive a notification email. This notification 
email is illustrated in Figure 4.  
The notification email illustrated in Figure 4, notifies the 
user about his/her ‘incorrect behavior’ and rationalizes why it 
may be important to participate in the online awareness 
program. The user also has the option to withdraw from the 
study. Nevertheless, if the user clicks the link to participate in 
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the awareness program, the user is redirected to the webpage 
illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 1: Form for Sending Simulated Malicious Emails 
 
 
 
Figure 2: User Receives Email 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Red Warning Screen 
The online malicious file attachment awareness program 
(illustrated in Figure 5) informs the user what malicious file 
attachments are, why it is important to be aware of such attacks 
and how the user can avoid falling prey to these attacks. To 
ensure that the user understands the risk associated with 
malicious attacks, the user is requested to be evaluated after 
reading through the content in the awareness program. The 
evaluation is illustrated in Figure 6. This ends the ‘sequence’ of 
the SERUMv1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Notification Email 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Malicious File Attachment Awareness Program 
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Figure 6: Malicious File Attachment Awareness Evaluation 
 
V. PREPARING FOR THE SERUMV1 EXERCISE 
 
The SERUMv1 software implementation was at this stage 
ready to be used to conduct the exercise. The exercise was 
going to be conducted during two cycles, consisting of one 
week for each cycle on all students at a university in South 
Africa. Each user (student) on the email system would receive 
an email that invites them to react incorrectly by responding 
with private information through a link to a website or opening 
an executable attachment. Comparing the individual behavior 
between the two cycles would conclude whether the individual 
users can in fact learn to act more securely regarding malicious 
emails. Subsequently, four different types of simulated 
malicious email attacks were crafted. Each of these types are 
discussed briefly. 
A. Database Crash 
 
The simulated Database Crash email claims that some 
database has crashed and, therefore, the user is requested to 
submit his/her username and password. This message uses the 
following social engineering techniques: 
 Urgency: The message requests the user to update 
his/her credentials “ASAP”. 
 Legitimacy: The message appears to originate 
from within the institution, since the institution’s 
email domain will be used. 
The user should doubt whether the message is valid 
because the message will request the user to update his/her 
‘sensitive’ credentials. 
B. Lottery Win 
 
This message requests the user to submit username and 
password in order to claim a ‘price’ (notice the misspelling). 
This message used the following social engineering techniques: 
 Legitimacy: The message appears to originate 
from within the institution, since the institution’s 
email domain will be used. 
 Strong Affect: The user may feel a strong sense of 
surprise. 
 Curiosity: The user may be tempted to witness 
what he/she has won. 
 
The user should doubt whether the message is valid 
because:  
 The message is addressed to every student inside 
the Faculty group. Everyone cannot be a winner. 
 The word ‘price’ is misspelled. 
 The message requests the user to update his/her 
‘sensitive’ credentials. 
C. Virus Scanner 
 
This message claims that the attached file vscan.exe will 
remove a dangerous virus. The message requests the user to 
open the ZIP file and launch the EXE file residing inside the 
ZIP file. This message uses the following social engineering 
techniques: 
 Fear: The user may fear that the virus that is 
detected may harm the user’s computer. 
 Legitimacy: The message appears to originate 
from within the institution, since the institution’s 
email domain is used. The message also refers to 
“COMPUTER MANAGEMENT”. 
The user should doubt whether the message is valid 
because the message claims that the virus is detected on the 
student's computer. However, the message will be sent to 
everyone inside a Faculty group. 
D. Pretty Girl 
 
This message claims that the attached file ’PrettyGirl.exe’ 
promises pictures of ‘hot’ girls. The message requests the user 
to open the ZIP file and launch the EXE file residing inside the 
ZIP file. The message uses the following social engineering 
techniques: 
 Curiosity: Many users may be enticed to open the 
attachment, as it promises pictures of ‘hot girls’. 
The user should doubt whether the message is valid for the 
following reasons: 
 The message was sent to every student inside a 
Faculty group. This should imply that the message 
is not meant as a ‘friendly’ personal message. 
 There is no name of the person who sent the 
message, only “A Friend” appears. The user 
should be aware that opening attached files from 
strangers is a risk to themselves and their 
organization. 
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Using these former messages, the exercise was finally 
conducted. The detailed findings and results of the exercise 
were published in Jansson & von Solms’ “unpublished” [21] 
paper Phishing for Phishing Awareness. The exercise was 
deemed successful and reflected all the principles identified in 
this paper. It was concluded that: Firstly, sending simulated 
malicious emails enhances the security of the system of an 
organization significantly as many users will refrain from 
opening susceptible email attachments or responding to 
criminals with sensitive information. Secondly, simulating 
malicious emails contributes towards cultivating an overall 
information security culture, as users become more aware of 
information security in general (in this case various phishing 
attacks). Thirdly, by being able to spot vulnerable users, the 
idea of “education on-demand” will reduce costs of training 
employees, as the education happens automatically and 
continuously. Finally, since the users can realize themselves 
that they are vulnerable, they choose themselves to be educated 
about the related attacks. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The amount of malicious emails has increased 
tremendously in recent times [23-25].  Additionally, there is a 
big increase in both the frequency and sophistication of such 
attacks on organizations [25]. Nowadays these attacks may 
even get into the production system of organization, 
subsequently, causing hazardous damages to the organization 
[25]. 
To contribute towards mitigating or prevent the success of 
malicious email attacks, this paper presented some information 
regarding lessons learnt from the development of an awareness 
exercise that was conducted recently. The exercise used the 
principles of education on-demand to educate vulnerable users.  
To educate vulnerable users, a software implementation of 
a model, called SERUM [22] was developed. The software 
implementation, called SERUMv1, simulates malicious emails 
and ‘catches’ the users that reacts to these emails. The reacting 
users are requested to ‘attend’ an online awareness program. 
Hence, the principle of education on-demand [10], [11].  
After the authors were satisfied with SERUMv1, this 
software implementation was used to conduct an exercise 
“unpublished” [21]. This exercise involved sending simulated 
malicious emails to 25579 subjects. The exercise was 
conducted in two cycles in order to conclude whether such an 
exercise is effective in training users regarding malicious 
emails, including phishing attacks. The detailed findings and 
results of the exercise are outside of the scope of this paper. 
However, the exercise was deemed successful and reflected all 
the principles identified in this paper. 
After the exercise it was concluded that distributing 
simulated malicious emails on the organization’s email system 
has minimal cost involved, continuously educates the most 
vulnerable users and can make users more aware of 
information security in general “unpublished” [21].  
The authors of this paper is adamant that the approach to 
test the awareness of end users with regard to simulated 
malicious emails, as discussed in this paper, can indeed be 
implemented in an organization. The principles of such an 
exercise are carefully encapsulated in SERUMv1, which 
should provide all the required ‘tools’ to an organization to run 
such an exercise. 
REFERENCES 
[1]  I. Mann, Hacking the human: social engineering techniques and 
security countermeasures. Gower Publishing, Ltd., 2008. 
[2]  H. Drucker, D. Wu, and V. N. Vapnik, “Support vector machines for 
spam categorization,” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL 
NETWORKS, vol. 10, no. 5, p. 1048--1054, 1999. 
[3]  S. H. von Solms and R. von Solms, Information Security Governance. 
New York: Springer, 2008. 
[4]  J. Dodge, C. Carver, and A. J. Ferguson, “Phishing for user security 
awareness,” Computers & Security, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 73-80, Feb. 
2007. 
[5]  P. Kumaraguru et al., “School of phish: a real-world evaluation of 
anti-phishing training,” in Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security, New York, NY, USA, 2009, pp. 3:1–
3:12. 
[6]  M. Wu, R. C. Miller, and S. L. Garfinkel, “Do security toolbars 
actually prevent phishing attacks?,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
conference on Human Factors in computing systems, New York, NY, 
USA, 2006, pp. 601–610. 
[7]  S. Egelman, L. F. Cranor, and J. Hong, “You’ve been warned: an 
empirical study of the effectiveness of web browser phishing 
warnings,” in Proceeding of the twenty-sixth annual SIGCHI 
conference on Human factors in computing systems, New York, NY, 
USA, 2008, pp. 1065–1074. 
[8]  S. Furnell, “Why users cannot use security,” Computers & Security, 
vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 274-279, Jun. 2005. 
[9]  C. Herley, “So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational 
rejection of security advice by users,” in Proceedings of the 2009 
workshop on New security paradigms workshop, New York, NY, 
USA, 2009, pp. 133–144. 
[10]  D. Bargeron, J. Grudin, A. Gupta, E. Sanocki, F. Li, and S. 
Leetiernan, “Asynchronous Collaboration Around Multimedia 
Applied to On-Demand Education,” Journal of Management 
Information Systems, vol. 18, pp. 117–145, Mar. 2002. 
[11]  J. A. Gordon and J. Pawlowski, “Education On-demand: The 
Development of a Simulator-based Medical Education Service,” 
Academic Medicine, vol. 77, no. 7, 2002. 
[12]  E. Spafford, Computer viruses and ethics. West Lafayette  Ind.: 
Computer Sciences Dep.  Purdue Univ., 1991. 
[13]  Sophos, “Threatsaurus the a-z of computer and data security threats.” 
Sophos Group, 2009. 
[14]  M. Aburrous, M. A. Hossain, D. Keshav, and T. Fadi, “Intelligent 
phishing detection system for e-banking using fuzzy data mining,” 
Expert systems with applications., vol. 37, no. 12, p. 7913, 2010. 
[15]  K. Jansson and R. von Solms, “Social Engineering: Towards a 
Holistic Solution,” in Proceedings of the South African Information 
Security Multi-Conference (SAISMC 2010), 2010. 
[16]  D. Twitchell, “Social Engineering and Its Countermeasures,” in 
Handbook of Research on Social and Organizational Liabilities in 
Information Security, M. Gupta and R. Sharman, Eds. Hershey, 
Pennsylvania: IGI Global, 2009, pp. 228-242. 
[17]  H. Hasle, Y. Kristiansen, K. Kintel, and E. Snekkenes, “Measuring 
resistance to social engineering,” in Information security practice and 
experience : first international conference, ISPEC 2005, Singapore, 
April 11-14, 2005 : proceedings, Berlin ;;New York  NY, 2005, pp. 
132-143. 
[18]  T. N. Jagatic, N. A. Johnson, M. Jakobsson, and F. Menczer, “Social 
phishing,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 50, pp. 94–100, Oct-
2007. 
 142 
 
[19]  A. J. Ferguson, “Fostering E-Mail Security Awareness: The West 
Point Carronade,” EDUCAUSE Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 54-57, 
2005. 
[20]  T. Steyn, H. Kruger, and L. Drevin, “Identity Theft — Empirical 
evidence from a Phishing Exercise,” in New Approaches for Security, 
Privacy and Trust in Complex Environments, vol. 232, Springer 
Boston, 2007, pp. 193-203. 
[21]  K. Jansson and R. von Solms, “Phishing for Phishing Awareness,” 
Unpublished, 2011. 
[22]  K. Jansson and R. von Solms, “Towards A Social Engineering 
Resistant User Model,” in 13th Annual Conference on WWW 
Applications, Johannesburg, 2011. 
[23]  Symantec, Symantec Intelligence Quarterly: Global Report (July - 
September 2010). Symantec Corporation, 2010. 
[24]  Symantec, “Symantec Report Shows No Slowdown in Cyber Attacks 
| Symantec,” May-2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.symantec.com/business/resources/articles/article.jsp?aid=
20100527_report_shows_no_slowdown_in_cyber_attacks. [Accessed: 
31-Aug-2010]. 
[25]  Symantec, Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportTrends for 2010. 
Symantec Corporation, 2011. 
 
 
 143 
 
Appendix B 
The following journal (Jansson & von Solms, 2011) article resulted from this dissertation and 
was published in the journal Behaviour and Information Technology. 
 Jansson, K., & von Solms, R. (2011). Phishing for phishing awareness. Behaviour & 
Information Technology, 1-10. doi:10.1080/0144929X.2011.632650 
o This paper presents the results of a phishing exercise that was conducted at the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
This article is attached as appendix B1. 
 
Appendix B1 
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Abstract 
By using various social-engineering techniques, criminals can run havoc on the Internet, and 
defraud many people in a number of different ways. This puts various organizational communities 
at risk. Therefore, it is important that people within such communities should learn how to protect 
themselves when active in cyberspace, or when dealing with cyber-related technologies. Training 
can indeed play a big role in this regard; and it can consequently, assist by altering the insecure 
behaviour of many people. The objective of this paper is to ascertain whether simulating phishing 
attacks, together with embedded training, can contribute towards cultivating users´ resistance to 
‘phishing attacks’. In order to achieve this objective, a phishing exercise at an institution in South 
Africa was conducted.  
 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Many criminals are currently focusing on attacking users; they do this by using deceptive 
techniques (social engineering) to carry out electronic fraud (Symantec 2010a). A number of 
authors refer to this as phishing (Mann 2008; Aburrous et al. 2010; Dodge et al. 2007; Kumaraguru 
et al. 2009; Jagatic et al. 2007; Aaron 2010).  
The Oxford English Dictionary (2009) defines phishing as: “The fraudulent practice of sending 
emails purporting to be from reputable companies, in order to induce individuals to reveal personal 
information, such as passwords and credit card numbers, online.” Thus, phishing electronically 
deceives a user into conforming to some action; and subsequently, divulging sensitive information.  
Phishing attacks have increased tremendously in recent times, and the lack of awareness regarding 
such attacks can have devastating effects on any organization or individual (Symantec 2010b). 
Consequently, it is important that the right phishing countermeasures are implemented. Indeed, 
most researchers and information security specialists agree that the key countermeasure to mitigate 
or prevent phishing attacks is security training (Dodge et al. 2007; Kumaraguru et al. 2009; Jagatic 
et al. 2007; Jansson & von Solms 2010).  
Kumaraguru et al. (2009) have evaluated the effects of simulating phishing attacks, together with 
‘embedded’ training on volunteering users.  The authors of this paper have used this approach in 
order to conduct an exercise to evaluate whether simulating phishing attacks, together with 
embedded training, can indeed contribute towards cultivating users’ resistance to phishing attacks. 
Thus, in this research, no volunteers were involved. The exercise was named ‘the SERUM 
exercise’, since it was partly based on some aspects of a model, called the Social Engineering 
Resistant User Model, with the same acronym (Jansson & von Solms, 2011). 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section discusses related work, 
including previous phishing exercises. Then, some general principles for conducting phishing 
exercises have been identified and defined. These principles were then reflected in the research 
methodology used in the exercise. Finally, the findings and the results of the evaluation are 
presented; and the paper concludes with some benefits and drawbacks, as well as a few future 
research suggestions. 
 
2.  Related work 
There are many studies and suggested solutions on how to protect the users of the Internet from 
phishing attacks.  
One technical solution is to use anti-phishing security toolbars. These connect to a database or list, 
where known phishing websites are blacklisted. Examples include: Websense, McAfee’s anti–
phishing filter, Netcraft anti-phishing system and Microsoft Phishing Filter (Aburrous et al. 2010).   
Shahriar and Zulkernine (2011) developed and implemented a technical approach in the form of a 
tool named PhishTester – to automate the process of testing whether a website is a phishing website 
or a legitimate website.  
Although technical tools can protect the user from falling prey to phishing attacks to a certain 
extent, it is important that the user should not become too reliant on technology. Thus, it is critical 
to combine the available technical tools with the appropriate phishing training (Kumaraguru et al. 
2010). 
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There are many training solutions on how to teach a user to avoid falling prey to phishing attacks. 
Jansson and von Solms (2010) developed a flowchart which employees can follow, to identify, 
mitigate or even prevent social engineering (including phishing) attacks. Srikwan and Jakobsson 
(2008) used cartoons to convey phishing awareness. Sheng et al. (2007) described the design and 
evaluation of ‘Anti-Phishing Phil’, an online game that teaches users good habits to help them avoid 
phishing attacks. 
Solutions, such as those discussed, may sometimes be sufficient in mitigating phishing attacks. 
However, to be ensured that this is the case, it is essential that the resistance to phishing attacks and 
its related countermeasures are enhanced (Jakobsson et al. 2008). 
 
2.1 Simulating Phishing Attacks to Measure Phishing Resistance 
Several researchers have used security exercises that simulate real phishing attempts – in order to 
evaluate the awareness levels of their subjects, as well as their countermeasures (Hasle et al. 2005; 
Dodge et al. 2007; Jagatic et al. 2007; Ferguson 2005; Steyn et al. 2007; Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz 
2006).  
Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz (2006) presented a set of techniques for ethical and safe contractions of 
experiments – in order to measure the success rate of a real phishing attack. They have disclosed the 
results of a number of experiments that adopted this set of techniques. Hasle, Yngve, Kristiansen, 
Kintel and Snekkenes (2005) developed a social engineering metric, called Social Engineering 
Resistance (SER), to evaluate the resistance to social engineering in an organization. In addition, 
they also conducted an e-mail exercise that involved simulating phishing attacks on 120 subjects, 
and then they measured their resistance.  
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Jagatic et al. (2007) studied the vulnerability of a university community to a phishing attack that 
purports to come from somebody in their own social network. Dodge, Carver and Ferguson (2007) 
conducted a number of exercises over a couple of years on the United States Military Academy 
(USMA) – in order to evaluate the success of their awareness programs.  
 
2.2 Simulating Phishing Attacks with Embedded Training 
Wash (2010) has modelled how users make security-decisions. Wash (2010) argues that in order for 
a user to ward off a threat, the user must first be exposed to that threat. Kumaraguru et al. (2010) 
argue that a user can learn how to ward off phishing attacks if the user pays adequate attention to 
the learning material. 
Kumaraguru et al. (2009) have studied the principles of simulating phishing attacks, together with 
embedded training on volunteers. Their ‘embedded’ training system teaches users to avoid falling 
prey to phishing attacks. To do this, the system sends simulated phishing e-mails to the users and 
then records their actions.  
Users who react ‘insecurely’ receive a ‘training message’ when falling for the attack. Each 
simulated phishing e-mail acts, not only as a mechanism to deliver training, but also as a test to 
determine whether the user has learned how to distinguish legitimate messages from phishing 
messages. Consequently, one will identify and present training interventions only to those users 
who continue to fall for simulated phishing attacks. This principle is similar to what is often 
referred to as ‘education on demand’ (Gordon & Pawlowski 2002). 
Kumaraguru et al. (2009) sent 515 volunteers a series of 3 legitimate and 7 simulated phishing e-
mails over the course of 28 days; and they had trained these subjects with the embedded training 
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system. Results of this study show that users trained with the embedded training system retain 
knowledge even after 28 days. Additionally, adding a second training message to reinforce the 
original training decreases the likelihood of people giving information to phishing websites.  
Their results also show that training does not decrease users’ willingness to click on links in 
legitimate messages; and furthermore, most of the participants enjoyed receiving training during 
their normal use of e-mail. 
The authors of this paper have used the principles of a phishing ‘embedded’ training system, as 
proposed by Kumaraguru et al. (2009), to conduct a phishing exercise to conclude whether users’ 
phishing resistance can be cultivated through simulating phishing attacks, together with embedded 
training. It must be noted that the study by Kumaraguru et al. (2009) involved only volunteers, and 
that the exercise in this paper involved no volunteers. Thus, the subjects had no knowledge of any 
research exercise in advance. Additionally, the geographical location for the research in this paper is 
different from that of Kumaraguru et al. (2009), as this study was conducted in South Africa. 
 
3. Principles of the SERUM Exercise 
There are many principles to be considered when conducting phishing exercises. Based on related 
research, the following principles were identified and followed with regard to the SERUM exercise: 
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3.1 Before Designing the Exercise 
Before the exercise was designed, the objective of the exercise was clearly defined (Dodge et al. 
2007). Additionally, ethical clearance was obtained from the institution, as it is essential that 
phishing studies obtain ethical clearance (Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz 2006; Kumaraguru et al. 2009). 
 
3.2 Before Conducting the Exercise 
Before conducting the real exercise, the exercise was ‘tested’ on a focus group. The reason for this 
was to ensure that the simulated phishing e-mails had passed through spam filters, and that ‘anti-
phishing tools’ in the web-browsers had not identified the ‘phishing scam’ (Kumaraguru et al. 
2009). 
The test population was recorded as 25 579 subjects (Hasle et al. 2005), and the timing of the 
exercise was such that the test could accurately assess the defined objective (Dodge et al. 2007). 
Thus, the exercise was conducted towards the end of the year, to allow all the subjects the necessary 
time to familiarise themselves with the e-mail system in use.  
No information on the research exercise was disclosed to any subjects in advance, as this might well 
have resulted in distortion or invalidation of the test data (Hasle et al. 2005). Furthermore, system 
administrators were alerted in regard to the exercise, and were provided with a predetermined 
response, which they could use to respond to any enquiries from the subjects. This minimized the 
chance of the administrators distributing warnings on the simulated phishing e-mails (Kumaraguru 
et al. 2009). 
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3.3 During the Exercise 
During the exercise, each subject was exposed to a phishing attack (Hasle et al. 2005), and they (the 
subjects) were provided with an e-mail message they were invited to open. However, if they had 
read the message carefully, they should have realised that it was not valid (Dodge et al. 2007). To 
make the subjects aware of their 'insecure' behaviour, they received both immediate notification and 
delayed notification – after such behaviour (Dodge et al. 2007). 
Users’ user-ids and e-mail addresses were collected and stored to cross-reference data between the 
two cycles and to gather statistics. These were also compared with the e-mail-system’s log to ensure 
that they were valid. Although the subjects were requested to divulge their password in a form field, 
no passwords or other sensitive information were collected and/or stored (Kumaraguru et al. 2009).  
The outcome of an attack was either disclosure of sensitive data (user’s name, e-mail address with a 
related password) or no disclosure of sensitive data (Hasle et al. 2005). Although the passwords 
were not verified, users’ user-ids and e-mail addresses were considered to be sensitive data, since 
these could be sold on the black market and used for sending spam (Symantec 2010a).  
The institution’s computer security staff were not referred to in any e-mail message, since this 
might compromise the trust between them and the subjects (Dodge et al. 2007). Furthermore, the 
subjects were not allowed to access the link in a message, or to open an attachment outside the 
institution. This minimized the chances that personal information would be leaked outside the 
institution (Dodge et al. 2007).  
152 
 
3.4 After the exercise 
After the exercise, logs were examined in order to find the number of active users (an active user is 
one who has read his/her e-mail) (Hasle et al. 2005). Additionally, all private data were deleted after 
the exercise, in order to maintain privacy (Kumaraguru et al. 2009). 
A week after the exercise, a general e-mail was distributed to all the subjects, making them aware of 
the exercise, and providing them with the contact details for any questions or for feedback 
(Kumaraguru et al. 2009). 
The next section describes the methodology utilized during the SERUM exercise. 
 
4. Methodology 
Using the principles described in the previous section for conducting the phishing exercise, a 
software implementation developed. The software implementation was tested on a small focus 
group – in order to find any possible flaws within the software implementation. For example, it was 
found that it is difficult to determine whether a user has actually read through the content of the 
associated awareness program. Therefore, an evaluation component consisting of three multiple-
choice questions was included in the online training program.  
After testing the prototype carefully, the formal phishing exercise was conducted. The exercise 
methodology is illustrated in Figure 1.  
The total number of users on the e-mail system was found to be 25 579. These users belonged to 
one of seven faculty groups. Although faculty group 2 may have consisted of more ‘computer- 
comfortable’ users than other faculty groups, this group also involved other departments which 
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were not related to information technology. Therefore, it is very difficult to have sound data on 
which group has the most ‘computer-comfortable’ users in this study. 
The type of simulated phishing attack a user received depended on the faculty group where the user 
was registered, as well as the week when the phishing attack was distributed. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, there were, in total, four different types of phishing attacks.  
For example, users registered in Faculty 1 received a ‘Lottery-Win’ message (Figure 3) for both 
week one and week two. However, users within Faculty 7 received a ‘Database Crash’ message 
(Figure 2) in week one and a ‘PrettyGirl’ message (Figure 5) in week two. This method was 
integrated – to conclude whether the simulated phishing attack together with embedded training was 
effective in training users on the different types of phishing attacks.  
The different types of phishing attacks are discussed in the following subsections. 
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Figure 1: SERUM Exercise Methodology 
 
4.1 Database Crash  
The Database Crash e-mail (illustrated in Figure 2) claimed that some database had crashed, and 
therefore, the user was requested to submit his/her username and password. This message used the 
following social engineering techniques (Twitchell 2009): 
 Urgency: The message requested the user to update his/her credentials “ASAP”. 
 Legitimacy: The message appeared to originate from within the institution, since the 
institution’s e-mail domain was used. 
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Figure 2: Database Crash 
 
The user should have doubted the validity of this message since the message requested the user to 
update his/her credentials. This is one of the most common methods ‘phishers’ use to gain sensitive 
information (Mann 2008).  
 
4.2 Lottery Win  
This message (illustrated in Figure 3) requested the user to submit his/her username and password, 
in order to claim a ‘price’ (notice the misspelling). This message used the following social 
engineering techniques (Twitchell 2009): 
 Legitimacy: The message appeared to originate from within the institution, since the 
institution’s e-mail domain was used. 
 Strong Affect: The user may have felt a strong sense of surprise. 
 Curiosity: The user may have been tempted to witness what he/she had won. 
 
156 
 
 
Figure 3: Lottery Win 
 
The user should have doubted whether the validity of the message for the following reasons: 
1. The message was sent to every student inside the faculty group. Thus, the ‘to address’ was 
Faculty@domain.com and not user@domain.com; 
2. The word ‘price’ was misspelt; 
3. The message was not addressed to any particular individual. 
 
4.3 Virus Scanner 
This message (illustrated in Figure 4) claimed that the attached file vscan.exe would remove a 
dangerous virus. The message requested the user to open the ZIP file and launch the .exe file 
residing inside the ZIP file. This message used the following social engineering techniques 
(Twitchell 2009): 
 
 Fear: The user may have feared that the virus that was detected could harm the user’s 
computer. 
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 Legitimacy: The message appeared to originate from within the institution, since the 
institution’s e-mail domain was used. The message also refers to “COMPUTER 
MANAGEMENT”. 
 
 
Figure 4: Virus Scan 
 
The user should have doubted whether the validity of the message for the following reasons: 
1. The message was sent to every student inside a Faculty group. Thus, the ‘to address’ was 
Faculty@domain.com and not user@domain.com.  
2. Installing software (including anti-virus software) should be done by computer-staff only.  
 
4.4 PrettyGirl  
This message (illustrated in Figure 5) claimed that the attached file’ PrettyGirl.exe’ promised 
pictures of ‘hot’ girls. This message used the following social engineering technique (Twitchell 
2009): 
 Curiosity: Many users would have been enticed into opening the attachment, as it promised 
pictures of ‘hot girls’. 
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Figure 5: PrettyGirl 
 
The user should have doubted whether the message was valid for the following reasons: 
1. The message was sent to every student inside a Faculty group. Thus, the ‘to address’ was 
Faculty@domain.com and not user@domain.com.  
2. No name regarding the sender of the message was included in the message. Only, “A 
Friend” appeared. 
 
5. Sequence of the SERUM exercise 
The sequence of the SERUM exercise is illustrated in Figure 6. The exercise was conducted in two 
cycles over a period of two weeks, as follows: Each user on the e-mail system received an e-mail 
that invited him/her to react insecurely – by responding with private information through a link to a 
website, or opening an exe attachment. The ‘phishing website’ or the exe attachment recorded the 
users who reacted ‘insecurely’. 
159 
 
These users then received ‘embedded training’ in the form of a red warning screen, alerting them of 
their ‘insecure’ behaviour, as well as another e-mail message, making them aware of their 
‘insecure’ behaviour. This message also provided a hyperlink to the online training program, giving 
the user the option to participate in this program. After reading through the content in the online 
training program, the user also had the option to be evaluated by responding to a number of short 
questions.  
Users who reacted insecurely did not receive any notification; neither was their behaviour recorded. 
However by comparing the e-mail log of each week with the exercise log of each week, it was 
possible to extract the users who had logged in on the e-mail system during each week, but had not 
reacted to the simulated phishing attack.  This concluded whether a user actually ignored (or did not 
notice) the phishing attack. Consequently, it was possible to deduce whether a user had behaved 
‘securely’, or not. 
Comparing the individual user behaviours between the two cycles made it possible to conclude 
whether the individual users had learnt to act more securely to phishing attacks in the second cycle. 
Subsequently, this concluded whether the users’ phishing resistance could be cultivated by 
simulating phishing attacks together with embedded training. 
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Figure 6: SERUM exercise Flowchart 
 
6. Findings and results 
The following sub-sections include the findings and results of the research exercise. 
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6.1. Week One 
A total of 9 273 (36.25% of all the users) checked their e-mails during week one (active users). A 
total of 1 304 users reacted incorrectly, while 165 of the reacting users took part in the awareness 
program. Additionally, 108 of the reacting users evaluated themselves after the awareness program. 
Thus, 14.06% of all the users who had logged in during week one reacted; 12.65% of these users 
took part in the awareness program; and from these users 65.4% evaluated themselves. In addition, 
PrettyGirl was the most enticing e-mail message during this week (Figure 3). It may also be argued 
that 7 969 users ignored the e-mail, as these were active on the e-mail system, but did not react to 
the attack. 
 
 
Figure 7: Reactions of active users per phishing type in week one 
 
 
 
19.26% 
9.07% 8.78% 
11.91% 
PrettyGirl Virus Scan DB Crash Lotto
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6.2. Week Two 
In week two, 8 231 (32.18% of all the users) checked their e-mails (Active Users). A total of 664 
users reacted, while 62 of these users took part in the awareness program. Additionally, 35 users 
evaluated themselves afterwards. Thus, 8.06% of all the users who had logged in during week two 
reacted; 9.3% of these users took part in the awareness program; and from these users, 56.4% 
evaluated themselves. In addition, PrettyGirl was also the most enticing e-mail message sent during 
week two (Figure 4). It could also be argued that 7 567 users ignored the e-mail, as these were 
active on the e-mail system, but did not react to the attack. 
 
 
Figure 8: Reactions of active users per e-mail type in week two 
 
6.3. Discussion 
Based on the results, it may be concluded that the number of reactions decreased by 640 in week 
two (Figure 5). However, it must be noted that the number of active users was 1 042 less in week 
two than in week one. Therefore, based on the difference between the active users during the two 
weeks, it may be concluded that there were 42.63% less reactions in week two.  
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Figure 9: Number of user reactions in week one and week two 
 
A group of 976 users reacting in week one failed to react in week two. However, these users were 
logged in (active) on their e-mail during week two. This implies that 976 users (11,85%) learnt from 
the first attack in week one, since they had logged in on the e-mail system during both week one 
and week two, but did not react in week two. Out of these 976 users, 129 users participated in the 
awareness program, and 80 of these users evaluated themselves. Thus, it may be assumed that 
13.21% of the users had learnt from the awareness program, while 8.19% of the users had probably 
learnt by evaluating themselves. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, Faculties 5, 6 and 7 received a different simulated phishing message in 
the second cycle (week two) compared with the first cycle (week one). Since a total of 201 users in 
these faculties ‘learnt’ from the exercise (Figure 10), this implies that simulating phishing attacks, 
together with embedded training, can indeed be effective in mitigating different types of phishing 
attacks. 
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Figure 10: Number of users that have learnt per faculty (in total 976 users had learnt) 
 
From the data and findings discussed above, it may reasonably be concluded that users can learn 
and positively adapt their e-mail behaviour – as a result of simulated phishing exercises – together 
with the necessary embedded training provided. Therefore, it may be deduced that simulating 
phishing attacks, together with embedded training, can indeed contribute to cultivating users’ 
resistance to phishing attacks. 
 
7. Conclusion 
With the huge increase in the number of phishing attacks on the Internet (Symantec 2010b), it is 
essential that users learn how to protect themselves in cyberspace. This paper has evaluated whether 
simulating phishing attacks, together with embedded learning, can contribute to cultivating users’ 
resistance to phishing attacks. To do this, such an exercise was conducted on the e-mail system of 
an institution in South Africa. 
Based on the exercise, it may be concluded that a simulated phishing attack, together with the 
embedded training can contribute towards cultivating users’ phishing resistance, as this approach 
reduces the user’s risk of becoming a victim to any future phishing attack.  This can be concluded 
107 
190 
35 
443 
56 
116 
29 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7Faculty 
165 
 
because many users reacted ‘insecurely’ in the first week, but after receiving the embedded training 
in the form of a warning screen, notification email, and the option to participate in the online 
training program, several of these users reacted ‘securely’ in the second week.  
It must also be noted that the reactions were 42.63% less in the second week. One contributing 
factor to this drop in reactions may have been because the users influenced each other and; thus, 
they ‘spread the word’ that simulated phishing attacks were being distributed on the e-mail-system. 
This could have made many users more vigilant. 
There were also some other interesting findings. For instance, a user is most likely to fall victim to 
an enticing 'pornographic scam'. Another interesting finding is that a user can learn to behave 
securely to phishing attacks that are different in nature. For example, some users were exposed to a 
request to divulge sensitive information in week one, and then exposed to a malicious exe 
attachment in week two. Since some of these users reacted in the first week, but did not react in the 
second week, it was possible to conclude that a user can learn to behave securely to different 
phishing attacks. 
 
7.1 Benefits and Drawbacks 
Because of the findings in this paper, it may be concluded that simulating phishing attacks, together 
with embedded training, can provide the following benefits for the organization. Firstly, the security 
of the system of an organization can be enhanced, as many users may refrain from opening 
suspicious-looking e-mail attachments, or from responding to criminals with sensitive information. 
Secondly, by being able to spot vulnerable users, the idea of “education on demand” can reduce the 
costs of training employees, as the education takes place automatically and continuously. Finally, 
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since the users come to acknowledge to themselves that they are vulnerable, they may often choose 
to be trained regarding related attacks.  
Although there can be many benefits with simulating phishing attacks with embedded training, it 
must be noted that there may be some drawbacks. For instance, a user may develop ‘too much 
resistance’ and ignore important ‘non-fraudulent’ requests, since the user may believe that these are 
fraudulent. For this reason, it is important that an organization conduct a phishing exercise with 
caution; and that in designing a simulated phishing attack, it should be rendered as realistic as 
possible. 
 
8. Future Research 
Researchers are urged to conduct further research, based on simulating phishing attacks, together 
with embedded training; in particular, whether giving feedback to users, after behaving securely to a 
phishing attack, can contribute to making users more resistant to future phishing attacks. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to measure whether a user deletes a phishing e-mail or not. 
Additionally, research on other mediums, such as mobile messaging, could result in valuable 
findings. 
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